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Date Code 
8/16/2013 NCOC 
APER 
COMP 
SMIS 
8/20/2013 AFSV 
8/22/2013 MODQ 
APER 
8/28/2013 AFFD 
ORDQ 
DISA 
CHJG 
8/29/2013 ORDR 
CHJG 
9/9/2013 MOTN 
APER 
'9/20/2013 MOTN 
NOHG 
HRSC 
NOHG 
First Judicial District Court - Bonner County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2013-0001342 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
City of Sandpoint vs. Independent Highway District 
District 
User 
JACKSON New Case Filed - Other Claims 
JACKSON Plaintiff: City of Sandpoint Appearance Scot R. 
Campbell 
User: HUMRICH 
Judge 
Barbara A Buchanan 
Barbara A. Buchanan 
JACKSON Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not Barbara A Buchanan 
listed in categories B-H, or the other A listings 
below Paid by: City of Sandpoint (plaintiff) 
Receipt number: 0495386 Dated: 8/16/2013 
Amount: $.00 (Cash) For: City of Sandpoint 
(plaintiff) 
JACKSON Complaint and Request for Declaratory and Barbara A Buchanan 
Injunctive Relief 
JACKSON Summons Issued - Original in file Barbara A. Buchanan 
HENDRICKSO Affidavit Of Service - incomplete Barbara A Buchanan 
contacted Attorney Campbell re: needing an 
amended affidavit of service, service date was 
not entered on this document 
left voice mail 8-23-2013 11 Opm 
HENDRICKSO Motion to Oisquality without Cause- Judge Barbara A Buchanan 
Buchanan 
HENDRICKSO Defendant: Independent Highway District John T. Mitchell 
Appearance David E Wynkoop 
HENDRICKSO Amended Affidavit of Service - Julie Bishop Barbara A. Buchanan 
accepted service for Independent Highway Dist 
8-19-13 
OPPELT Disqualification - Judge Buchanan Barbara A. Buchanan 
OPPELT Disqualification Of Judge - Automatic - Judge Barbara A. Buchanan 
Buchanan 
OPPELT Change Assigned Judge District Court Clerks 
OPPELT Order of Reassignment Lansing Haynes 
OPPELT Change Assigned Judge John T. Mitchell 
HENDRICKSO Motion to Dismiss John T. Mitchell 
HENDRICKSO Defendant: Independent Highway District John T. Mitchell 
Appearance Susan P. Weeks 
HENDRICKSO Defendant's Motion for Enlargement of Time to John T. Mitchell 
File Brief 
HENDRICKSO Notice of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
re: Defendant's Motion for Enlargement of Time 
to FIie Brief 
HENDRICKSO Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/23/2013 02:00 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Defendant's Motion for Enlargement of Time 
to File Brief 
Kootenai County Courthouse 
HENDRICKSO Notice of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
re: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
Date: 6/19/2015 First Judicial District Court - Bonner County User: HUMRICH 
Time: 09: M ROA Report 
Page 2 of Case: CV-2013-0001342 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
of Sandpoint vs. Independent Highway District 
of vs. District 
Date Code User Judge 
9/26/2013 HRSC HENDRICKSO Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss John T. Mitchell 
11/13/2013 04:00 PM) Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss 
Kootenai County 
9i30/2013 APER HENDRiCKSO Piaintiff: City of Sandpoint Appearance C. John T. Mitchell 
Matthew Andersen 
NOTC HENDRICKSO Notice of Association -Attorney C. Matthew John T. Mitchell 
Andersen for Plaintiff 
10/11/2013 BREF HENDRICKSO Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss John T. Mitchell 
10/17/2013 FIOC OPPELT File Out of County - Judge Mitchell John T. Mitchell 
10/22/2013 MISC HENDRICKSO Plaintiffs No Objection to Defendant's Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Enlargment of Time to File Brief 
10/23/2013 HRVC OPPELT Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
10/23/2013 02:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Defendant's Motion for Enlargement of Time to 
File Brief 
Kootenai County Courthouse - Per Judge 
Mitchell's Chambers 
HRSC OPPELT Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference John T. Mitchell 
11/13/2013 04:00 PM) In Kootenai County 
OPPELT Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
11/7/2013 RSPN HENDRICKSO Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to John T. Mitchell 
Dismiss 
AFFD HENDRICKSO Affidavit of Scot R. Campbell John T. Mitchell 
AFFD HENDRICKSO Affidavit of Shannon Syth John T. Mitchell 
11/8/2013 MOTN HENDRICKSO Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs Response John T. Mitchell 
Brief and Affidavits 
MOTN HENDRICKSO Motion to Shorten Time John T. Mitchell 
NOHG HENDRICKSO Notice of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
on Defendant's Motion to Strike and Motion to 
Shorten Time 
HRSC HENDRICKSO Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/13/2013 04:00 John T. Mitchell 
PM) 
11/12/2013 REPL HENDRICKSO Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to John T. Mitchell 
Dismiss 
·11/13/2013 MISC HENDRICKSO Plaintiffs Supplemental Citation to Authority John T. Mitchell 
RSPN HENDRICKSO Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to John T. Mitchell 
Strike Response Brief and Affidavits 
CTLG OPPELT Court Log- From Kootenai County John T. Mitchell 
DCHH OPPELT Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss scheduled John T. Mitchell 
on 11/13/2013 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Julie Foland 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
Kootenai 100 Pages 
Date: 6/19/2015 
Time: 09: M 
Page 3 of 
of 
'oate 
11/13/2013 
12/3/2013 
12/9/2013 
12/18/2013 
·3/3/2014 
3/4/2014 
5/7/2014 
5/8/2014 
5/14/2014 
5/15/2014 
5/19/2014 
VS. 
Code 
DCHH 
GRNT 
SCHE 
HRSC 
MEMO 
STIP 
ORDR 
CINF 
MOVA 
ORDR 
CONT 
HRSC 
NOHG 
HRSC 
MEMO 
MISC 
FIOC 
REPL 
First Judicial District Court Bonner County 
ROA Report 
User· HUMRICH 
Case: CV-2013-0001342 Current Judge: John T Mitchell 
of Sandpoint vs. Independent Highway District 
User 
OPPELT 
OPPELT 
OPPELT 
OPPELT 
District 
Hearing result for Scheduling Conference 
scheduled on 11/13/2013 04:00 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Julie Foland 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: In Kootenai County - Less Than 100 
Pages 
Judge 
John T. Mitchell 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
11/13/2013 04:00 PM: Motion Granted Motion 
to Shorten Time and Motion to Strike Portions of 
Plaintiffs Response Brief and Affidavits 
Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and John T. Mitchell 
Initial Pretrial Order 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial - 5 Days John T. Mitchell 
03/25/2014 09:00 AM) 
HENDRICKSO Memorandum Decision and Order Denying 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
John T. Mitchell 
OPPELT 
OPPELT 
KRAMES 
KRAMES 
OPPELT 
OPPELT 
OPPELT 
Stipulation for Reciprocal Preliminary Injunction John T. Mitchell 
Reciprocal Preliminary Injunction Order John T. Mitchell 
Faxed Reciprocal Preliminary Injunction Order, John T. Mitchell 
Stipulation for Reciprocal Preliminary Injunction 
and Scheduling Order to Judge Mitchell per 
request 
Stipulated Motion To Vacate Trial Date John T. Mitchell 
Order Vacating Trial Date John T. Mitchell 
Hearing result for Jury Trial - 5 Days scheduled John T. Mitchell 
on 03/25/2014 09:00 AM: Continued 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial - 5 Days John T. Mitchell 
10/28/2014 09:00 AM) 
HENDRICKSO Notice of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
re: Defenant's Motionfor Leave to File 
Interlocutory Appeal 
HENDRICKSO Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/21/2014 03:30 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Kootenai County 
Defendant's Motion for Leave to File Interlocutory 
Appeal 
HENDRICKSO Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to John T. Mitchell 
File Interlocutory Appeal (I.AR 12(a)) 
OPPELT City of Sand point's Response to Defendant's John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Leave to File Interlocutory Appeal 
OPPELT File Out Of County- Judge Mitchell John T. Mitchell 
HENDRICKSO Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
leave to File Interlocutory Appeal 
John T. Mitchell 
Date: 6/19/2015 
09:1 
Page 4 of 
City 
Date 
5/21/2014 
5/27/2014 
6/4/2014 
6/12/2014 
6/23/2014 
7/7/2014 
7/8/2014 
7/9/2014 
7/15/2014 
7/22/2014 
Code 
DCHH 
NOHG 
HRSC 
MOTN 
MEMO 
ORDR 
MOTN 
MEMO 
CINF 
AFFD 
AFFD 
AFFD 
MEMO 
MEMO 
REPL 
DCHH 
First Judicial District Court - Bonner County 
ROA Report 
User: HUMRICH 
Case: CV-2013-0001342 Current Judge: John T Mitchell 
of Sandpoint vs. Independent Highway District 
District 
User 
HENDRICKSO Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T Mitchell 
KRAMES 
KRAMES 
HENDRICKSO 
HENDRICKSO 
HENDRICKSO 
HUMRICH 
HUMRICH 
HUMRICH 
HENDRICKSO 
HENDRICKSO 
HENDRICKSO 
HENDRICKSO 
HUMRICH 
HENDRICKSO 
OPPELT 
05/21/2014 03:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Julie Foland 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Kootenai County 
Defendant's Motion for Leave to File Interlocutory 
Appeal 
Notice Of Hearing 
re: Pit's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary 
Judgment 07/22/2014 04:00 PM) Plaintiffs 
Motion 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
City of Sandpoint's Motion for Summary Judgmen1 John T. Mitchell 
[Oral Argument Requested] 
City of Sandpoint's Memorandum in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Summary Judgment 
Order Granting Rule 12 Interlocutory Appeal John T. Mitchell 
Certification 
Motion for Appeal by Permission and Stay of John T. Mitchell 
Proceedings - filed with ISC 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Appeal by John T. Mitchell 
Permission - filed with ISC 
Clerk Information - Still before ISC; have not John T. Mitchell 
made a decision on Motion yet 
Affidavit of Marj Tilley John T. Mitchell 
Second Affidavit of Marj Tilley 
Affidavit of Julie Bishop 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
Memorandum in Response to City of Sanpoint's John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
City of Sandpoint's Memorandum in Opposition to John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Appeal by Permission (filed with ISC) 
City of Sanpoint's Reply in Support of Summary John T. Mitchell 
Judgment 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
scheduled on 07/22/2014 04:00 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Julie Foland 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Plaintiffs Motion - Less Than 100 
Pages 
(To be held in Kootenai County) 
Date: 6/19/2015 First Judicial District Court - Bonner County User: HUMRICH 
Time: 09:1 ROA Report 
Page 5 of Case: CV-2013-0001342 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
City of Sandpoint vs. Independent Highway District 
of VS. District 
Date Code User 
7/22/2014 CMIN OPPELT Court Minutes John T. Mitchell 
Hearing type: Motion for Summary Judgment 
Hearing date: 7/22/2014 
Time: 4:01 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Julie Foland 
Minutes Clerk: Jeanne Clausen 
Tape Number: Kootenai Co. 
Susan Weeks 
Mr. Anderson for the plaintiff 
7/29/2014 ORDR HUMRICH Order Denying Motion for Appeal by Permission John T. Mitchell 
SCDF HUMRICH Supreme Court Document Filed- Order Denying John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Appeal by Permission 
7/31/2014 MEMO OPPELT Memorandum Decision and Order Granting John T. Mitchell 
Plaintiff City of Sandpoint's Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
ORDR OPPELT Order Granting Declaratory Relief John T. Mitchell 
MISC HENDRICKSO ******END OF FILE #1******BEGIN FILE #2****** John T. Mitchell 
8/13/2014 NOTC HENDRICKSO Notice of Presentment John T. Mitchell 
(without oral argument) 
MOTN HENDRICKSO City of Sandpoint's Motion for Award of Attorney's John T. Mitchell 
Fees and Costs 
MEMO HENDRICKSO City of Sandpoint's Memorandum in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Attorney's Fees anc Costs 
MEMO HENDRICKSO Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit of C. John T. Mitchell 
Matthew Andersen in Support of Attoney's Fees 
and Costs 
8/21/2014 ORDR CMOORE Order Granting Request for Attorney's Fees and John T. Mitchell 
Costs 
JDMT CMOORE Declaratory and Monetary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
8/22/2014 ORDR CMOORE Amended Order Granting Request for Attorney's John T. Mitchell 
Fees and Costs 
JDMT CMOORE Amended Declaratory and Monetary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
8/27/2014 MOTN HENDRICKSO Motion for Reconsideration John T. Mitchell 
OBJC HENDRICKSO Objection to Memorandum of Costs and Attorney John T. Mitchell 
Fees and Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney 
Fees 
AFFD HENDRICKSO Affidavit of Susan P. Weeks in Opposition to John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Attorney Fees 
MEMO HENDRiCKSO Memorandum in Support of Objection to John T. Mitchell 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees and 
Motin to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees 
8/28/2014 AFFD HENDRICKSO Affiavit of Brent Featherston John T. Mitchell 
Date: 6/19/2015 
Time: 09:1 
Page 6 of 8 
of 
Date 
9/4/2014 
9/8/2014 
9/9/2014 
9/15/2014 
9/18/2014 
9/19/2014 
9/23/2014 
9/25/2014 
10/7/2014 
10/8/2014 
10/17/2014 
Code 
BNDC 
APSC 
NOTA 
AFFD 
NOHG 
HRSC 
MISC 
REQU 
REQU 
SCDF 
CCOA 
ORDR 
HRVC 
FIOC 
RSPN 
SCDF 
CINF 
First Judicial District Court - Bonner County 
ROA Report 
User: HUMRICH 
Case: CV-2013-0001342 Current Judge: John T Mitchell 
City of Sandpoint vs. Independent Highway District 
User 
BRACKETT 
BRACKETT 
District 
Judge 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to John T. Mitchell 
Supreme Court Paid by: Weeks, Susan P. 
(attorney for Independent Highway District) 
Receipt number: 0014399 Dated: 9/4/2014 
Amount $129.00 (Check) For Independent 
Highway District (defendant) 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 14400 Dated 
9/4/2014 for 100.00) 
John T. Mitchell 
HUMRICH Appealed To The Supreme Court John T. Mitchell 
HUMRICH NOTICE OF APPEAL John T. Mitchell 
HENDRICKSO Affidavit of Douglas S. Marfice John T. Mitchell 
HENDRICKSO Notice of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
re: Plaintiffs Motion for Permanent Injunction and 
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs 
HENDRICKSO Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/23/2014 02:30 John T. Mitchell 
PM) to be heard in Kootenai County 
Plaintiffs Motion for Permanent Injunction and 
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs 
HUMRICH Clerk's Records due 11/19/2014 to ISC John T. Mitchell 
HENDRICKSO Request for Additional Record John T. Mitchell 
HUMRICH 
HUMRICH 
HUMRICH 
OPPELT 
OPPELT 
OPPELT 
Request for Additional Record (certified copy John T. Mitchell 
mailed to ISC 9/24/2014) 
Supreme Court Document Filed- "ORDER John T. Mitchell 
CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING APPEAL" 
Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal John T. Mitchell 
Order Vacating Trial John T. Mitchell 
Hearing result for Jury Trial - 5 Days scheduled John T. Mitchell 
on 10/28/2014 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
File Out Of County - Judge Mitchell John T. Mitchell 
HENDRICKSO City of Sandpoint's Reponse to Motion for 
Reconsideration and Reply to Opposition to 
Attorney Fees Award 
John T. Mitchell 
HUMRICH 
HUMRICH 
Supreme Court Document Filed- "Response to John T. Mitchell 
Conditional Dismissal and Request Appeal Be 
Retained" 
Appellant requested an extension of time to 
10/30/2014 to obtain final judgment 
John T. Mitchell 
Date: 6/19/2015 First Judicial District Court - Bonner County User: 
Time: 09: M ROA Report 
Page 7 o Case: CV-2013-0001342 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
City of Sandpoint vs. Independent Highway District 
City of vs. Highway District 
Date Code User 
10/23/2014 DCHH OPPELT Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
10/23/2014 02:30 PM: District Court Hearing He!< 
Court Reporter: Julie Foland 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: to be heard in Kootenai County 
Plaintiff's Motion for Permanent Injunction and 
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs - Less Than 
100 Pages 
10/24/2014 MEMO OPPELT Memorandum Decision and Order Granting in John T. Mitchell 
Part (As to Timing of this Court's Prior Decision) 
and Denying in Part (as to Amount of Attorney 
Fees Previously Awarded) Defendant IHD's 
Motion for Reconsideration of Attorney Fees 
10/28/2014 CMIN OPPELT Court Minutes John T. Mitchell 
Hearing type: Motion for Attorneys Fees 
Hearing date: 10/28/2014 
Time: 10:28 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Linda Oppelt 
Tape Number: 
Susan Weeks 
NOFH OPPELT Notice Of Hearing Re: Defendant's Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Presentment of Judgment 
HRSC OPPELT Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Presentment of John T. Mitchell 
Judgment 11/19/2014 02:00 PM) In Kootenai 
County 
11/4/2014 SCDF HUMRICH Supreme Court Document Filed- Order Granting John T. Mitchell 
Extension of Time to Obtain a Final Judgment 
11/13/2014 JDMT OPPELT Second Amended Declaratory and Monetary John T. Mitchell 
Judgment [Proposed] 
MISC HUMRICH Email dated 11/13/2014 from ISC to Counsels John T. Mitchell 
CDIS HENDRICKSO Civil Disposition entered for: Independent John T. Mitchell 
Highway District, Defendant; City of Sandpoint, 
Plaintiff. Filing date: 11/13/2014 
11/18/2014 CINF HUMRICH Certified "Second Amended Declaratory and John T. Mitchell 
Monetary Judgment [Proposed]" mailed to ISC 
11/21/2014 FIRT HENDRICKSO File Returned John T. Mitchell 
11/24/2014 JDMT CMOORE Final Judgment John T. Mitchell 
12/2/2014 FIOC OPPELT File Out Of County - Judge Mitchell John T. Mitchell 
12/8/2014 MEMO HENDRICKSO Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to John T. Mitchell 
Alter or Amend Judgment 
MEMO HENDRICKSO Amended Memorandum in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Defendant's Motion top Alter or Amend Judgment 
12/16/2014 CINF HUMRICH Email Kootenai county for copy of Final Judgment John T. Mitchell 
filed 11/24/2014 
Date: 6/19/2015 First Judicial District Court - Bonner County User: HUMRICH 
Time: 09:1 ROA Report 
Page 8 of Case: CV-2013-0001342 Current Judge: John T Mitchell 
City of Sandpoint vs. Independent Highway District 
of vs. District 
Date Code User Judge 
12/30/2014 RSPN HENDRICKSO City of Sandpoints Response to Defendant's John T. Mitchell 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 
MISC HENDRICKSO Declaration of C. Matthew Andersen John T. Mitchell 
2/4/2015 NOHG HENDRICKSO Notice of Hearing John T Mitchell 
re: Defendant's Motion to Alter or 
AmendJudgment 
HRSC HENDRICKSO Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/03/2015 02:30 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend 
Judgment 
2/5/2015 NOHG HENDRICKSO Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
re: {correcting Changer Facsimile Number) 
2/17/2015 MISC HUMRICH Reset due dates for clerk's records - due to ISC John T. Mitchell 
4/21/2015 
3/26/2015 NOHG HENDRICKSO Second Amended Notice of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
re: Independent Highway District's Motion to Alter 
or Amend Judgment 
HRSC HENDRICKSO Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/08/2015 04:00 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Independent Highway District 's Motion to 
Alter or Amend Judgment 
4/2/2015 MEMO OPPELT Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's John T. Mitchell 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment 
4/8/2015 CTLG OPPELT Court Log- From Kootenai County John T. Mitchell 
DCHH OPPELT Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
04/08/2015 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Julie Foland 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Independent Highway District's 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment - Less Than 
100 Pages 
DENY OPPELT Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
04/08/2015 04:00 PM: Motion Denied 
Independent Highway District's Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment 
4/10/2015 ORDR HENDRICKSO Order Denying Motion to Alter or Amend John T. Mitchell 
Judgment 
5/28/2015 FIRT OPPELT File Returned John T. Mitchell 
6/17/2015 MOTN HUMRICH Motion for Extension of Time by Clerk of District John T. Mitchell 
Court or Administrative Agency 
Street 
Sandpoint, 83864 
Telephone: 208.263.0534 
Facsimile: 208.255.1368 
scampbell@ci.sandpoint.id.us 
Bar No. 4121 
!N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal corporation 
of State Idaho, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR 
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a political 
subdivision of the State of Idaho, 
Defendant 
Filing Fee A: Exempt 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, City of Sandpoint, by and through the undersigned City Attorney, 
for a cause of action and claim for relief against the Defendant, Independent Highway District, 
and hereby complains and alleges as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff City of Sandpoint {"City") is a municipal corporation org~nized and 
existing under by virtue of the laws of the State of Idaho and is located Bonner 
County, Idaho. \Nas incorporated in and a current population 
COMPLAINT 
2. 
3. 
occurred 
State 
II 
JURISDICTION ANO VENUE 
was as 
conduct which forms the basis for the causes of action set forth 1-ierein 
Bonner County1 Idaho. Accordingly, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction 
over this matter pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 1-701 and 1-705. In addition, the legal rights 
of the parties are affected by a Stipulation for Settlement dated 3, 2003, a Joint Powers 
Agreement by and between City and District dated July 8, 2003, as amended by a 
Memorandum of Understanding executed on or about September 14, 2005. A copy of the 
Stipulation for Settlement is attached hereto as . A copy of the Joint Powers 
Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". A copy of the Memorandum of Understanding is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "C". Exhibits "B" and "C" are collectively referred to as the 
"Agreements11 • 
4. Defendant is a highway district located wholly within Bonner County, Idaho. 
Accordingly, is court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant pursuant to Idaho Code Section 
5-514. 
5. Declaratory relief is presently necessary and appropriate so that the may 
determine and exercise its rights under the Agreements. 
COMPLAINT 2 
7. 
Iii 
CITY OF SANDPOINT v SANDPOINT !NDEPENDFNT HIGHWAY DISTRICT 
Docket Nos. 19618 & 20749 
126 Idaho 145,879 P.2d 1078 (Idaho 1994) 
On or about August 1994, Idaho Supreme Court decided, in a consolidation 
of two appeals, the respective responsibilities for streets in the City. 
8. The Court determined that (1) The District has supervisory authority to maintain 
streets within the District absent a showing by the City that it has a functioning street 
department (emphasis added), and The District has exclusive power to vacate st-eets 
its boundaries where the City does not have a functioning street department (emphasis added). 
9. By Memorandum of Understanding effective September 14, 2005 the District 
granted the City the right and power to vacate streets and rights-of-way within City limits, 
subject to the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding and Idaho Code. 
SANDPOINT INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT v BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
Docket No. 27194 
138 Idaho 887, 71 P.3d 1034 {Idaho 2003) 
10. On or about April 2000, citizens in Bonner County submitted a petition to the 
Board of Commissioners for Bonner County requesting that the District be dissolved and that 
Street Department be placed in charge of all streets in the City. 
11. Following multiple and public testimony, the County Commissioners 
by the voters. 
COMPLAINT 3 
to court. 
upon 
14. District appealed the district court opinion to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
15. On June 4, 2003, Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commissioners, 
holding dissolution of the District could be determined by the voters. 138 Idaho 887, 71 
P.3d 1034 (2003). 
16. Sandpoint could not be succeeding operational unit because Idaho Code 40-
1811 in Section ( that "all surplus moneys of the dissolved highway district remaining 
of the dissolved shall immediately be delivered to the treasurer of the 
operation and Section states that "No city whose incorporated limits lie 
or partially within the boundaries of a dissolved highway district shall be entitled to 
receive any share of the moneys of the dissolved highway district." 
17. case was remanded to the district court for further action consistent with 
Idaho Supreme Court's opinion. 
18. 
support 
department. 
COMPLAINT 
CITY OF SANDPOINTV SANDPOINT INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT 
Docket No. 27441 
139 Idaho 65, 72 P.3d 905 (Idaho 2003) 
During the same time that the residents of the City obtained signatures of 
dissolution of the District, the City was developing a fully functioning street 
4 
storm water snow 
street 
20. On 2000, suit a judgment it has a 
functional street and therefore has exclusive general supervisory authority for 
its streets. 
21. Idaho Supreme Court determined that although the City of Sandpoint had a 
function street department, the District continued to have jurisdiction over the City 
streets, the District's jurisdiction over those streets is lawfully terminated. 
STIPULATION FOR SETTLEMENT 
22. For a period of approximately three years1 pending resolution by the Supreme 
Court Dockets 27194 and 27441, the City controlled and maintained the streets within the 
23. During this same period, without annexation into the District, the District 
controlled and maintained certain streets outside the City of Sandpoint in Ponderay and Dover. 
24. As a result of the Supreme Court opinion in Docket 27194, the County 
Commission was continuing with dissolution of the District. 
25. To avoid complete dissolution1 the District agreed with the City that the City 
continue to operate and maintain its own streets and the District would continue in 
existence opportunity to annex neighboring cities. 
COMPLAiNT 5 
26. 
27 
COMPLAINT 
a. 
was a 
shall retain and control over current 
Recognition of the City jurisdiction shall be set forth in a 
Agreement. 
11, 
Streets. 
Powers 
c. Joint Powers Agreement will provide for 
received under Idaho Code 8-40. 
division of all ad valorem funds 
d. Joint Powers Agreement is a permanent resolution subject to 
termination only by mutual agreement of both parties. 
e. Division of funds shall be made twice yearly. 
District to pay over to (emphasis added) ad valorem property tax 
received from levies by the District upon all property located 
the City. 
g. The City would not continue to seek dissolution of the District. 
h The City would not oppose annexation elections sought 
i. The current lawsuit would be dismissed with prejudice. 
District. 
immediately enter into a Joint Powers Agreement to carry 
out the terms of the Stipulation for Settlement. 
6 
JOINT POWERS AGREEMENT 
a 
sections 67 
29. Joint powers agreements enable state and public agencies to most 
use powers and cooperate to advantage. 
30. purpose the Joint Powers was to divide the 
maintenance and control of streets and public rights of way, and compensate the City by 
transferring all tax revenues collected from properties within the City, for street work 
performed by in the City. 
3L Idaho Code §67-2332 provides public agencies may contract each other 
to "perform any governmental service, activity, or undertaking which each agency 
contract is authorized by to induding1 but not to joint 
contracting for services, supplies and capital equipment, provided that such contract shall be 
authorized by the governing body of each party to the contract." 
32. The City has fully functioning Street and Planning Departments enabling the City 
to fully perform the functions anticipated by the Joint Powers Agreement. 
IV 
COUNT ONE 
(Breach of Contract) 
33. City realieges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in 
Paragraphs one above. 
COMPLAINT 7 
entities. 
35. a Joint Powers at 
the Court. 
36. The purpose the Agreement vvas to resolve issues bet\lveen 
37. in exchange not seeking the complete dissolution District, the District 
negotiated a compromise settlement agreement with the City. 
38. 
approved 
39. 
The Stipulation for Settlement between the City and the District that was 
District Court states: "Said joint powers agreement is intended to be a 
to termination by mutual agreement of both parties. 
Powers Agreement dated 8, 2003 states: of 
agreement shall be perpetual or such time as the District and the City jointly and together 
agree to amend or terminate the same." 
40. On July 11, 2013, the District notified the City that they were withholding funds 
were not going to perform a material term the agreement. A copy of the notice is 
attached as ibit 
41. On July 25, 2013, District notified the City that they were unilaterally 
terminating the entire Joint Powers Agreement in violation of the court directive and the terms 
of the A copy of the notice is attached as Exhibit "E". 
42. Without prior notice, or any discussions with the City, and with the intent of 
needed by to 
COMPLAINT 8 
into 
43. As a may not be able to current 
not able to construct projects determined necessary the 
Street 
44. contends: 
COMPLAINT 
a. The Joint Powers Agreement is a lawful division of governmental powers. 
C. 
City is entitled Idaho Code § 40-801(1}(a) to receive one half 
valorem property taxed collected by the District in the City. 
City is by contract to receive an additional one half of the ad 
valorem property tax, including penalties and collected in the 
as a result of having a fully functioning street department and in 
compensation for performing all the duties agreed to in the Joint Powers 
Agreement. 
ad 
d. The transfer by the District, a governmental entity, of the additional one half 
of the ad valorem property tax to the City, another governmental entity, is 
not an indebtedness or liability of the District under Article Eight, Section 
Three of the Idaho Constitution. 
e. even if the collection and distribution of the ad tax is 
considered it falls as an and 
9 
expense state 
streets 
V 
DECLARATION OF PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS 
45. District's notice of intent not to honor the Joint Power Agreement (See Exhibits 
Code§§ 67-2326 that governs relations between 
governmental entities. 
46. District's actions the Supreme recognition powers retained 
a a fully street department at set in previous Supreme Court 
Cases the parties, as cited above. 
47. actions terms of the Settlement Agreement wherein City 
compromised its claims against the District in favor of a joint resolution as directed by the Court 
48. is entitled to a judicial determination and declaration that: 
a. City is to benefit of its bargain negotiated between the City and 
the District; 
b. The Joint Powers Agreement does not violate Article Eight, Section Three of 
the Idaho Constitution; 
C. Settlement does not violate Idaho Code §40-801; and 
d. Joint Powers Agreement is a valid and enforceable contract between the 
COMPLAINT 10 
VI 
PRl=I IMINL!.RV ANn 
50. Joint Power Agreement to 
duties pursuant to Idaho Code §50-301. 
51. the Powers Agreement entitles to 
in of a permanent injunction requiring District to: 
a. Cease the City1s operation and maintenance 
its streets Joint Powers Agreement; and 
Immediately to the all tax revenues, including penalties and 
interest 
52. has 
action, and therefore, 
law and the Idaho Rules of 
§ and of 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff 
as 
COMPLAINT 
and currently being withheld from the City. 
VII 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
required to expend funds to retain counsel to prosecute 
to recover reasonable costs and attorney fees as provided by 
Procedure, induding1 but not limited to, Idaho Code Sections 
Procedure 54. 
VIII 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Sandpoint prays for judgment against Defendant Independent 
11 
2. a Powers is a 
exercise pursuant to Code§§ 67-2326 through 67-2332; 
3. For a Memorandum Understanding 
into parties on 2005 is a exercise of governmental 
4. For an order the District interference the City's operation 
maintenance its streets to Joint Powers 
5. For an order requiring the District to immediately transfer to the City all ad 
valorem taxes collected District and being withheld by the District; 
6. For a requiring District to comply 
by 
7. For costs including fees; and 
8. For such other relief as the Court deems appropriate and proper. 
CITY OF SANDPOINT 
R. Campbell " 
Attorney for the City of Sandpoint 
COMPLAINT 12 
She is the Mayor for the City of Sandpoint, the Plaintiff in the above entitled matter; 
She has read and understands the contents of the forgoing complaint; 
The statements and allegations contained therein are true and correct to the best of her 
personal knowledge, information and belief. 
DATED the 
Marsha Ogilvie, Mayor 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
) ss 
County of Bonner ) 
ON THIS_, __ day of 2013, before me, a Notary Public in and for the 
State of Idaho, appeared Marsha Ogilvie and acknowledged to me that she is the Mayor of the 
City of Sandpoint and that the foregoing complaint is true and correct to the best of her 
knowledge, information and belief. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereto set my hand and affixed my official seal the date 
and year in this certificate first above written. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: _.;.._ ......... ...;._;.__ ___ ~ 
COMPLAINT 
Attorney at Law 
'P, 0, Box A 
Coeur d1AJene, ID 83816 
PhOne (Z08) 664-2161 
FAX (208) 765~5117 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
ORIGINAL 
IN THE DISTRICT CO'VllT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN A."lD FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal ) 
corporation of the State of !d'aho, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
\IS, ) 
) 
SANDPOINT INDEPENDE~"T ) 
HIGHWAY DIST1UCT, a political ) 
subdivision of the State cf Idaho1 ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No, CV..00-00615 
STIPULATION FOR SETTL,EMENT 
Plaintiff City of Sandpoint and defendant Sandpoint Independent 
Highway District, acting through respective counsel and with the approval of 
the governing board of each present to the Court the following findings: 
L In this case, the judgment of District Judge James F. Judd granting 
summary judgment · to the City of Sandpoint entered November 28, 2000 
awarded to the City of Sandpoint exclusive jurisdiction and control cf 
maintenance of all streets within the city limits of the City cf Sandpoint 
S'I1PULA.Tl'.ON FOR SETTLEMENT 
l 
! I 
2. a 
streets. 
3. The Sandpoint Independent H1ghway District has jurisdiction 
control certain streets and roads outside of the city limits. 
4, The City of Sandpoint and the Sandpoint Independent Highway 
District have cooperated in the funding of certain projects within the city limits. 
5. The Sandpoint Independent Highway District has been providing 
semces to the City of Pond~ray and the CitY of Dover and has sought through 
the Bonner County Board of Commissioners to annex both cities. The county 
has deferred action upon the annexations. 
6. On June 19. 2003, th.e Idaho Supreme Court reversed the judgment 
of Judge Judd remanding this case to the district court. Idaho Supreme Court 
Docket No. 27441. 
1. In a companion case, Sandpoint Independent Highway District v. 
Board of Commissioners of Bonnet County, in which the City of Sandpoint is 
an intervenor. District Judge .fames F. Judd entered partial summary judgment 
on December 29. 2000 affirming the order of the Bonner· County 
Commissioners that an election on dissolution of the Sandpoint Independent 
Highway District should be held, Bonner County Case No. CV--00-00788, 
STIPULATION FOR SETILEMEt-.i'T 
2 
rsvz 99z aoe 
8. 
oart 
" 
affirmed the order of Judge Judd directing that a dissolution election should 
be held. Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 27194, 
9. The opinion.of the Idaho Supreme Court remanded the case to the 
Bonner County Board of Commissioners which is now considering setting a 
date for a dissolution election. 
10. The City of Sandpoint and the Sandpoint Independent Highway 
District have now determined, based upon their respective experiences with 
street control and maintenance engaged in each since the district court decision 
was entered and the City of Sandpoint assumed jurisdiction and contro!1 that 
the interests of the taxpayers within the respective entities and of the road 
users would best be served by ¢0ntinuation of the present arrangement. Based 
upon the experience of the past three years, it is agreed that the City of 
Sandpoint should maintain its own streets and the Sandpoint Independent 
Highway District should continue in existence with the opportunity to expand 
to neighboring cities by annexation. 
STIPULATION FOR SEITLEMENT 
3 
SO'd 
concur 
not 
best interest& of the public. 
Based upon these findings. the parties stipulate and agree to the 
following; 
L The City of Sandpoint shall retain jurisdiction and control over all 
streets now within its city limits and as may subsequently be annexed into the 
city. Recognition of the city jurisdiction shall be set forth in a joint powers 
agreement as provided hereafter. 
2. The Sandpoint Independent Highway District and the City of 
Sandpoint shall enter into a joint powers agreement made pursuant to Chapter 
23, Title 67, Idaho Code which will provide for division of all ad valorem funds 
received under Chapter B, Title 40, Idaho Code. Said joint powers agreement 
is intended to be a permanent resolution subject to termination only by mutual . 
.. 
agreement of both parties. The division of funds shall be made twice yearly, 
The joint powers agreement would provide that the Sandpoint Independent 
Highway District pay over to the City of Sandpoint all ad valorem property tax 
funds received from levies by the District upon all property located within the 
city limits. The joint powers agreement would cover other matters as are 
appropriate. The tax revenues from district levies upon property within the city 
STIPULATION FOR SE'ITLEMENT 
4 
!JO'd 
cu:r:rent to 
3. The City of Sandpoint, which joined as a petitioner in seeking the 
dissolution election, would now request the Bonner County Board of 
Commissioners to vacate the dissolution elec.tion and stipulate to dismiss case 
No. CV-00-00?ss with prejudice. 
4. The City of Sandpoint will not oppose annexation elections sought 
by the Sandpoint Independent Highway District-
5. The Sandpoint Independent Highway District would waive costs 
awarded on appeal by the Idaho Supreme Court in Docket No. 27441, 
6. The parties will immediately proceed to enter into a joint powers 
agreement to carry out the terms of this stipulation for settlement. 
7. This case may be dismissed with prejudice, ~1th each party to bear 
its own costs and attorney's fees, 
~ :.':a.J'"'• ...... ' ,.,,,,,-~-""' 
Dated this -2.. d?,y of July, 2003. (..,._ 
1 ~ \ / 
STIPtJLATION FOR SETI'LEMf.NT 
C:::~--~~ ?~_f) 
Scott W, Reed· 
Bruce H. Greene 
Attorney for Sandpoint Independent 
Highway District 
"'.'V 'J 
EXHIBIT B 
And 
SA1"\JTIPOINT INTIEPENDE~'T IDGHW A Y 
RRC'TTAI.~ 
This Joint Powers Agreement is made this _g!_ day of July, 2003, between 
the Sandpoint Independent Highway District, P. 0. Box 1047, Sandpoint, Idaho 
83864 (hereinafter referred to as HDISTR1CT"), and the City of Sandpoint, 1123 
Lake Street, Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 (hereinafter referred to as "CITY"), who enter 
this agreement pursuant to the provisions, terms and conditions of Idaho Chapter 23, 
Title 67, Idaho Code. 
DURATION: 
PREAMBLE: 
PURPOSE: 
JURJSDICTION, 
MAINTENANCE 
The duration of this agreement shall be perpetual or until 
such time as the District and the City jointly and together 
agree to amend or terminate the same. 
The parties have entered into a stipulation filed of record 
in City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent .l{ighway 
District, Bonner County Case No. CV-00-00615 which 
provides for execution of this joint powers agreement. 
The purpose of this agreement is to divide the jurisdiction, 
maintenance and control of streets and public rights of 
way within the boundaries of the district between the 
District and the City an.d provide for sharing of ad 
valorem tax revenue. 
A..~1) CO:N"'TR.OL: The City shall exercise exclusive general supervisory authority 
over all the streets and public rights of way within the city 
limits of the City of Sandpoint including any property 
subsequently annexed. 
-1-
SlJPERV1SOR Y 
AUTHORITY: 
The District shall exercise exclusive general supervisory 
authority over all streets and public rights of way within 
the boundaries of the District lying outside of the city 
limits of the City of Sandpoint 
The supervisory authority of the City and of the District, 
each within the boundaries described above, shall include 
the follovving: 
1. Acquisitions, vacations and abandonments. 
2. Acceptance of streets and rights of way. 
3. Construction, creation a.Tid opening of streets and 
rights of ways. 
Extension, modifications and realignments of same. 
5. Controlling access to streets and rights of ways, 
encroachment pennits. 
6, Design and use standards. 
7. Traffic control, striping and signage. 
8. Review of proposed subdivisions as regards to 
streets and storm drain systems and inspection of 
construction as the same proceeds. 
9. Sidewalks. 
10. Parking. 
11. Street lights and such utilities as may be located 
within the public streets and right of way. 
12. All ordinary and necessary maintenance of streets 
a..'ld rights of way. 
13. Franchise involving street rights of way. 
14. Police regulations. 
,..,, 
-L-
REVENlJE 
DISTRIBlJTION. l, 
Between 
Exercise of the above supervisory authority does not 
preclude cooneration between the entities for the com..111on 
. ~ 
benefit of the residents. Cooperation and shared services 
will be expected. 
The City will have the final say over all street matters 
within its boundaries, and the District over those streets 
outside the City 
The District at the present time and in the future will levy 
and apply for ad valorem property taxes under the 
autJ1ority granted in Chapter 13, Title 40, Idaho Code. The 
District will pay over to the City all property tax funds 
such District IeVIes on ail property located within the 
city limits. 
On the basis of present tax rates this amount is presently 
approximately $350,000 per year. District, upon receipt of 
tax revenues, forward to the City all tax revenues 
received by the District collected from properties vvithin 
the City on November 1st, February 1st, May 1st and 
August 1st respectively. The first required payment 
herein shall commence with the funds budgeted for 2003, 
and receivable in January 2004. This shall include 
transfer of funds in 2003, when such money is available 
and not already con:u"llitted by the District. 
2. District agrees to additionally provide highway services 
with or without equipment vv:ithin the City. Such services 
may include regular maintenance, assistance on special 
projects, or other assistance as may be agreed to by the 
City1s Public Works Director or Mayor, and the Districfs 
Board of Directors or Foreman. Services to be provided 
will be on an as needed and as available basis. 
-3-
COOPERATION: The parties recognize that road maintenance requirements on 
occasion require more personnel and equipment th::ln the 
responsible entity may have at that time. The parties 
agree to share personnel and equipment upon an as 
needed and available basis for road maintenance projects 
within the city limits of Sandpoint 
INTIE:t\1NIFICATION: 
PERSONNEL: 
1. City agrees to defend, indemnify and hold harmless 
the District from all liability or expense on account of 
claims, suits, and costs growing out of or connected with 
the City's negligent or 'Wrongful exercise of rights granted 
herein, if any, provided the District will not be relieved of 
liability for its own wrongful acts and negligence and that 
of its employees, agents, and assigns. 
2. District agrees to indemnify, defend and hold the 
City harmless from all liabilities, judgments, costs, 
damages and expenses which may accrue against, be 
charged to, or recovered from City by reason of or on 
account of damage to City property, or the property of, 
inJury to, or death of any person, when such damage or 
injury is caused by District's employees, subcontractors, 
or agents while within the City for maintenance or other 
District work 
The parties agree that District personnel operating '\-Vithin 
the City are in no way employees or agents of City and 
are not entitled.to worker's compensation or any benefit of 
employment with the City, and that City persormel are in 
no way employees or agents of District and are not 
entitled to worker's compensation or any benefit of 
employment with the District 
-4-
DISSOLUTION: 
SE\lERABILITY 
CLAUSE: 
Between 
lliTIEPENDENT HlGH\V A Y 
This Agreement wiH automatically terminate if th.e District is 
dissolved. It will also tenninate if the City supports any 
future petition for dissolution of District 
If any portion of this Agreement is held to be invalid or 
unenforceable for any reason, the remaining provisions 
shall continue to be valid &TJ.d enforceable. If a Court 
finds that any provision of this Agreement 1s mvalid or 
unenforceable, but that by limiting such provision, it 
would become valid and enforceable, then such provision 
shall be deemed to be written, construed, and enforced as 
so limited. 
IN W1ThTESS WHEREOF, the District, by and through its commissioners 
and the City, by and through its Mayor and City Clerk have executed this 
Agreement to be effective the first date indicated above. 
DATED this _2.!!: day of July, 2003. 
HIGHWAY DISTRICT CITY OF SANDPOINT 
~ARD OF CO:M:MISSIONERS 
~ hllinnan 
Commissioner 
TITLE: INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING 
EXHIBIT C 
WHEREAS: The Independent Highway District has title to the streets and rights-of-way 
within the city but by mutual agreement the city has control of all streets 
and rights-of-ways within the city; and, 
VVHEREAS: It has become necessary to simplify and clarify the process of vacating 
streets and rights-of-way within the City limits by notifying the Independent 
Highway District prior to public hearing to allow the District to object. 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED THAT: The Memorandum of Understanding 
between the Independent Highway District and the City of Sandpoint, a 
copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof as if fully 
incorporated herein, be approved and the mayor and City Clerk be 
authorized to execute same on behalf of the City. 
ATTEST: 
m~P~ 
Maree Peck, City Clerk 
City Council Members: 
YES NO ABSTAIN ABSENT 
1 Elliott Motion X 
2. Ogilvie Second X 
3. Boge X 
4. Burgstahler X 
5. Spickelmire X 
6. Lamson X 
MEMORANDUM OF U1'1DERSTA1'1>ING 
THIS AGREEI'v1EN1, entered into between the City of Sandpoint, I 123 Lake Street, 
Sandpoint, Bonner County, Idaho a municipal corporation of the State of Idaho herein referred to 
as "CITY" and the Independent Highway District, a Governmental Subdivision of the State of 
Idaho, P.O. Box 1047, Sandpoint, Idaho, herein referred to as "IlID", 
WHEREAS, the IfID has title to the streets and rights-of-way within the city but by 
mutual agreement the CITY has control of all streets and rights-of-way within the CITY; and 
V\"HEREAS, the boundaries of the CITY remain within the boundaries of the IlID; and 
\V'HEREAS, it is necessary, from time to time, to vacate streets and rights-of-way within 
the CITY. 
NOW THEREFORE, the CITY and the IlID hereby agree as follows: 
1. The CITY shall have the right and power to vacate streets and rights-of-way 
within CITY limits subject to the provisions of this Agreement and Idaho Code. 
2. The CITY shall notify IlID in writing prior to any public hearing regarding the 
vacating of a right-of-way within CITY limits. 
3. If no written objection to the request to vacate is received from IHD within thirty 
(30) days of said notice, the CITY may proceed with such vacation. The IHO 
shall also sign off as need be on any documents relinquishing title to the vacated 
way. 
4. If written objection is received from IHD stating the reasons for the objection, the 
CITY shall deny the request to vacate. 
5. IlID shall defend any claim related to a IHD objection to vacation re-quest 
at vacate 
streets and rights-of-way within CITY limits including provisions 
notices and public hearings. 
required 
DATED this __ day of ____ __, 2005. 
ATTEST: 
)l10~ ~ 
JvlAREE PECK 
CITY CLERK 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT 
~0--0-4t 9-1,;-06 
MAX B J;LL, CHAIRMA-N DATE 
9-1v-o< 
DATE 
&</Y_.....,,_..,..jf;eA ~ ~/~--6 < 
SSION"'ER DATE 
Sherer 
uav1C! !::. wynKoop 
at Law 
City of Sandpoint 
Scot R. Campbell 
Sandpoint City Attorney 
11 Lake St. 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864-0871 
law Offices 
SHERER & WYNKOOP, LLP 
730 N. Main Street 
P.O. Box 3·i 
Meridian. Idaho 83680-2604 
11, 2013 
EXHIBIT D 
_, i"-<"""J!"', ,...,,...._,, ,<f"'>f",f""; 
rrHJftt: 4Uo-oot -~ovv 
Fax 208-887-4865 
Via ·First Class Jf ail attd 
Via e-mail to scampbell(a),d.sandpoint.id. us 
Re: Notice (ifTerminarion (?{Revenue Sharing Agreemenl 
Qffer ofSel!lemem -- IRE 408 
Dear ML Campbell: 
I write as attorney for the Independent Highway District ("IHD"). IHD has asked my 
office to review the legality of the agreement between IHD and the City of Sandpoint ("City"); 
which agreement provides that IHD wilt transfer to the City all IHD levy proceeds collected 
from City properties. 
Our office has opined to IHD that the agreement violates Idaho law. The agreement runs 
afoul of Article Eight, Section Three of the Idaho Constitution, as wel1 as Idaho Code §40-801 
and several other important legal principles. 
This provides formal notice that IHD wiH no longer make these illegal payments to the 
City, effective immediate]y. 
Offer of Settlement - Rule 408 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, 
The HID Commissioners hope to amicably and finally resolve this matter by also settling 
several additional issues which remain outstanding between the City and IHD. IHD has 
authorized me to make the following settlement offer to resolve these issues in return for the 
City's agreement that the provisions of Idaho Code §40-801 will control future property tax 
revenue sharing. 
Also, as part of the settlement, IHD forego any claim to recoup from the those 
amounts previously illegally paid to the City in violation ofldaho law. It is my understanding 
that this amount is million dollars. 
Please respond at your earliest convenience whether the City is agreeable to IHD' s 
proposed settlement agreernenL The IHD Commissioners are willing to meet with the City to 
discuss and finalize the proposed settlement agreement. 
Sincerely, 
SHERER & WYNKOOP, LLP 
Independent Highway District 
3 
Law Offices 
Vilt e-mail to 
was not validly entered into that it 
Powers Act. Idaho Code §67-2328. 
A g, L LU 1 j l : AM r1 d! nderl rte 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF mE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
FOR THE BONNER 
' J 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV 2013-1341 
vs. 
Th1DEPENnENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, 
Defendant. 
The Honorable Barbara Buchanan having been disqualified pursuant to Idaho Rule 
40(d)(l) in the above matter now, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above matter is assigned to the Honorable 
John T. Mitchell> District Judge, for the disposition of any pending and further proceeding. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following alternate judges are hereby assigned ro 
preside in this case: Rich Christensen, Lansing L. Haynes, John P. Luster, Benjamin R. Simpson, 
Fred M. Gibler, Charles W. Hosack, George R, Reinhardt, III, Steve Yerby. Jeff Brudie, Carl 
Kerrick, John Stegner; Michael Griffin. 
DATED this y..9 dayof~2013. 
L O,AM ~ r... k\ ~ I\ u2> -
LANSING L. ES 
Administrative District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAJLING 
I hereby certify that on the_v_day of 2013, a true and con-ect copy of the foregoing 
was sent via facsimile, U.S. Mail, or interoffice mail to the following: 
ORDER OP REASSIGNMENT: 
CV 
! / : 
i/ j 
" r L '.I 
DAVIDE. WYNKOOP 
208-887-4800 
FAX 208-887-4865 
I.S.B. 2429 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
JAMES, VERl~ON & WEEKS, PA 
1626 LINCOLN WAY 
COEUR D-ALENE, IDliliO 83814 
208-667-0683 
FAX 208-664-I 684 
I.S.B. 4255 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Independent Highway District 
IN THE DISTRICT FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND OF THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal corporation ) 
of the State ofidaho, ) 
Plaintiff; 
vs. 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a 
political subdivision of the State of Idaho, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant ) 
COMES NOW Independent Highway 
CASE NO, CV 2013-01342 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
("District") and through its attorneys 
David E. Wynkoop of SHERER & WYNKOOP, LLP and Susan Weeks of JAMES, VERNON 
& WEEKS, P.A. and hereby moves this Court for an order dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint; 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) 
reasons that: 
- l 
Idaho Rules Procedure. motion is brought for the 
:') o. 0 0 
a cause 
statutes. 
Briefing will be supplied to the com1 accordance with I.R.C.P. 7. Oral argument is 
requested_ 
DATED this 1 fh day of September, 2013. 
MOTION TO DISMISS - 2 
SHERER & WYNKOOP, LLP 
David . Wynkoop, of the fir 
Attorneys for Independent Hi 
/) IA 
I HEREBY that on ~ day September, I served a true and 
cmTect copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS upon the following} by the method 
indicated below: 
Scot R Campbell 
Sandpoint City Attorney 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
MOTION TO 
XX via facsimile to 208-255-1368 
~S/20/2013 13:59 20855457d 
Box 
Meridian, ID 83680 
Te1ephone: (208) 887-4800 
Facsimile (208) 887-4865 
ISB No. 2429 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. 
l 626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684 
ISB No. 4255 
JAMES VERN 
Attorneys for Defendant Independent Highway District 
PAGE 01/02 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHDO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF BONNER 
CITY OF SAl'\TDPOINT, a municipal 
corporation of the State ofidaho, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a 
political subdivision of the State of Idaho, 
Defendant. 
I CASE NO. CV-2013~01342 
DEFENDAl~T'S MOTTON FOR 
ENLARGEMENT OF TIME TO FILE 
BRJEF 
COMES NOW Defendant, Independent Highway District, by and through its attorneys of 
record, David E. Wynkoop of Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP and Susan P. Weeks of James, Vernon & 
Weeks, P.A. and hereby moves th.is Court, pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 6(b), for an 
enlargement oftirne to October 14~ 2013, in which to file its memorandum in support ofits motion 
to dismiss. This motion is made by and for the reason that counsel's case load is significant at this 
time and the issues raised the motion to dismiss are complex and require extensive research and 
3 3:59 2085545741 JAMES VERN PAGE 02/02 
on 
Orai argument is requested. 
DATED this 20th day of September, 2013. 
JAMES. VER!"-TON & WEEKS, P 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 20th day 
copy of the foregoing instrument by 
September. 2013, I caused to be served a true and correct 
method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Scot R. Campbell 
Sa.11dpoint City Attorney 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, ID 83 864 
Hon. John T. Mitchell (chamber courtesy copy) 
1 P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
•o 
:D 
/~ 
! 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 255-1368 
u.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
T elecopy (FAX) (208) 664-1188 
/I 
~fuc(.&1~ 
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT TIME TO BRIEF:2 
09/ 4:00 2085646741 
Menoian, 83680 
Telephone: (208) 887-4800 
Facsimile (208) 887-4865 
ISB 2429 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A 
626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684 
ISB No. 4255 
JAMES VERN 
Attorneys for Defendant Independent Highway District 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST .TL"DICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHDO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BO"l\i'NER 
CITY OF SANDPO]:!\;T, a municipal 
corporation of the State of Idaho, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
INDEPEKDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a. 
political subdivision of the State of Idaho, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CV-2013-01342 
NOTICE OF HEARING RE: 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
ENLP...RGEMENT OF TIME TO FILE 
BRIEF 
Date: October 23, 2013 
Time: 2:00 p.m. 
l Place: Kootenai County Courtbouse 
I 
PLEASE TAKE KOTICE that on October 23, 2013, at the hour of2:00 p.m., or as soon 
thereafter as the matter may be heard, in the Kootena.i County Courthouse, Defendant 
Independent Highway District shall present for hearing its Motion for Enlargement of Time to 
Fiie Brief before the Honorable John T. Mitchell, Defendant does not object to Plainti.ffs 
NOTICE OF HEARING RE: DEFE"!\1DA.'J'T'S :MOTION FOR ENLARGEr.AENT TIME 
TO FILE BRIEF: 1 
20/2013 4: 00 2086646741 JAMES VERN PAGE 02/02 
day September, 3, 
J.AJvfES, VER.i'JON & WEEKS. P.A 
~ (2 ~d&:'. 
Susan P. Weeks 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of September, 2013, I caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing instrument by the met.11od indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
; Scot R. Campbell 
Sandpoint City Attorney 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Hon. John T. Mitchell (chamber courtesy copy) 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 81 6 
NOTICE OF HEARING RE: 
TO FILE BR1EF: 2 
D 
D 
~/ 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Te1ecopy (FAX) (208) 255-1368 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight l\.-fail 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 664-1188 
FOR ENLARGEMENT OF 
WYNKOOP 
SHERER& 
McR1vIAN, 83680 
208-887-4800 
FAX 208-887 -4865 
I.S.B. 2429 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 838 
208-667-0683 
FAX 208-664-1684 
I.S.B. 4255 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Independent Highway District 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND OF THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal corporation ) 
of the State of Idaho, ) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a 
political subdivision of the State ofidaho, 
Defendant 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Introduction 
CASE NO. CV 2013-01342 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
This lawsuit follows two prior lawsuits filed by the City against the Independent 
Highway District ("IHD"). Both suits went to the Idaho Supreme Court and resulted in decisions 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT MOTION TO DISMISS - l 
HID 1 --1 UH 
geographical boundaries, including properties located within the City. Pursuant to 
City is entitled to one half of the property tax proceeds collected II-lD fron1 
properties, and IHD is entitled to the other half. 
§40-801, 
h1 2003 the City and IHD entered into an agreement ("Agreement") purp01iing to alter 
the distribution. mandated in I.C. §40-801. Based upon the Agreement, IHD turned over to the 
City 100% of the IHD property tax revenue collected by IHD from City properties. The 
Agreement pm·ports to create a perpetual indebtedness and liability ofIHD in favor of the City 
whereby IHD shaH tum over to the City all revenues collected from City properties, one-half 
the statute requires remain with IHD. notice of termination 
Agreement based upon IHD's belief that the Agreement violates Idaho's Constitution and 
statutes. The City then filed this lawsuit seeking to enforce the illegal Agreement. 
IHD respectfully submits that the City's lawsuit should be dismissed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
l 2(b )( 6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Agreement at issue 
violates Idaho's Constitution, several Idaho statutes, and public policy, and is unenforceable for 
lack of consideration. Thus, the Agreement ls illegal, void and unenforceable as a matter of law. 
Background 
Beginning the early 1930's IHD maintained Sandpoint City streets. The City initiated 
judicial action in the early 1990's to attempt to gain control over City streets, resulting in an 
Idaho Supreme Court decision of City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway District, 
1 See City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist., 126 Idaho 879 P.2d 1078 
Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist., l 39 Idaho 65, 72 P3d 905 (2003) 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 2 
over streets 
310 1323, is 
jurisdiction" over Sandpoint streets because the did not have a functioning street 
department City 
In 2000, the City passed various resolutions establishing a City street department. The 
City then initiated a second lawsuit once again claiming jurisdiction over City streets. The City 
sought to enjoin IHD from exercising any supervisory authority over City streets and to enjoin 
IHD from making any levy upon the real property within City. In City of Sandpoint v. 
Sandpoint Independent Highway District, 139 Idaho 65, 72 P .3d 905 (2003) ("Sandpoint If'), the 
Idaho Supreme Couit again held that IHD had exclusive general supervisory authority over the 
City streets, again citing as authority Idaho Code §§40-1310 and 40-1323. The held that 
"the city cannot obtain jurisdiction over city streets that are within the boundaries of the 
Highway District unless the High\vay District's jurisdiction over those streets is first lawfully 
terminated under the appropriate statutory provisions." Sandpoint Il 139 Idaho at 70, 72 P.3d at 
910. 
Agreement 
Following issuance of the decision in Sandpoint the City and IHD entered into the 
illegal Agreement in 2003. had been filed and litigation ensued. The 
City intervened in the litigation to support the dissolution of I.HD. As part of a settlement of that 
litigation, the City and entered into the Agreement ,vhich provided IHD would perpetually 
turn over to the City aH property taxes IHD collected from City properties, thus creating for IHD 
a pennanent liability indebtedness favor 
BRIEF SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 3 
3. 
IHD terminated the Agreement because the Agreement violates Idaho's Constitution, statutes, 
public policy, 
IHD respectfully submits that the City's Imvsuit should be dismissed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6) for the reason that the Agreement is illegal on face. The Agreement violates Article 
VIII, §3 of the Idaho Constitution, Idaho Code §§40-801 and 40-1333, et seq; the Joint Powers 
Act, and public policy. 
Idaho Constitution, Article VIII, §3 
Any agreernent entered into by an Idaho public agency must be consistent the Idaho 
Constitution. Article §3, which provides 
incur any indebtedness, or liability, any manner, or for 
"'"''""'"" of the state, shall 
purpose, exceeding that year the 
income and revenue provided for it in such year, without the assent of two thirds (2/3) of the 
qualified electors ... Any indebtedness or liability incurred contrary to this provision shall be 
void:' (Emphasis added). In the present case, the Agreement was entered into without a vote of 
two-thirds of the qualified IHD electors. Since the 2003 Agreement created an indebtedness or 
liability without a vote of the electors, it is void and unenforceable. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted Aliicle §3 to preclude multi-
year obligations such as the illegal Agreement at issue in this case. The Idaho Supreme Court 
firnt addressed this issue 100 years ago in the case of Charles Feil v. of Coeur d'Alene, 23 
Idaho 32, 129 P. 643 (1912). In that case, the city entered into a twenty year contract to purchase 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT MOTION TO DISMISS - 4 
court 
holding that the agreement constituted an "indebtedness or liability" extending beyond the city's 
budget year in vi0Iatio11 §3 of the 
history of Article VIII, §3 and noted that its language is more restrictive than virtually any other 
state's constitution. The Court rejected the city's argument because numerous other states 
had upheld similar agreements that the Idaho Court should do so. 
The Idaho Supreme Court noted that "[ o ]ur constitution speci:ficany ~==~~~~£ 
the income or revenue for more than the current year." (emphasis added) Feil, 23 Idaho at 45. 
"[T]he framers of our constitution employed more sweeping and prohibitive language in framing 
sec. 3 of art. 8, and pronounced a more 
is to be found in any other constitution to which our attention has been directed:' Feil, 23 Idaho 
at 49. "The constitution not only prohibits incurring any indebtedness, but it also prohibits 
incurring any liability." Feil, 23 Idaho at 49. The Court further noted that the intent of the 
framers was to prevent the pledging of future income including "aU sources and kinds ofincome 
or revenue" (Ibid) and that no public agency "shall incur any indebtedness or liability any 
manner, or for any purpose" beyond the budget year. Feil, 23 Idaho at 50. 
The Comi then discussed the breadth of the term "liability", noting several definitions, 
including " ... the state of one who is bound in law and justice to something which 
enforced by action" and "the state of being bound or obliged in law or justice to do, pay or make 
good something; legal responsibility." (Ibid) This language certainly applies to the case at bar 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT MOTION TO DISMISS - 5 
discussed reasons to 
financially obligate future governing bodies. 
Suppose, now, after purchasing this prope1iy, another city council hereafter 
to be elected should decline to comply with the promises, agreements and 
covenants of this ordinance. If the ordinance is legal and valid, would not 
the courts intervene to compel the city authorities to comply with the 
provisions and terms of this ordinance and to take such steps as might be 
necessary to raise the required revenue to meet these obligations ... 
Feil, 23 Idaho at 53. 
The city in Feil argued that the agreement should be declared valid since it obligated only 
the future revenues to be received from the water system to be financed and did not obligate the 
general revenues of the city. The rejected the city's position, responding " .. the 
receipts from this source wm at once become an income, under the provisions of sec. 3, art 8, of 
the constitution, which it is forbidden to pledge or hypothecate for more than the ctment year.,." 
(emphasis added) Feil, 23 Idaho at 55; and "[a]fter it owns that property, the receipts from water 
rents would clearly be an income or revenue within the purview and meaning of the constitution, 
but in advance of the purchase it undertakes to appropriate and hypothecate that income for a 
period of twenty years so that it may not be an income after the purchase is made." (Ibid) 
The Comi went on to state that the constitution provides the exclusive method for 
incurring long tenn obligations; specifically, a vote of two-thirds of the electors of the taxing 
district. Absent such a vote, no obligation may be incmTed beyond the current b1.1dget year. 
Based upon the holding in Feil, it is clear the Agreement at issue in this case violates the 
Idaho Constitution. The illegal Agreement purp01is to obligate revenues 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT MOTION TO DISMISS - 6 
Boards 
liability created by the 2003 IHD Board without the required voter approval. is not 
pem1itted by the Idaho Constitution. 
Another test of Article VIII, §3 occurred in the case of Grant .M.iller v. of Buhl, 48 
Idaho 668,284 P. 843 (1930). The City of Buhl attempted to purchase an electricity generating 
system. The city pledged the future revenues from the sale of power to pay off the purchase 
price of the system. Citing Feil, the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed that Article §3 of the 
Idaho Constitution prohibited Idaho public agencies from incurring multi-year obligations. The 
Com1 declined the city's invitation to overrule but rather reaffirmed the reasoning of Feil. 
It is anticipated that of Sandpoint claim that the illegal Agreement is saved 
by the "ordinary and necessary" exception to A11icle VIII, §3. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
twice recently ruled on the "ordinary and necessary" exception to A11icle VIII, §3. In City of 
Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 137 P.3d 388 (2006) the Court first reaffirmed the holding in Feil, 
prohibiting multi-year obligations by Idaho's public agencies. In response to the city's argument 
that the ordinary and necessary exception saved the agreement, the Court held that the ordinary 
and necessary exception clause did not apply. Rather, the ordinary and necessary exception was 
limited only to expenditures made during the budget year and only if the necessity is truly 
urgent. 
Here, we return to the test stated in Dunbar and hold that order for an 
expenditure to qualify as "necessary" under the proviso clause of Article 
VIII, §3 there must exist a necessity for making the expenditure at or 
during such year. (emphasis added) 
143 at 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 7 
went on an 
§3. Because the obligation did not meet the "necessary" criteria within the current budget 
year in which the obligation was incurred, the Court held that the agreement incurring the multi-
obligation was illegaL The Comi emphasized that such a long-tem1 obligation was only 
valid if first approved by a two-thirds vote of the electors. Future years' needs were held not to 
fall into the ordinary and necessary exception in the year in which the liability or indebtedness 
was created. 
The most recent Article VIII, §3 case relevant to the facts in the present case is City of 
Idaho Falls v. Fuhriman, 149 Idaho 574,237 P.3d 1200 (2010). In this case, the city entered 
into a 17-year agreement that obligated the city to future purchases of electricity. The Court held 
that the agreement violated A1iicle VIII, §3 and did not fall within the "ordinary and necessary" 
exception. The Court noted that the city could incur sh01t-te11n obligations within the budget 
year, but that the city could not incur an obligation extending beyond the current budget year. 
The city argued in Fuhriman that its taxpayers would benefit from the certainty of a long 
term contract for the pmchase of electricity. The Supreme Court responded that the city may not 
incur a long-tenn liability for a short term need. The Court reiterated that the Idaho Constitution 
"imposes upon the political subdivisions of the state a pay as you go system of finance." 149 
Idaho at 579, citing Frazier. 
In this case, the iHegal Agreement purports to transfer all IHD levy proceeds from City 
properties to the City. This liability is permanent and not limited to a fixed number of years such 
as Feil, Frazier and Fuhriman cases, but rather into perpetuity. The obligation by a past 
Board Boards 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 8 
ever 
to perpetuity. 
For instance, assuming that revenues collected City properties pursuant to the IHD 
Plaintiff's Cornpiaint), then the 2003 Agreement would create over a 20 year period an 
indebtedness and liability against IHD and in favor of the City in the amount of $7 million 
dollars based upon the assessed values in 2003. This is a huge liability for a small agency like 
IHD. 
None of the current Commissioners signed the Agreement. Yet, cun-ent and future 
IHD Commissioners must cut checks, four times a year, to the City for funds that statutoiily 
belong to IHD. This current and future Commissioners of the ability to exercise 
the judgment they were elected to exercise in how best to spend the IHD revenue they are 
entrusted with by law. 
Any agreement which violates Article VIII, §3 of the Idaho Constitution is "void" under 
the express language of this Constitutional provision. See e.g. Deer Creek Highway Dist. v. 
Doumecq Highway Dist., 37 Idaho 601, 218, P. 371 (1923) and Boise Dev. Co. v. City of Boise, 
26 Idaho 347, 143 P. 531 914) (affirming that agreements entered into violation of Article 
VIII, §3 are void.) In conclusion, the Agreement violates the express language of Article VIII, 
§3, the policy behind Article VIII, §3, and the Idaho Supreme Comt cases interpreting Aliicle 
VIII, §3 and is therefore void. 
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Idaho 
case is 
Code §40-801(1)(a) which provides that: 
A utho,·ity and pr,r,l"PilnrP for lf'vif'<:. ThP <'ommi<:.;:iom~r,;: of~ c:rnmty 
highway system, the commissioners of a county-wide highway district, and 
the commissioners ofhigfo.vay districts are empowered, for the purpose of 
construction and maintenance of highways and bridges under their 
respective jurisdictions, to make the following highway ad valorem tax 
levies as applied to the market value for assessment purposes within their 
districts: 
( a) Two-tenths per cent (0.2%) of market value for assessment purposes 
for construction and maintenance of highways and bridges; provided that 
if the levy is made upon prope1iy within the limits of any incorporated 
city, fifty per cent (50%) of the funds shall be app01iioned to that 
incorporated city. [ emphasis added] 
This statute empowers highway districts and counties to levy a property tax to raise revenues for 
road construction and maintenance. (Cities also have independent authority under Title 50, 
Idaho Code, to levy property taxes for road building and maintenance by their city street 
depmtments. See specifically Idaho Code §50-235 and §50-236.) It is IHD's property tax 
revenues that are at issue in this litigation, not City tax revenues. 
Idaho Code §40-801(1)(a) provides that if a city maintains city streets, then 50% of the 
revenue from city properties shall be retained by the highway district and the other 50% shall be 
distributed to the city for construction and maintenance of city streets. It is impo1tant to 
understand that the property tax revenue collected pursuant to this statute is IHD's revenue, and 
it has a statutory obligation to distribute a poition to a city as set forth in the statute. However, 
the remaining po1tion is revenue to the highway district, and any distribution must comply with 
the Idaho constitution and the statute. 
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t~x 
tenns statute agreeing to some tax 
would violate the Article 8, Section III of the constitution. The statute does not authorize a 75/25 
split or a i 00/0 split This tax distribution ratio has been in since at ieast 1963. See City of 
Rexburg v. kfadison County, 115 Idaho 88, 764 P.2d 838 (1988). The rationale for imposing the 
highway tax on city prope1iies is that city residents use the streets maintained by counties and 
highway districts and so should help finance the maintenance ofthe roads on which they drive. 
By entering into an Agreement purporting to provide for a tax distribution ratio other than 
the mandated 50/50 split, IHD and the City violated Idaho Code §40-801 and the Idaho 
constitution. An ag1:eement entered into in violation of a statute is iHegal and unenforceable. 
"[A] contract [that] cannot be performed without violating applicable law is illegal and void." 
City of Meridian v. Petra, Inc., 154 Idaho 425,299 P.3d 232,252 (2013). "The general rule is 
that a contract prohibited by law is illegal and hence unenforceable." J. Baynard 1\1iller, MD. v. 
Frederick R. Haller, lvf.D., et ed., 129 Idaho 345,351,924 P.2d 607,613. 
Joint Powers Act 
The Agreement in this case involves an agreement that purports to be a Joint Powers 
Agreement. The Joint Powers Act, Idaho Code §67-2326, et seq ("JPA"), authorizes local 
government agencies, in limited circumstances, to cooperate and share responsibilities. For 
example, if two road agencies share a common boundary, it may be inefficient for each agency to 
maintain, plow and chip seal one side of a road. Accordingly, it may be a wise use of taxpayer 
fonds for the two agencies to agree that one agency will perform all maintenance on one shared 
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return 
are use first is that an 
agency cannot delegate away or exceed its statutory or constitutional authority when entering 
a joint agreement Nor can the JP A be used c1. mmmi;;r tu ..;uu:sc u v iubtiuu vf ::;t<1tutu1y ur 
constitutional provisions. No such agreement can extend "beyond the limitation of such powers, 
privileges or authority" of the agencies involved. LC. §67-2328. The JPA cannot be used as a 
bootstrap to make legal an agreement which is otherwise illegal. 
Second, the requires that ali agreements entered into under the JPA have a 
teimination clause. LC. §67-2328 rnandates that: 
( c) Any such agreement shall specify the following: 
*** 
(5) The permissible method or methods to be employed in accomplishing 
the partial or complete tel'mination of the agreement and for disposing of 
property upon such partial or complete termination. [emphasis added] 
The Agreement the City seeks to enforce provides that "[t]he duration of this agreement 
shall be perpetual or until such time as the District and the City jointly and together agree to 
amend or tenninate the same." ( emphasis added). Under the language of the Agreement, no 
method is provided to tenninate the Agreement. Rather, the Agreement places a prohibition on 
the termination of the Agreement absent mutual agreement. There is no way for IHD to 
terminate the Agreement and the substantial liability it'11posed on IHD thereby, unless the City 
agrees. There is no logical reason for the City to tenninate an agreement under which it receives 
financial benefits far in excess of what the statutes authorize. Thus, there is no effective method 
to terminate the Agreement provided the termination clause in the Agreement Without an 
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a prupt:r 
joint power Agreement is inconsistent §3 of the Idaho Constitution. Elected 
officials are forc\rcr bound decisio11s their predecessors obligating the 
expenditure of all future revenue collected from city properties. In such a case, it is apparent that 
subsequent elected IHD Commissioners cannot fulfill the role to which they were elected. This 
is inconsistent with Idaho statutes and the Idaho Constitution. 
This rationale is particularly compelling this case. noted in the letter the City 
attached to its Complaint as an exhibit, IHD has already paid over to the City several millions of 
dollars in revenues under the Agreement. If the Agreement is enforceable with no practical 
uu,,u.n.HJH clause, foture 1HD obligated to pay over to the City 
additional millions of dollars of revenue from propeity tax receipts of a relatively smaH 
agency with a relatively small budget. As a result, cunent and future IHD Commissioners would 
not have the revenues to fund the priorities they believe to be most important to the taxpayers 
and voters they were elected to serve. This financial liability greatly diminishes their ability as 
elected officials to act in the public interest. As discussed above, this situation without voter 
approval is the very reason that Article VIU and the JP A do not permit such an agreement. 
Idaho Courts Disfavor Perpetual Agreements 
Idaho courts hold perpetuity clauses such as the one in the Agreement to be illegal in 
violation of public policy. In Barton v. State, 104 Idaho 338,659 P.2d 92 (1983), the Idaho 
Supreme Comt declined to read a contract as containing a perpetuity clause that bound the State 
Transportation Department perpetuity. our a term 
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30 Idaho 440, 1 1 
purporting to be binding into perpetuity is paliicularly compeiling when our Idaho Constitution 
and case specifically·· proltlbit multi-year co11tracts b)' pt1blic agencies~ 
Idaho Code §40-1333 
Idaho Code §40-1333 provides: 
Cities, with city highway systems, shall be responsible for the 
construction, reconstruction and maintenance of highways in their 
respective city systems, except as provided in section 40-607, Idaho Code. 2 
Cities may make agreements with a county, highway district or the state 
for their highway work, or a portion of it, but they shaH compensate the 
county, district or state fairly for any work performed. (emphasis added) 
The Idaho legislature has established a clear policy that a city must use its own revenues 
to maintain city streets and may not use highway district revenues to do so, except as provided in 
I.C. §40-801. A city cannot expect highway district revenues to fund the maintenance of city 
streets. If a highway district constructs or maintains a city street, the city must repay the 
highway district for all expenditures made within the city by the highway district. 
The City seems to suggest IHD is receiving a benefit by virtue of the City maintaining 
City streets. This is not trne since the City has a statutory duty to maintain City streets. IHD 
receives nothing from the City in return for the IHD revenue paid over to the City. 
Lack of Consideration 
It has long been held as a matter of contract law that a contract must be supported by 
legal consideration in order to be enforceable. The City has provided no new consideration in 
2 Idaho Code §40-607 applies only to cities under 5,000 population. The in paragraph 1 ofits ..,v,u,n,""" stated 
that Sandpoint City's population is 7,400, therefore LC. §40-607 does not apply to these facts. 
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l 
streets. 
lacks merit as the City already has a statutory duty to maintain streets. See Idaho Code §40-
1333 .. . l:i .. contract vil1icl1 contai11s 110 co11sideration is ilh1sory and therefore ur1enforceable~ See 
e.g. lvfartinez v. JCRMP, 134 Idaho 247,999 P.2d 902 (2000), wherein the Comi reaffi1111ed this 
common law principal but then found an exception for insurance contracts because they were 
contracts of adhesion. 
Pursuantto Idaho Code §§40-801(1)(a) 40-1333, the City maintains its City streets 
and is entitled to receive a 50% distribution of the tax revenues collected by IHD from City 
prope11ies. Contrary to these statutes, the language illegal Agreement purports to require 
IHD to turn over to the City 100% of the revenue receives from City properties. 
newly elected IHD Board is obligated to provide significant IHD funds to the City based upon an 
illegal Agreement to ,which the current and future Commissioners were not a party. The legal 
problem is that the City provides no new consideration to IHD during the current budget year or 
during that Commissioner's term of office. Under Article VIII, §3, no obligation can legally be 
made beyond the budget year by public agencies. Any past consideration which may have been 
provided to IHD by the City cannot be used as consideration for the obligation to pay to the City 
IHD revenues outside the year the agreement was reached. 
CONCLUSION 
The Agreement the City seeks to enforce violates the Idaho constitution, numerous Idaho 
statutes, and public policy, and accordingly is void, illegal and unenforceable. Therefore, 
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to state a cause 
f 1 tb A~., I I · ~ uay October) 'l J. 
SHERER & WYNKOOP, LLP 
David E. Wynkoop, of th 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
15 CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal 
corporation of the State of Idaho, 
16 
17 vs. 
Plaintiff, 
18 INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a 
19 political subdivision of the State of Idaho, 
Defendant. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Case No. CV-13-01342 
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This action was brought to enforce a lawful executed Joint Powers Agreement ("JPA!t) (See 
Complaint, Ex. B) entered into between the City of Sandpoint ("City") and the Independent Highway 
District ("District"), signed on July 8, 2003. The motivation for the JPA was simple and undisputed: the 
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taxpayers' election to dissolve the The District had sued the Bonner County Commissioners to 
stop the dissolution election, but it was unsuccessful. (See, Complaint, ,r,r 20-25; ,r 37; and Sandpoint 
Independent Highway District v. Board of County Commissioners of Bonner County and the City of 
Sandpoint, Intervenor, 138 Idaho 887, 71 P.3d 1034 (2003).) The JPA was a compromise of the very 
issues raised in this case. The substance and motivation for the JP A was set out in a filed stipulation that 
was approved by this Court. (See, Stipulation for Settlement, Complaint, Ex. A) Based on the 
Stipulation for Settlement, this Court entered a final Order of Dismissal. (Copy attached to this brief.) 
It is undisputed that the JPA was an idea advocated by the District. (Aff. of S. Campbell, Ex. 1) 
The efficacy of the JP A was endorsed by the District, and it specifically agreed the JP A was in the best 
interests of the taxpayers. (Complaint, Ex. A; ,r10) The JP A requires joint mutual assent if it is to be 
terminated or amended. (Complaint, Ex. B, "DURATION", p. 1) It is undisputed that the District has 
unilaterally stated the JPA has been terminated. (Complaint, Ex. E; Defendant's Memorandum, p. 2) 
The District has now breached its obligation to make disbursements. (Aff. of S. Syth, Ex. 2) This action 
was commenced for a dedaration of rights so the City can demand that the District comply with the JP A 
obligations. 
The District has filed an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss that should be denied because: 
1. The JP A is lawful, constitutional and enforceable between two public entities. 
2. The JP A was the product of willful negotiation to compromise pending litigation for 
significant consideration, and after the District represented to the Court the JP A 
would be in the best interests of the taxpayers of Bonner County. 
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equitably estopped denying its efficacy. 
4. The City is entitled to a hearing for a Declaration of its rights in the JPA, its damages 
arising out of the breach by the District and an injunction. 
UNDISPUTED OPERATIVE FACTS 
The starting point for this action is the recognition that it involves a lawful agreement between 
two political subdivisions of the State of Idaho. The District's boundaries include the City of Sandpoint 
and its taxpayers. By law the City and the District are charged with representing the interests of the 
taxpayers of the City concerning highways within the City limits. Whatever may be the current 
motivation of the District for ceasing the disbursement to the City, the fact remains there is only one pot 
of dollars from which to draw, i.e., the money paid by the City taxpayers. This case is not about a debt 
14 j or new taxes. This is not a civil action between private parties, or a public entity versus a private party. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
The case is about how the District legally chooses to divide tax money that has been apportioned to it in 
the best interests of the taxpayers of the City when it signed the JP A. 
A county collects property taxes each year based upon levies approved by districts or other 
taxing units. LC. §40-801(a) and I.C. §40- 803. A highway district can approve an ad valorem tax levy 
on the county property not to exceed 0.2% of the assessed market value. I.C. §40-801(1)(a). The 
collected amount is then "apportioned" to a district, unless there is an incorporated city within its 
boundaries; then the "apportioned" amount is reduced to 50%, with the other 50% of collected taxes 
23 "apportioned" to the city. LC. §40-801(l)(a). The apportioned funds are paid over to the highway 
24 district, including delinquent payments, interest, costs on all tax sales and redemptions. I.C. §40-805. 
25 
26 
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to the 
$241,000 to $338,000. of S. Syth, 16-8; Ex. That money is used exclusively for the operation, 
maintenance and snow removal of the streets in the City. (Aff. of S. Syth, 19) How the parties arrived at 
I the agreement to divide the revenue paid to the District each year is not a secret. 
2.1 History of the Dispute. 
The dispute brought forth in this case has had a long judicial history that played out before the 
Supreme Court in three separate matters. The first matter was ruled on in 1994 (identified by the 
District as Sandpoint D: City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway District, 126 Idaho 145, 
879 P.2d 1078 (1994). That action addressed who had ultimate authority over the street maintenance 
and their day-to-day operations within the City limits. The Supreme Court concluded that because the 
City did not have a :functioning street department, the District retained general supervisory authority to 
maintain the streets. Sandpoint I at pp. 150-151. 
The second matter was identified by the District as Sandpoint II: City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint 
Independent Highway District, 139 Idaho 65, 72 P.3d 905 (2003). In response to the ruling in 
Sandpoint I, the City did organize a functioning street department by ordinance passed May 17, 2000. It 
then commenced a declaratory judgment asking whether it had executive general supervisory authority 
over the City's public streets, since it had a fully functioning street department. The District Court ruled 
in favor of the City, but certified the question to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in Sandpoint II 
determined the statutory clause was silent as to the mechanism of transferring jurisdiction between the 
Highway District and the City; but reasoning that a multi-step process existed to divest a Highway 
District's liabilities, it would be inconsistent with the legislative intent to permit a City to exclude its 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS -- 4 ~~~~ada4 A PROFESSIONAL SEWlCE CORPORATION 
2.00 No!lhwest Blvd .• Suits 206 
Coeur d' Alan&, kklho 83814 
Phone: (208) 667-2103 
ll 
·1 
I/ taxpayers 
2 l1 that statutory dissolution the District be necessary before the City obtain jurisdiction 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
over the City streets within its boundaries. Sandpoint II, 139 Idaho at 70. The summary judgment 
issued by the District Court was reversed, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings on 
June 19, 2003. 
While largely ignored by the District, there is a third key decision in these related actions, which 
lead directly to the JPA. On June 4, 2003, the Supreme Court entered its opinion in Sandpoint 
Independent Highway District v. Board of County Commissioners of Bonner County and Bonner 
Countv and City of Sandpoint, 138 Idaho 887, 71 P.3d 1034 (2003). The action was to enjoin the 
County from conducting the very election to dissolve the District that was called for in Sandpoint II. 
The City was an Intervenor in that case, as well as one of the petitioners to dissolve the District that had 
been filed in April 2000. The question on appeal was whether the County Commissioners properly 
determined it was in the best interest for the entire District to be dissolved and then schedule an election 
for a vote on the dissolution. The Supreme Court concurred that the Commissioners' findings were 
correct; dissolution would be in the best interest of the public. The Court sent the matter back, allowing 
an election. 
With the almost simultaneous remands of Sandpoint II and Sandpoint III confronting the parties, 
cooler heads prevailed; the City and the District negotiated a compromise that resolved both companion 
cases. The District proposed a settlement that included entry into a Joint Powers Agreement (Aff. of 
Campbell, Ex. 1) The settlement was entered of record on July 3, 2003 as a Stipulation for Settlement. 
(Complaint, Ex. A) During the three years of appeal of Sandpoint II and Sandpoint III, the parties had 
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agreed to an arrangement that divided the labor; the City maintained the streets within its boundaries, 
while the District maintained all other streets outside the City but within the District boundaries. This 
arrangement was memorialized in the Stipulation for Settlement, which also provided that the City and 
the District would enter into the JP A for future work and funding disbursements. The District and the 
City represented on the record that they agreed to the following verities that cannot now be disputed by 
the District: 
1. 
2. 
"[T]hat the interests of the taxpayers within the respective entities and of the road 
users would best be served by continuation of the present arrangements." 
"Based on experience, the City should maintain its own streets and the District 
should expand its service area by annexation." 
3. "That continued litigation and the anticipated dissolution election would be costly 
and would not be in the best interests of the public." 
(Complaint, Ex. A) The terms of the settlement called for a joint statement of road jurisdiction, entry 
into the JP A, that the City would join to vacate the dissolution election, and would not object to future 
annexations into the District. Id. 
The Court approved Stipulation provides: 
2. The Sandpoint Independent Highway District and the City of 
Sandpoint shall enter into a joint powers agreement made.pursuant to Chapter 23, 
Title 67, Idaho Code which will provide for division of all ad valorem funds 
received under Chapter 8, Title 40, Idaho Code. Said joint powers agreement is 
intended to be a permanent resolution subject to termination only by mutual 
agreement of both parties. The division of funds shall be made twice yearly. 
The joint powers agreement would provide that the Sandpoint Independent 
Highway District pay over to the City of Sandpoint all ad valorem property tax 
funds received from levies by the District upon all property located within the city 
limits. The joint powers agreement would cover other matters as are appropriate. 
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This Court approved the Stipulation by Order dated July 11, 2003. (See, Attached A to this 
brief, signed by this Court and subject to Judicial Notice, ER 201.) Sandpoint II was dismissed with 
prejudice by this Court on June 4, 2004 (CV-00-788). The parties thereafter complied with the 
6 
7 Stipulation and entered into the JP A. As a consideration for entering into the JP A, the City agreed to 
8 assist in withdrawing the petition to dissolve the District and agreed not to challenge future annexations 
9 to the District. The election did not occur. Future annexations have occurred over the past ten years and 
lO include such communities as Dover and Ponderay. 
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2.2 Current Litigation - Sandpoint IV. 
On July 11, 2013, exactly ten (10) years after this Court approved the stipulation, the District 
notified the City that it was unilaterally withholding funds and refused to perform its obligations under 
the JPA. (Complaint, Ex. D) On July 25, 2013, the District notified the City that it unilaterally 
"elected" to terminate the JPA. (Complaint, Ex. E) The City filed its Complaint in this action on 
August 16, 2013, (Sandpoint IV) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the District to 
comply with the terms of the JP A The District is now seeking to dismiss the Sandpoint IV under 
I.R.C.P. I2(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
3. MOTION TO DISMISS Ac~D SlJMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must view the facts and reasonable inferences in the 
light most favorable to t.1ie plaintiff. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 637, 778 P.2d 757 
(1989). For a complaint to be dismissed under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), it must appear beyond doubt that the 
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it Curtis v. Siebrand Bros. Circus & Carnival Co., 68 Idaho 285,303, 194 P.2d 281 (1948). Moreover, 
if matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, a motion to dismiss shall 
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Thus, if a trial court considers factual allegations outside the pleadings on a motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim, it errs if it fails to convert the motion to one for summary judgment Hellickson v. 
Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273,276, 796 P.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1990). 
In Response to the motion, the City has filed the Affidavits of Scot R. Campbell and Shannon 
Syth. Both set forth operative facts relevant to the issues raised in the motion. First, as shown by the 
attachment to Mr. Campbell's affidavit, the use of a JP A at issue was advocated by the District. Second, 
the amounts disbursed by the District each year are not at a set amount; they vary annually, include 
delinquent payments from prior tax years and thus cannot as a matter of fact and law constitute a debt as 
asserted by the District. In addition, the City is relying upon the attachments to the Complaint as 
evidence of the parties' intent to be bound by the JP A, and the reliance that the City has invested in the 
JP A. These documents establish the fact that the JP A is in the best interests of the taxpayers of the City 
and of the District, that there was valuable consideration for the JP A and there is more than ample 
mutual advantage to both the City and the District by utilizing the JP A to serve the taxpayer. If any of 
these material facts are disputed, then the pending motion must be denied, discovery should ensue as 
24 permitted by I.R.C.P. 56(f), and the matter proceed to trial. Otherwise, the law outlined herein. 
25 
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as a matter 
Motion to Dismiss failure to state a must denied. 
4. ARGUMENT AND POINTS OF AUTHORITY 
The District's motion is based on assertions that the JP A to which it agreed to ten (10) years ago 
is legally void. To reach its wrong conclusions, the District has misapplied constitutional and statutory 
provisions, ignored the stated valid duration and consideration provisions in the JP A, as well as ignoring 
the fact that it is judicially and equitably estopped from asserting the invalidity of the JP A. 
4.1 The Joint Powers Agreement is legal, and the parties are entitled to provide 
for apportionment of taxes pursuant to that JP A. 
Idaho's Legislature has provided a statutory scheme that allows the state and public agencies ''to 
make the most efficient use of their powers by enabling them to cooperate to their mutual advantage ... " 
LC. §67-2326. "Public agency" includes both cities and highway districts. I.C. §67-2327. Public 
agencies may enter into agreements with one another for joint or cooperative action (a 'joint powers 
agreement" or "JPA") for the "joint use, ownership and/or operation agreements." The agreements may 
be for any power, privilege or authority "enjoyed jointly." LC. §67-2328. The District enjoys its power 
over the City streets pursuant to LC. §40-801. The City enjoys its power over its streets pursuant to 
I.C. §40-201. The improvement of highways is "permanent policy" of the State ofldaho. An agreement 
to care for the highways of the City is without question legal. LC. §67-2328(b). 
Idaho's Legislature has also provided a statutory scheme relating to the levy of taxes by highway 
districts. Highway districts are authorized, "for the purpose of construction and maintenance of 
highways and bridges under their respective jurisdictions," to make a highway ad valorem tax levy of up 
to two-tenths percent (0.2%) of market value for assessment purposes. I.C. §40-801(1)(a). The levy , 
I 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS -- 9 A ?ROFESSIONAL SE."lVICE COAPORAT'.ON 
250 Norl!lwest Blvd •• Suite 206 
Coeur d' Alane-. Idaho S3814 
Ph(;.ne: (208) 667 -2103 I 
amount may vote revenues. §40-819. statutory 
2 I scheme does not proscribe the highway district allocating the remaining revenues to the city by 
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agreement or otherwise. Nor does the statutory scheme in any way limit or proscribe the use of a joint 
powers agreement to divide funds for the mutual benefit of the very taxpayer who foots the bill for the 
local roads consistent with the State's permanent policy. 
Without attacking the purpose of the JP A, the District fashions an argument to say the 
mechanism of the JPA is illegal. The District is wrong. The District interprets LC. §40-801 et. seq. to 
mean "if a city maintains city streets, then 50% of the revenue from city properties shall be retained by 
the highway district and the other 50% shall be distributed to the city for construction and maintenance 
of city streets." Defendant's Memorandum, p. 10. This is a mistatement. The statute does not make 
city maintenance of city streets a condition precedent for the 50% distribution requirement to take effect. 
Further, the statute does not command that the highway district "retain" the remaining tax revenues from 
properties collected on properties located in the city. A court may not insert terms into statutes which 
are not there. Barnes v. Hinton, 103 Idaho 619,620,651 P.2d 553 (1982). More importantly, the statute 
does not state the District is absolved from expending funds to maintain roads in the cities lying within 
its District. To the contrary, such would be gross malfeasance and a violation of the District's sole 
purpose of, "construction and maintenance of highways and bridges under their respective jurisdictions". 
I.C. §40-801. 
The District cites Citv of Rexburg v. Madison Cnty., 115 Idaho 88, 764 P.2d 838 (1988), 
apparently to support the idea that the statute does not permit anythi.11g but a 50/50 tax distribution ratio. 
The District misreads the case, as the case dealt with an inadvertent decimal point error, resulting in the 
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rather revenue, taxes. 
1 Idaho at 88-89. The court in City of Rexburg did not address wnem,er a disbursement larger than 
50% would have violated the statute; it merely stated that the county had a statutory duty to at least 
allocate the 50%. 115 Idaho at 89-90. 
In reality, there is no law that states the 50% allocation of tax revenues required by LC. §40-
801(a) are the sole funds available for a City to maintain its roads. The issue in this case is not an I 
ephemeral academic argument. The practical reality is that the District needed to avoid an election that 
would have dissolved it The City needed funds to maintain its streets and the District was not doing its 
10 job. To avoid the election, the District devised a court approved settlement to set out how it would meet 
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its statutory duty to maintain City roads. The District agreed to divide its total revenue from the 
taxpayers by disbursing to the City the funds paid City taxpayers, but not a dime more. This is 
significant because the District's legal obligation is to maintain all of the roads within its jurisdiction, 
including the City's roads. See, Sandpoint I, supra. The 50% disbursement to the City required by IC 
§40-801 does not absolve the District of its obligations to City streets. Rhetorically it can be asked, is 
the District arguing it has no fmancial obligation to the City because of the mandatory disbursement 
required by I.C. §40-801(a)? Taking the District's argument to a logical conclusion; if the City did not 
spend its apportioned funds on roads, or the amount was inadequate, then it would be the City's tough 
luck as the District would have no further fmancial responsibility to maintain City roads. The District's 
argument is circular and not supported by the law. There is certainly no law to suggest that the District 
and City are prohibited from capping what will be divided from District revenue to the District, or 
memorializing the cap on the division in a joint powers agreement. The JP A does not violate IC §40-
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4.2 The Joint Powers Agreement did not create an "indebtedness." 
This case does not involve a debt. This case is about how the District has agreed to "divide" the 
funds it statutorily has available annually to meet its statutory duty to maintain the streets in its 
boundaries. Thus the District's constitutional argument about Article VIII §3 is based on a false 
premise. Very simply, the District has the power to levy a tax. I.C. §40-801(a). If that levy is made 
upon property within the limits of any incorporated city, 50% of the funds are apportioned to that 
incorporated city. The District has no control over those funds. Id. As to the balance of the revenue 
raised from the total District wide taxes, the District agreed it would divide from its funds any money 
received from the City taxpayer and disburse it to the City, but no more. The levy is a burden on all the 
taxpayers in the District. The levy amount can freely change as circumstances change. The amount can 
be up, or it can go doVvn. (Aff. of S. Syth, 16) This case is not about a fixed amount the District must 
pay annually in perpetuity. This case is about dividing an annual pot of money and who is going to 
write the check from that pot of money to fix the roads in Sandpoint, Idaho. The parties agreed ten (10) 
years ago in a Court approved agreement how the revenue would be divided to maintain the streets of 
Sandpoint. That is not a debt. 
The District's argument that this case is about indebtedness is pure sophistry. The JP A does not 
create an ongoing indebtedness or liability for District. The periodic disbursements to the City are 
23 based solely upon revenues raised by law to maintain highways. The amount divided to the City is not 
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The fact the disbursement is not a debt is easily seen when comparing the JP A disbursement to a 
municipal bond. A bond is for a fixed term. It is for a fixed amount. It has a fixed interest rate. It has a 
fixed date for interest payn;ients. It has provisions for security that will pay the precise amount 
bargained for even if there is a short fall in tax revenue. That is a debt. 
Here, the District has the statutory duty to maintain the roads within its jurisdiction. The District 
argues this is a "liability" it has incurred. Defendant's Memorandum, p. 5. Maintaining the roads of 
the City of Sandpoint is not a "debt" or "liability", it is an obligation set out as the sole purpose of the 
District. LC. §40-801. How the District spends its revenue to meet the statutory duty is its business and 
the legislature has left it to the District to do such. The District has already agreed how it will fulfill that 
duty in the best interests of the City taxpayers. It signed a JP A with the City. 
Article VIII §3 of the Idaho Constitution prohibits municipal governments, including cities and 
other subdivisions of the state, from incurring indebtedness or liability exceeding that year's revenues 
without a two-thirds approval by the voters. The purpose of the section is "to prevent local government 
entities from incurring debts without approval from the voters and a clear plan to retire those debts. 11 
City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 3, 137 P.3d 388 {2006); Taxpayers for Improving Pub. Safety v. 
Schwarzenegger, 172 Cal. App. 4th 749, 761, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 370, 377 (2009). Idaho's limitation on 
indebtedness was modeled after California's constitution. Frazier, 143 Idaho at 3. California courts 
1 If District contends that the JP A creates an ongoing indebtedness by virtue of regular division of its revenue given to the 
City, it must similarly contend that I.C. §40-801, which requires a 500/o remittance to the City, is an unconstitutional "debt''. 
The District has not, and indeed cannot, demonstrate the unconstitutionality ofI.C. §40-801 while using the statute to buttress 
its argument against the validity of the JP A. 
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/ is 1ntencted 
2 I consent the taxpayers, and require governmental agencies ro carry on their operations on a cash 
I 
: I basis." In re S. Humboldt Cmty. Healthcare Dist., 254 B.R. 758, 760 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2000). 
I The Idaho Supreme · Court declared long ago that a municipality does not violate the 
5 
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10 
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13 
constitutional prohibition on indebtedness when it pays expenses out of the revenue for that year. Ball 
v. Bannock County. 5 Idaho 602, 51 P. 454,455 (1897). Here, the District's disbursement to the City 
pursuant to the JP A are limited to a portion of that year's revenues, as no disbursement will ever require 
funds beyond what District has already collected. This is in accord \\ith the concept that "'[a] sum 
payable upon a contingency is not a debt, nor does it become a debt until the contingency happens."' In 
re Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases, 201 Cal. App. 4th 758, 807, reh'g denied (Jan. 4, 2012), 
review denied (Mar. 14, 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 312 (U.S. 2012) (quoting Doland v. 
14 Clark,143 Cal. 176, 181, 76 P. 958 (1904)). In In re Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases, the 
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court determined that "the state's commitment in the Joint Powers Agreement to pay the excess 
mitigation costs does not violate Section 1, Article XVI of the California Constitution because the state's 
commitment is contingent on there being excess mitigation costs, and a contingent obligation does not 
qualify as a 'debt' or 'liability' within the meaning of'' California's constitutional limit on debt. 
201 Cal.App. 4th at 807. 
The District cites to Frazier; Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 129 P. 643 (1912); 
Miller v. City of Buhl, 48 Idaho 668,284 P. 843 (1930); and City ofidaho Falls v. Fuhriman, 149 Idaho 
574, 237 P.3d 1200 (2010), to demonstrate the constitutional prohibition on indebtedness. However, 
24 these examples are inapplicable to this case, as they all deal with municipal purchases of systems or 
25 
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municipality to current 
2 year and for which the municipality would be liable from its general revenues. Feil, the Coeur 
3 d'Alene incurred indebtedness by purchasing a water system and issuing bonds payable over 20 years, 
4 I paid for by revenues from the water system. 149 P. at 649-50. Buhl dealt with a contract for the 
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purchase of an electrical generating system, paid for by the receipts from the sale of power and light. 
284 P. at 843. Fuhriman involved a power purchase JPA, by which the City of Idaho Falls would 
purchase power and energy from BPA over a 17-year period and would, upon certain events, require 
Idaho Falls to post cash or a letter of credit to secure its payment obligations. 149 Idaho at 576. And 
Frazier dealt with an JP A for the expansion of an airport's parking facilities. 143 Idaho at 2. None of 
these cases involve a situation analogous to the facts at hand. 
In contrast, this case deals only with contingent periodic disbursements from the District to fulfill 
its statutory duty to maintain City roads. Construction and maintenance of roads by statute is the only 
reason the District has the power to levy taxes. By its terms, the JP A simply requires District to 
"forward to the City all tax revenues received by the District collected from properties within the 
[c]ity ... " (Complaint, Ex. B) A debt is "an 'unconditional promise to pay a fixed sum at some specified 
time, and is quite different from a contract to be performed in the future, depending upon a condition 
precedent, which may never be performed, and which cannot ripen into a debt until performed." 15 
McQuillin Mun. Corp. §41:17 (3d ed.). "If an obligation is payable out of a special fund only, and the 
municipality is not otherwise liable, it is generally held that there is no indebtedness." 15 McQuillin 
Mun. Corp. §41:30 (3d ed.) (citing U.S. v. City of Charleston, 149 F. Supp. 866 {S.D.W.Va 1957); Law 
Offices of Cary L. Lapidus v. City of Wasco, 114 Cal.App. 4th 1361, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 680 (1st Dist.), rev. 
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from general funds, are not considered debt, and not prohibited the Constitution. at 1368. 
See also, Homebuilders Assoc. v. Kansas City, 431 S.W.2d 1 ll(Mo. 1968) (contract for reimbursement 
from revenues derived from water main extension were not unconstitutional debts); 15 McQuillin Mun. 
Corp. §41:22 (2013) (merely incurring contingent future liability does not create an indebtedness, a 
contract to pay a fixed price annually, where contingent on the supply furnished, does not create an 
indebtedness). 
In this case, the District's disbursement to the City is akin to a special or contingent fund, as the 
District is not otherwise liable to pay City any fixed amount at any point; the District's disbursement 
amount is entirely conditioned by its collection of taxes on properties within the city. As shown by the 
Affidavit of Ms. Syth, in fact the amount varies each year. As in Lapidus, the District's promise to 
disburse tax revenues to the City does not "place a charge upon the general funds of the City, nor create 
a situation in which future taxpayers might be strapped with obligations incurred by a prior 
administration without the ability to meet those obligations or the necessary voter approval." Id. 
( citations omitted). The JP A is no more than an agreed division of funds from tax levies; if no funds are 
collected, no obligation exists. Taxes levied on property Vvithin a city are generally not part of its 
indebtedness. 15 McQuillin Mun. Corp. §41 : 17. The JP A is simply what the stipulation states it is; an 
agreement on the division of revenue. That is not a debt. 
4.3 The JP A provides for an appropriate method of termination- that is, by the Parties' 
mutual asset. 
Idaho's Joint Powers Act ("Act") authorizes the type of JPA entered into between the City and 
I the District. I.C. §67-2326, et seq. The Act authorizes municipal agencies to share responsibilities by 25 
26 
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is make 
2 I by enabling them to cooperate to their mutual advantage. I.C. §67-2326. The JPA is to implement the 
3 
"permanent policy" of the State. The District's contention that the JP A is void for want of an effective 
4 I termination clause is misguided. I.C. § 67-2328 requires, "Any such agreement shall specify the 
5 ! 
6 
following: (1) Its duration." The plain meaning of the statute does not require duration of a specific 
7 I number of months or years. The JP A satisfies the Act's duration requirement by providing express terms I 
8 of the JP A's duration, and an additional vehicle for its termination upon certain dissolving acts. The 
9 Parties did not leave any room for ambiguity when they mutually agreed on the JP A term to meet the 
10 
1 mutual obligation to maintain City streets: 
11 I 
12 
DURATION: The duration of this [A]greement shall be perpetual or until such 
time as the District and the City jointly and together agree to amend or terminate the 
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same. 
(Complaint, Ex. B) The JP A further provides: 
DISSOLUTION: This JPA will automatically terminate if the District is dissolved. 
It will also terminate if the City supports any future petition for dissolution of 
District. 
(Complaint, Ex. B) 
The District's cites cases involving agreements lacking any term of duration. This is not the case 
here, where the parties specifically provided for the JP A's duration - in perpetuity or by mutual 
amendment or termination. In fact, Courts have held that a definite term of duration in perpetuity is not 
the same as an "indefinite" duration. Bell v. Leven, 120 Nev. 388, 391, 90 P.3d 1286 (2004); Southern 
Wine and Spirits of Nevada v. Mountain Valley Spring Company, LLC, 646 F.3d 526, 532 (8th Cir. 
2011 ). In both Bell and Southern Wine, the courts held that the parties contemplated the duration of 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTIONTODISMISS -- 17 ?o1~~rfli'dM4 A ?ROi=ESS!ONAL SS:W!CE COft~TION 
250 Northwest Blvd •• &.lite 200 
Coeur d'Alene. !daho83814 
Pham: (208) 667-2103 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
terms. 
The District argues that because I.C. §67-2328(5) requires a method(s) to be employed "in 
accomplishing the partial or complete termination of the agreement" this language should be read by the 
Court to mean a joint powers agreement cannot continue in perpetuity. The statute does not say that. 
The District also says there is no method of termination. Again, the District is wrong: the method is 
mutual agreement. The District builds its argument that "the JP A is an illegal in perpetuity agreement" 
by citing to Barton v. State, 104 Idaho 338, 659 P.2d 92 (1983), and several other cases for the 
proposition that "Idaho courts hold perpetuity clauses such as the one in the JP A to be illegal in violation 
of public policy." (Brief in Supp. of Motion to Dismiss at 13) These cases are not apposite to the facts 
of this case, as they deal exclusively with state permits to private parties "to erect or maintain a 
14 ! permanent obstruction in a public street, or convey the street or rights to the street to a private person ... " 
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Barto!!, 104 Idaho at 340. Barton is particularly distinguishable, as the court there was asked to infer an 
intent for the state to be perpetually bound by a purported JP A Id. The court declined to imply such a 
term. Id. "Absent clear manifestation to be perpetually bound, [the court] will not infer such intent. 
Where a contract is not expressly made perpetual by its terms, construction of such contract as perpetual 
is disfavored." Id. Here, the JP A expresses in no uncertain terms that its duration is to be perpetual, or 
until mutually amended or terminated. Nothing about the term is ambiguous or violative of public 
policy. Contra, the JP A advances the permanent public policy of improving highways. LC. §40-201. 
The Parties manifested a clear understanding that the JP A would exist permanently absent mutual 
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Other states addressing the issue have also ruled contrary to the District's argument. For 
example: A contract that "provide[ s] for termination or cancellation upon the occurrence of a specified 
event" is not void as a perpetual contract or terminable at will. Payroll Express Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 659 F.2d 285,291 (2d Cir.1981) (applying New York law); see Nicholas Labs. Ltd. v. Almay. 
Inc., 900 F.2d 19, 21 (2d Cir.1990) (applying New York law); First Commodity Traders, Inc. v. Heinold 
.Commodities, Inc., 766 F.2d 1007, 1012 (7th Cir.1985) (applying Illinois law); Southern Hous. 
,Partnerships, Inc. v. Stowers Management Co., 494 So.2d 44, 47-48 (Ala.1986); G.M. Abodeely Ins. 
Agency, Inc. v. Commerce Ins. Co., 41 Mass.App.Ct. 274,669 N.E.2d 787, 789-90 (1996). The specific 
event which allows termination can include a breach by a party of a term of the contract. See, First 
Commodity Traders, 766 F.2d at 1012; Payroll Express, 659 F.2d at 292. Ross-Simons of Warwick, 
Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc. 182 F.R.D. 386, 395 (D.R.I.,1998) 
Arguendo, the District's position were correct, the remedy should be to give effect to the 
remainder of the JP A. The JP A has a severability clause, which would keep enforceable the distribution 
scheme and the remainder of the JP A even if the duration clause is limited to mutual termination. 
(Complaint, Ex. B) This would be consistent with the intentions of the parties stated in the Stipulation 
that, "[S]aid joint powers agreement is intended to be a permanent resolution subject to termination only 
by mutual agreement of both parties". (Complaint, Ex. A, p. 4, 12) Factually, the parties have already 
relied upon the custom of using mutual agreement to amend the JPA. For example, see the mutual 
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The JPA's duration clause should be found sufficient or limited to termination by mutual 
4 I agreement. 
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4.4 The JP A is supported by adequate consideration; the Parties intended for the 
original terms of the JP A to provide sufficient mutual consideration for the duration 
oftheJPA. 
As its last "shot gunned" justification for not honoring its obligation, the District contends that 
the City must provide new consideration "for each budget year" in return for the District's compliance 
with the JP A. This is, under any other circumstances, a mugging. It is basic common sense that a party 
cannot enter into a settlement, the terms of which call for a statutorily-authorized joint powers 
agreement to effect a statutory policy, and then demand ten (10) years after the fact additional 
consideration for each subsequent year. 
The JPA is the result of the Parties' Stipulation for Settlement ("Settlement"), entered into July 3, 
2003. (Complaint, Ex. A) By its terms, the Settlement grants the City jurisdiction over city streets, 
requires the formation of a the JP A, compels the City to vacate its petition for a dissolution election, 
requires dismissal of the civil case with prejudice, requires the City to not oppose future annexation 
elections sought by the District, and stipulates that the District waives costs awarded on appeal by the 
Idaho Supreme Court in Docket No. 27441. (Complaint, Ex. A) 
The JP A itself recited mutual consideration. (Complaint, Ex. B) The Stipulation was entered in 
Sandpoint II, and referred to Sandpoint III as a "companion case"; the Stipulation ended all continued 
24 litigation. The City agreed to cap its maintenance needs from the District to the amount paid by its 
25 
26 
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to 
the taxpayers 
is significant. 
faced with the obligation to 
fund roads in a much wider geographical area,, but with a lesser tax base. In other words, the City would 
get less service for its tax dollar today than it would have received if annexations had been successfully 
resisted .in years past The argument of no consideration is not only misplaced, it is just plain not fair. 
"[T]he settlement of a bona fide dispute or controversy is the consideration for a compromise or 
settlement, rather than any question as to the amount actually due or owing from one to another. It is the 
settlement of the bona fide controversy, differences, or claims of the parties which forms the 
consideration for the new contract terminating the parties' former transactions." Moran v. Copeman, 
55 Idaho 785, 47 P.2d 920, 922 (1935). The North Carolina Court of Appeals summarized this point 
well: "The real consideration is not found in the parties sacrifice of rights, but in the bare fact that they 
have settled the dispute." Knight Pub. Co .. Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank. N.A., 131 N.C. App. 257, 
262, 506 S.E.2d 728, 731 (1998). 
This Court approved the Settlement. The Idaho Court of Appeals recently held that a sett1ement, 
the terms of which are incorporated into a court order, does not need additional consideration to be 
effective. Davidson v. Soelberg, 154 Idaho 227, 296 P.3d 433, 438 (Ct. App. 2013). The same rationale 
should apply here, where the Parties provided mutual consideration in the Settlement, a part of which 
was the exercise of their rights under LC. §67-2326, et~. 
Additionally, mutual benefit and consideration are inherent in the nature of a joint powers 
agreement. As noted above, the purpose of the Act is "to make the most efficient use of [public 
agencies'] powers by enabling them to cooperate to their mutual advantage." I.C. §67-2326. The Act 
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11 . " 
, to to or cooperative aA,u.vu. 
2 I JP A, by its terms, its incorporation into the Settlement, and the underlying policy of joint powers 
3 
41 
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is supported by adequate consideration. 
4.5 The District is estopped from taking a position inconsistent with its act of entering 
into the .Joint Powers Agreement. 
The District is taking a position contrary to which it agreed when it entered into the JP A, and 
consented to this Court's Order. It was the Court's dismissal based on the stipulation that permitted the 
JP A. As a matter of equity, the District is either judicially estopped from reversing its position taken in 
open court, or is equitably estopped from harming the City by reversing its position. The doctrine of 
estoppel may be used against a highway district to prevent it from talcing a position inconsistent with 
previous actions, in order to prevent manifest injustice; the Supreme Court approved this very legal 
principal in Sandpoint I, 126 Idaho at 15L See also, Murtaugh Highway Dist. v. Twin Falls Highway 
Dist., 65 Idaho 260, 268, 142 P.2d 579 (1943). 
4.5.1 The District is judicially estopped from reversing its position on the 
stipulated settlement which the court approved. 
Judicial estoppel precludes a party from advantageously taking one position, then subsequently 
offering a second position that is incompatable with the first. Hoagland v. Ada County, 154 Idaho 900, 
303 P.3d 587, 599 (2013). Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine which exists to protect the dignity 
of judicial process, and is invoked by the court at its discretion. Id. Generally, when a litigant obtains a 
22 judgment, advantage, or consideration from one party, he will not thereafter be permitted to repudiate 
23 such by means of inconsistent and contrary allegations or testimony to obtain a recovery or a right 
24 against another party arising out of the same transaction or subject matter. Indian Springs, LLC v. 
25 
26 I 
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intended to prevent parties from playing "fast and loose" \\ith the legal system. 
In Hoagland, a plaintiff had dismissed state law claims including wrongful death, based on 
representations to the presiding judge that she was preceding entirely on § 1983 claims; on appeal, the 
plaintiff attempted to resurrect wrongful death state claims which she had voluntarily dismissed. The 
court found that the representation to the court which established the basis for dismissal estopped the 
plaintiff from pursuing the claim. When a party has taken a position before the court, it may not 
thereafter pursue an action based on an inconsistent position. Buckskin Properties, Inc. v. Valley 
County, 154 Idaho 486, 300 P.3d 18-29 (2013). In Buckskin, counsel for Valley County expressed in 
oral argument that certain resolutions would not be rescinded, and that the County would not enforce the 
provisions of a capital contribution agreement requiring the payment of compensation for future phases 
of a project. Based on those representations, the court found the developer's claim for declaratory relief 
moot. Thereafter, the County began to assert a contrary legislative or contractual scheme to enforce the 
contributions to the detriment of the opposing party. The court found the County was judicially 
estopped from changing its position on the legislative scheme. 
Just as in Hoagland and Buckskin, the District here made specific representations to this Court in 
the filed stipulated settlement, which included by its nature counsel's representation that the agreements 
were legal, and a proper basis for the Court's Order of Dismissal. LR.C.P. 1 l(a)(l) Toe District now 
seeks to repudiate all of the terms of the stipulation, including the JP A. The court should exercise its 
discretion to prevent the District from asserting the invalidity of the JP A, which was the basis for this 
Court to dismiss the City of Sandpoint's action in Sandpoint II, and rendered moot the election to 
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I 
Stipulation on 
District represented that the interests of the taxpayer and road users would best be served by a 
continuation of the arrangement in which the City maintained the streets within its boundary, that the 
I District would maintain all streets outside the City but within the District boundaries, and the District 
capped its obligation to the City by disbursing 100% of the tax revenues to the City for that pn_rpose; the 
JP A was to be executed memorializing these agreements. The parties also stipulated that continued 
litigation on the dissolution action would be costly and not in the best interests of the public, and the 
court dismissed based on that Stipulation. These are significant representations the District should not 
now be allowed to abandon. 
Now, the District has begun to withhold funds, claiming that the JP A is not valid or enforceable. 
This is clearly an inconsistent position to the one taken before this Court that was enunciated solely to 
halt the dissolution election. To preserve the integrity of the system, the District should be judicially 
estopped from pursuing a completely contrary position which it took before this Court. Otherwise, this 
Court is basically been used as a tool for deceptive conduct by the District in agreeing to a contract in 
order to avoid continued litigation, and representing as much to the court, and now disclaiming any 
enforceability of such contract when the risk of dissolution or litigation appears to be past. 
4.5.2 The District should also be equitably estopped from claiming that the JP A is 
unenforceable. 
Equitable estoppel requires ''that the offending party must have gained some advantage or caused 
a disadvantage to the party seeking estoppel; induced the party seeking estoppel to change its position to 
its detriment; and it must be unconscionable to allow the offending party to maintain a position which is 
inconsistent from a position from which it has already derived a benefit." Sandpoint!, 126 Idaho at 151. 
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motion, statutory 50/50 
governmental agencies do not have discretion to violate the express terms this statute by agreeing to 
some other tax distribution ratio ... " Brief in Supp. of Motion to Dismiss at 11. The District also claims 
specific terms of the JP A render it unenforceable, and claims it is overall unconstitutional. This position 
is entirely inconsistent with District's act of entering into the Stipulation and the JP A. The District 
obtained the advantage and benefit of avoiding litigation that would have resulted in an election likely to 
dissolve the District. It agreed to provide a specific apportionment of taxes pursuant to a JP A to avoid 
that result. It induced the City to forego that dissolution election and agree not to block any additional 
annexation by the District. The District devised the benefit of the JPA for ten (10) yeas and it is now 
unconscionable to allow it to repudiate its prior position. See, Sandpoint I, supra. 
13 5. CONCLUSION 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
For the foregoing reasons, District's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be 
denied. The Court is asked to enter an order in a form to be submitted to chambers. 
DATED this~ day ofNovember, 2013. (;); 
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Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal ) 
corporation of the State of Idaho, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
SANDPOINT INDEPENDENT ) 
HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a political ) 
subdivision of the State of Idaho, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-00-0061S 
ORDER APPROVING 
STIPULATION FOR SETTLEMENT 
A.l'lffi DISMISSING CASE 
The Idaho Supreme Court having entered Remittitur to this Court on 
June 26, 2003 and the parties having thereafter filed with this Court a 
Stipulation for Settlement, now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Stipulation for Settlement filed 
herein be, and it is hereby, approved. 
ORDER APPROVING STIPULATION 
FOR SETILEMENT 
1 
FURTHER ORDERED that this case and it hereby, 
dismissed with prejudice with each party to bear its own costs and attorney's 
fees. 
Dated this J day of July, 2003. 
/SJ JOHN l MITCHELL 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this / it.-day of July, 2003, I served by mail or 
facsimile true copies of the above document upon the following: 
BRUCE GREENE 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
320 N. 2ND AVENUE 
SANDPOINT, IDAHO 83864 
SCOTT W. REED 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P. 0. BOXA 
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816 
~~  (!Ltd~ 
ORDER APPROVING STIPULATION 
FOR SETTLEMENT 
2 
I 
1 .I 
II !I 21 
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3 j Sandpoint, Idaho Telephone: (208) 263-0534 
4 Facsimile: (208) 255-1368 
scampbell@ci.sandpoint.id. us 
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C. MATTHEW ANDERSEN, ISB No. 3581 
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS, a 
Professional Service Corporation 
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-2103 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121 
cma@winstoncashatt.com 
Attorneys for City of Sandpoint 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJJ\i'TY OF BONNER 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal 
16 corporation of the State of Idaho, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a 
political subdivision of the State of Idaho, 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Bonner ) 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-13-01342 
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I, SCOT R. CAMPBELL, being first duly sworn on oath, say: 
1. lam Sandpoint, 
AFFIDAVIT OF SCOT R. CAMPBELL 
A "'FIOZ:ESS~.!;L SI::::~VICE GOR?OR~TlOPt 
/l\i,,m- 811/'d., SJ.£ite 206 
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"I 
.) . Maintained on a regular basis are files related to pending historical litigation. 
The City Sandpoint litigation files includes those related to 
Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway District, Bonner County Cause No. CV-00-00615 
(Sandpoint II). 
5. Located in the Sandpoint II files are copies of correspondence exchanged at the time the 
9 matter was settled in 2003. 
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6. Attached as Ex. 1 is a true and correct copy from the City's files of a letter dated June 24, 
2003 from the Highway District's lawyer, Bruce Greene proposing settlement by entering into a Joint 
Powers Agreement. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _i __ day of November, 2013. 
Notary Public in 
Residing at ~==__...:~~:::::z_-, 
My appointment expires:--"-=~~-=__...:'-
AFFIDAVIT SCOT R. CAMPBELL 
2 '"Ro=ES&oOl'l'Al S£~V!CE OOFIP-{JF!AT!ON 
~.iortr~E!l;;i:i. 'S,liiil!, 200 
24-2003 16 :.C:4 
June 24, 2003 
City of Sandpoint 
Attn: Mayor Ray rv.liller 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, ID 83 864 
GREENE,P.A 
Attorney At Law 
320 North Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(208) 263-1255 
FAX (208) 265-2451 
VIA FACSIMlLE ONLY TO 263-3678 
Re: Sandpoint lndependmt Highway District 
Dear Mayor: 
To avoid any further confusion (hopefully) the settlement offer pending is as follows: 
1) SIHD would agree to a stipulated court settlement giving Sandpoint jurisdiction over its' 
streets, despite the Supreme Court ruling. 
2) SIBD would waive t.11.e costs award in the Supreme Court decision. 
3) SIHD would agree by Joint Powers Agreement to share its' property taxre--venues Vvith the 
City annually. The District would pay over to the City all the property tax funds receive.cl from the 
residents of the District who are also inside the City The JPA could also cover a number of other 
things, e.g., plovnng, grading, hauling services, etc. which you might need assistance on The tax 
revenues would vary annually, but right now would approximate $175,000. I don't have the exact 
figure before me- but it is inthe documents earlier furnished. 
4) The City would in turn agree - as would Bonner County- that the dissolution election be 
vacated. 
5) The County would be further agreeing that annexation elections go forward ( naturally you 
would not be able to dictate to the County; you would sim,ply agree as part of the stipulation with the 
County that such election be vacated and annexations be approved. 
EXHIBIT 
I 
City of Sandpoint 
Attn: Mayor :Ray M'tller 
2003 
Those be essential terms settlement proposal. we discussed 
benefits from settling as opposed to ongoing li-iigation 441d politicking, 
don't need to be in a settlement agreement. 
The District awaits your response this Thursday morning. Hopefully these two entities can stazt 
cooperating. If the peacemakers are given a chance for a feiv years vie may "ve!l look back in surprise 
as to why we had struggled against each other so long. 
The District Vvill meet in executive session after we hear your response. 
Yours very tmly, 
BRUCE H. GRETh'E 
Counsel for SIHD 
BHG/bw 
cc: SIHD 
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1626 Lincoln Way 
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WINSTON & CASHATT, LA WYERS, a 
Professional Service Corporation 
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-2103 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121 
cma@winstoncashatt.com 
11 Attorneys for City of Sandpoint 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF B01'i'NER 
STATE 
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CITY OF SAND PO Th.TT, a municipal 
corporation of the State of Idaho, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a 
political subdivision of the State of Idaho, 
23 STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
24 County of Bonner ) 
Case No. CV-13-01342 
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I, SHA1'i'NON SYTH, being first duly sworn on oath, say: 
AFFIDAVIT OF SHA1'i'NON SYTH 
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2. 
Sandpoint. 
I 
As part my responsibilities I am the custodian City 
: 1
1 
3. As part my r=ponoihiliti= I ,m chargeA with the verification of ,mmmts pai,l 
annually by the taxpayers Sandpoint for assessments related to the operation, maintenance and snow 
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11 
12 
13 
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17 
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21 
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24 
removal for the City's streets. 
4. The City of Sandpoint lies within the boundaries of the Independent Highway District. 
The boundary covers a wider area than the City. 
5. The Independent Highway District is responsible for setting the annual budget for 
maintenance, operations and snow removal within its boundaries, which is directly related to tax rates. 
6. The total tax paid in a given year fluctuates due to the changing budgets set by the 
Independent Highway District. The City of Sandpoint receives funds for the operation, including snow 
removal, and maintenance of its streets principally from two sources. First, like all other cities in the 
state, the County is required by law to forward to the City of Sandpoint 50% of the funds collected from 
the taxpayers of the City. The balances of the collected funds are paid to the Independent Highway 
District. Second, to meet its statutory duty for road maintenance within its boundaries, since the last 
quarter of 2003, the District has disbursed to the City the remaining portion of revenue allocated to it 
from City taxpayers. By the terms of the negotiated settlement, the sum paid is a cap on the amount the 
District contributes to the operation, maintenance and snow removal of the city streets. 
7. I maintain the City of Sandpoint's records of the total amounts disbursed each year to the 
City of Sandpoint for the operation, maintenance and snow removal for its streets. 
8. Attached as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct summary of the total amounts disbursed each 
year since 2003 property tax collections from the Independent Highway District to the City. The 
25 I amount disbursed varies each year due to the vagaries affecting the tax collecting from the taxpayers in 
261 the City. In addition, when there is a delinquent payment made, there is a disbursement for that 
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taxes been collected Further, exhibit reports only maJor items 
expenditure from the City Street Department's budget made for that fiscal year in reliance on the funds 
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9. All funds disbursed to the City for operations, maintenance and snow removal go into a 
restricted account for the Street Department. The funds are used only for the specific purpose of 
operation, maintenance and snow removal. 
10. Over the years, the City has expended the funds for such items specifically listed in 
Exhibit 1 directly related to operations, maintenance and snow removal. 
11. In reliance on the disbursement made by the Independent Highway District, the City has 
expended funds and incurred obligations for services, equipment, maintenance, personnel, created a 
management structure and dedicates oversight at great expenditure of time and money all to operate, 
maintain and remove snow in the best interests of the City. 
12. The City of Sandpoint anticipates that the imminent start of snow season will bring with 
it dangerous road conditions caused by accumulated ice and snow. Removal could be impeded if the 
Independent Highway District continues to withhold tax 
Notary 
Residing at ~:...z..::~-~==,-
My appointment 
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6 I David R. Wynkoop 
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP 
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9 Susan P. Weeks 
10 James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
11 Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
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F 
Q t = quarters in which property taxes were collected by the County 
FY2013 
Property 
Tax Year 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
Total 
FY2012 
Property 
Tax Year 
1STQTR 
Oct,Nov, Dec 
714.09 
389.38 
2,462.07 
193,152.99 
196,718.53 
lSTQTR 
Oct,Nov, Dec 
Adjustment 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 1,085.53 
2009 387.27 
2010 3,358.48 
2011 176,897.00 
2012 
Total 181,728.28 
FY2011 
Property lSTQTR 
Tax Year Oct,Nov, Dec 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 341.93 
2008 397.63 
2009 2,372.24 
2010 172,845.57 
2011 
2012 
Total 175,957.37 
11/6/2013 
ZNDQTR 3RDQTR 4THQTR 
Jan,Feb,March April, May, Jun July, Aug, Sept 
BYIHD 
1~20 
865.82 
223.44 
1,041.70 
9,750.82 
11,882.98 
ZNDQTR 3RDQTR 4THQTR 
Jan,Feb,March April, May, Jun July, Aug, Sept 
427.90 
6.50 
117.37 812.18 88.88 
481.87 1,378.05 344.62 
1,401.73 1,637.26 382.19 
14,204.76 131,278.77 4,424.23 
16,205.73 135,106.26 5,674.32 
ZNDQTR 3RDQTR 4TH QTR 
Jan,Feb,March April, May, Jun July, Aug, Sept 
0.35 
464.50 348.04 
573.64 1,902.01 264.51 
1,397.58 992.41 355.34 
12,542.26 130,442.67 3,291.21 
14,977.98 133,685.48 3,911.06 
FISCAL YEAR 
TOTALS 
1.20 
1,579.91 
612.82 
3,503.77 
202,903.81 
208,601.51 
FISCAL YEAR 
TOTALS 
427.90 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
6.50 
2103.96 
2591.81 
6779.66 
326804.76 
338,714.59 
FISCAL YEAR 
TOTALS 
0.35 
1,154.47 
3,137.79 
5,117.57 
319,121.71 
328,531.89 
EXHIBIT 2 
City of Sandpoint 
Finance Department 
S!HD Revenue Receipt History 
EXPENDITURES 
AMOUNT 
EXPENDITURE 
PROJECTS 
162,943 Asphalt Overlay 
31,266 Snow Removal 
13,985 N Sandpoint pathway 
75,462 Boyer Infrastructure 
1,000 Main Street 
4,348 (:,.jk; .. l, l ""'""'P i..-.+. grn+ ...,...,,,+,-h 
5,794 Schweitzer cutoff 
64,384 Skidsteer/2013 GMC 
359,182 
EXPENDITURES EXPENDITURE 
AMOUNT PROJECTS 
202,428 Asphalt Overlay 
37,917 Snow Removal 
16,334 Boyer to Division 
46,652 Selkirk loop Int Ctr match 
350,564 Washington St 
1,612 Schweitzer cutoff 
655,507.00 
EXPENDITURES EXPENDITURE 
AMOUNT PROJECTS 
134,745 Asphalt Overlay 
40,305 Snow Removal 
9,367 Boyer to Division 
26,377 Seal coat 
467,119 Washington St 
4,767 Schweitzer cutoff 
682,680 
U:\ssyth\My Documents\SIHD\2013 Summary.xlsxSheetl 
1 n 
F iscai Year October 1 the 30th City of Sandpoint 
quarters which property taxes were coliected by the County Finance Department 
SIHD Revenue Receipt 
FY2010 
Property 1STQTR 2NDQTR 3RD QTR 4THQTR FISCAi. YEAR EXPENDITURES EXPENDITURE 
Tax Year TOTALS AMOUNT PROJECTS 
2003 4.24 4.24 137,366 Asphait overlay 
2004 15,863 Snow Removal 
2005 31.13 31.13 232,064 Pine st Rebuild 
2006 283.78 160.19 71.57 515.54 4,352 Schweitzer cutoff 
2007 998.41 613-52 1,264.28 431.42 3,307.63 
2008 3,759.28 1,413.40 1,201.41 812.23 7,186.32 
2009 167,602.57 15,957.84 126,049.58 7,435.68 317,045.67 
2010 
2011 
2012 
Total 172,648.28 18,144.95 128,617.97 8,679.33 328,090.53 389,645 
FY2009 
Property lSTQTR 2NDQTR 3RDQTR 4THQTR FISCAL YEAR EXPENDITURES EXPENDITURE 
Tax Year Oct,Nov, Dec Jan,Feb,March April, May, Jun July, Aug, Sept TOTALS AMOUNT PROJECTS 
2003 55.27 4.83 60.10 268,552 Asphalt Overlay 
2004 42.74 2.09 0.57 45.40 102,489 Snow Removal 
2005 710.78 59.11 538.57 1.19 1,309.65 8,000 Schweitzer cutoff 
2006 481.25 142.60 810.46 214.14 1,648.45 
2007 4,606.13 1,029.52 835.22 386.62 6,857.49 
2008 165,351.61 10,331.88 121,636.59 3,352.66 300,672.74 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
Total 171,247.78 11,565.20 123,825.67 3,955.18 310,593.83 379,041 
FY2008 
Property lSTQTR 2NDQTR 3RDQTR 4THQTR FISCAL YEAR EXPENDITURES EXPENDITURE 
Tax Year Oct,Nov, Dec Jan,Feb,March April, May, Jun July, Aug, Sept TOTALS AMOUNT PROJECTS 
2003 0.38 1.40 1.22 3.00 336,505.00 Asphalt Overlay 
2004 286.36 82.90 28.81 11.72 409.79 2,230 Schweitzer cutoff 
2005 329.23 472.66 538.23 245.65 1,585.77 
2006 599.50 1,163.82 921.50 406.48 3,091.30 
2007 136,182.53 7,149.08 140,705.66 5,394.57 289,431.84 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
Total 137,398.00 8,869.86 142,195.42 6,058.42 294,521.70 338,734.63 
11/6/2013 U:\ssyth\My Documents\SIHD\2013 Summary.xlsxSheetl 
the touowing 30th of Sandpoint 
Finance Department 
SIHD Revenue 
fY2007 
Property 1STQTR 2NDQTR 3RD QTR 4THQTR FISCAi.. YEAR EXPENDffURES EXPENDITURE 
Tax Year Oct,Nov, Dec Jan,Feb,March April, May, Jun July, Aug, Sept TOTALS AMOUNT PROJECTS 
2003 192.03 452.43 1.79 646.25 202,729 Asphalt Overlay 
2004 256.21 264.99 1,043.18 133.32 1,697.70 18,030 Dover bike path 
2005 2,885.21 1,332.69 782.39 17,982.25 22,982.54 42,415 Snow Removal 
2006 1 ,,., QC:') (It; 7 /1Q1 ")") 105,336.81 '! 17h 1? ?c;2,r:;c;i:;_?n 71,250 ::lb Rr.y,=,r <:o'.:)clrn.~t .L"'TL.1...IV"-~VJ , ,._,.._.-'-•'-'- _,,, ..... # .., .... -. 
2007 6,178 Schweitzer cutoff 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
Total 146,295.50 9,131.33 107,162.38 21,293.48 283,882.69 340,602 
FY2006 
Property lSTQTR 2NDQTR 3RDQTR 4THQTR FISCAi.. YEAR EXPENDITURES EXPENDITURE 
Tax Year Oct,Nov, Dec Jan,Feb,March April, May, Jun July, Aug, Sept TOTALS AMOUNT PROJECTS 
2003 221.40 254.68 527.07 76.32 1,079.47 109,535 Asphalt Overlay 
2004 1,911.82 894.50 1,362.18 1,333.02 5,501.52 31,337 Ella Ave - Lake to Superior 
2005 119,707.28 9,779.76 100,877.23 4,818.56 235,182.83 12,448 Snow Removal 
2006 8,000 Sandcreek Ped Brdwlk 
2007 6,198 Division St Bikepath 
2008 85,238 Rotary snow blower/dump trk 
2009 19,750 Ford F600 
2010 4,085 Schweitzer cutoff 
2011 
2012 
Total 121,840.50 10,928.94 102,766.48 6,227.90 241,763.82 276,591 
FY2005 
Property lSTQTR 2NDQTR 3RDQTR 4THQTR FISCAi.. YEAR EXPENDITURES EXPENDITURE 
Tax Year Oct,Nov, Dec Jan,Feb,March April, May, Jun July, Aug, Sept TOTALS AMOUNT PROJECTS 
2003 (718.49) 108.45 670.70 2,020.14 2,080.80 12,500 Asphalt Overlay 
2004 114,899.31 9,557.74 81,253.13 3,153.06 208,863.24 36,700 Sandcreek Ped Bdwlk 
2005 18,584 Snow Removal 
2006 2,800 Lincoln Ave 
2007 12,500 CMAQ Flusher/deicer 
2008 133,293 loader /snowblower 
2009 10,000 Schweitzer cutoff 
2010 
2011 
2012 
Total 114,180.82 9,666.19 81,923.83 5,173.20 210,944.04 226,377 
11/6/2013 U:\ssyth\My Documents\SIHD\2013 Summary.xlsxSheetl 
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iscal Year October 1 30th City of Sandpoint 
Q Finance Department 
S!HD Revenue 
FY2004 
Property 1STQTR 2NDQTR 3RDQTR 4THQTR FISCAL YEAR EXPENDITURES EXPENDITURE 
Tax Year Oct,lllov, Dec Jan,Feb,March April, May, Jun July, Aug, Sept TOTALS AMOUNT PROJECTS 
2003 107,053.37 8,742.96 80,763.22 4,045.51 200,605.06 100,730 Cedar St Overlay 
2004 18,600 Asphalt Overlay 
2005 31,283 Snow Removal 
2006 1 Ll flfl{) Qnyo.- porl hiir- p~Th ..... -.,...,.., ..... 
2007 35,490 Sandcreek Bridge 
2008 6,000 1/2 Lakeview sidewalk 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
Total 107,05337 8,742.96 80,763.22 4,045.51 200,605.06 206,103 
GRAND TOTAL 2,746,249.66 
11/6/2013 Documents\SIHD\2013 
DAVIDE. WYNKOOP 
ShJ£R.ER & vn:NKOOP, 
MAIN 
31 
MERIDIAN; IDAHO 83680 
208-887-4800 
FAX 208-887-4865 
I.S.B. 2429 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, PA 
1626 LINCOLN WAY 
COEURD-ALENE, IDAHO 83814 
208-667-0683 
FAX 208-664-1684 
I.S.B. 4255 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Independent Highway District 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND OF THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal corporation ) 
of the State ofidaho. ) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a 
political subdivision of the State ofidaho, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW Independent Highway 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV 2013-01342 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S 
RESPONSE BRIEF AND 
AFFIDAVITS 
David E. Wynkoop of SHERER & WYNKOOP, LLP and Susan P. Weeks of JAMES, VER.i."'lON 
& WEEKS, P.A. and hel·eby moves this Court for an order sttiking the Affidavit of Scot 
Campbell. the Affidavit of Shrum.on Syth and those portions of Plaintiffs' Response Brief which 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE BRJEF 
'. 1 1! AND AFFIDAVITS- l 1 i ·~· 
Complaint, not limited 
A Motion to Dismiss based upon IRCP Rule is based upon aUegations contained 
Plaintiffs Complaint See Hellickson v Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 796 P.2d 150 (Ct.App. 1990). 
RnlA i?(h) providf'.~· 
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered ( 6) to dismiss for failure of 
the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters 
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of 
as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable 
opportunity to present all material made pe1tinent to such a motion by 
Rule 56. 
It is premature for this motion to be converted to a summary judgment motion since the 
parties have not yet conducted discovery to gather the facts. The parties may save the time and 
expense of discovery if the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss in part or in whole. 
Accordingly~ any matters outside the allegations contained Plaintiffs' Complaint 
should be stricken and not considered by the Court 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this y<f'h day ofNovember, 2013. 
MOTION TO STRJKE PORTIONS 
AFFIDAVITS- 2 
SHERER & WTh"'KOOP, LLP 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE BRIEF 
6 o. '2 ;) L 
,....;,,-t/ X --,v,. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this " -- day of November, 2013, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S 
RESPONSE BRIEF AND AFFIDAVITS upon the following, by the method indicated 
Scot R. Campbell 
Sandpoint City Attorney 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Cs Matthew Anderson 
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS 
250 No1thwest Boulevard, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 814 
XX via facsimile to 208-255-1368 
XX via facsimile to 208-765-2121 
MOTION TO STR1KEPORTI0NS OF PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE BRIEF 
3 
DAVIDE. WYNKOOP 
SHERER & ~'YNKOOP, LLP 
MERIDIAN, IDAHO 83680 
208-887-4800 
FAX 208-887-4865 
I.S.B. 2429 
SUSANP. WEEKS 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
208-667-0683 
FAX 208-664-1684 
I.S.B. 4255 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Independent Highway District 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND OF THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal corporation ) 
of the State of Idaho, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a ) 
political subdivision of the State ofidaho, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Introduction 
CASE NO. CV 2013-01342 
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
In its response to this motion, the City maintains that the Joint Powers Agreement (JP A) 
that is the subject of this litigation was a lawful agreement. The City premises this argument on 
two concepts. The first is a sweeping statement that joint power agreements generally are a 
laV\ful, constitutional and enforceable agreement between public agencies. The City recognizes 
- 1 
analysis is must a 
motion to dismiss that focus on this key issue. 
The second argument is estoppel. The City contends that both judicial estoppel and 
equitable estoppel preclude IHD from questioning the legality of the JPA. However, neither of 
these doctrines prevents a party from questioning the constitutionality or legality of an 
agreement. 
Procedural Irregularities 
In its response to IHD's motion to dismiss, the City focuses on the correct standards to be 
utilized by the Court in considering a motion to dismiss. The City then states under 12(b )( 6), if 
matters outside the pleadings are presented, the Court is to treat the motion to dismiss as a 
motion for summary judgment. IHD has moved to strike affidavits submitted by the City with its 
response. IHD presented no matters outside the pleadings in its motion to dismiss. The City is 
unable to convert the Districf s motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment by supplying 
rebuttal affidavits. See Nampa Charter School. Inc. v. DeLaPaz, 140 Idaho 23, 89 P.3d 863 
(2004). Therefore, the City's affidavits should be stricken and this Court should determine the 
matter based solely upon the City's pleadings. 
Further, the City's arguments that there are material questions of fact that dictate the 
matter proceed forward as a summary judgment are not persuasive. IHD raises issues of whether 
the contract is illegal and unconstitutional. These issues do not require additional discovery for 
determination. They require only an examination of the pleadings. There is no judicial utility in 
extending this case to allow for discovery if the fundamental issues can be determined in a 
motion to dismiss. 
s 
Jurisdiction over Separate Highway Systems 
a 
defined I.C. § 40-104, which provides: means public highways within the 
corporate limits of a city, with a functioning street department, except those highways which are 
under federal control, a part of the state highway system, part of a highway district system or an 
extension of a rural major collector route as specified in section 40-607, Idaho Code." IHD's 
jurisdiction is defined in LC. § 40-109, which provides in relevant part: "'Highway district 
system' means all public highways within each highway district, except ... those included within 
city highway systems of incorporated cities with a functioning street department. .. " Idaho Code 
§ 40-201 provides that "[t]here shall be a system of state highways in the state, a system of 
county highways in each county, a system ofhigh"vays in each highway district, and a system of 
highways in each city, except as otherwise provided." 
The jurisdiction of a highway district is set forth in l.C. § 40-1310 and l.C. § 40-1311, 
and is limited to those highways within the highway district system. It does not include the city 
system. The jurisdiction of a city is set forth in l.C. § 40-1333, which provides that cities with 
city highway systems shall be responsible for the construction, reconstruction and maintenance 
of highways in their respective city systems. This same code section allows cities to make 
agreements with highway district for their highway work, or a portion of it, but also requires 
cities to compensate the highway district fairly for any work performed. 
Idaho Code§ 50-1301(2) defines a functioning street department as a city department 
that is responsible for the maintenance, construction, repair, snow removal, sanding and traffic 
control of a public highway or public street system, and that the existence of such department 
qualifies it to receive 
-3 
to § 1 recogmzes 
a 
residents a within the boundaries of a highway ~·~·u~ are considered to be 
members of the highway district,Idaho Code§ 40-1323 gives the city council the same powers 
and duties as highway district commissioners. 
After analyzing these exact statutes in City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent 
Highway Dist., 72 P.3d 905, 139 Idaho 65 (Idaho 2003) (Sandpoint I), our Supreme Court 
concluded "the above statutes, insofar as is relevant to this case, provide that a city with a 
functioning street department has jurisdiction over all public highways within its corporate 
limits, except those highways that are part of a highway district system, and a highway district 
has jurisdiction over all public highways within the highway district, except those included 
within a city highway system of an incorporated city with a functioning street department." 
After Sandpoint L the City created a functioning street department. Paragraph 18 of 
Complaint. However, in City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 
65, 72 P.3d 905 (2003)(Sandpoint II), the Supreme Court noted that the above statutes were 
intended to establish jurisdiction for cities with functioning street departments at the time the 
highway district was formed. The Supreme Court held for a city that created a functioning street 
department after the fact, the highway district did not lose control over the streets until the 
highway district's jurisdiction was lm.vfully terminated. 
Thereafter, a petition to dissolve IHD was considered by the commissioners of Bonner 
County. This lead to litigation between IHD and the Bonner County Commissioners and the 
ensuing Supreme Court case of Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist. v. Board of County 
1 This jurisdiction is no different than a 
county or school district. 
or school district where residents of the city are also residents of the 
-4 
to an for was 
the City would not obtain any of the money or assets as a successor entity if the district was 
dissolved. FoI1owing these last two decisions by the Supreme Court, the City and IHD entered 
into the JP A that is the subject of this suit. 
Joint Powers Agreement 
Given the holdings of the Idaho Supreme Court in Sandpoint II and the companion case 
of Sandpoint III, until the City is deannexed or IHD is dissolved, IHD has jurisdiction over the 
streets in Sandpoint. Why the City claims that the jurisdiction is pursuant to I.C. § 40-801 is 
unclear. The jurisdiction exists pursuant to statutes discussed above. 
The fundamental precept a 
power, privilege or authority, they 
lS 
exercise them 
two more) agencies the same 
, but never beyond the limitation of 
such powers, privileges or authority, including statutory and constitutional limitations. LC. § 67-
2328. In other words, a joint pmvers agreement is a contract between two or more public 
agencies to exercise,jointly, all power(s) common to each of them, for the purpose of 
accomplishing specific goals they may have in common. The City maintains that IHD has a 
statutory obligation pursuant to I.C. § 40-801 to maintain the City's roads, and therefore the 
payment by IHD to City IHD's tax revenue to discharge duty is an appropriate 
exercise of a joint power to meet a common goal. In truth, IHD has jurisdiction of the city 
streets because they are within their jurisdiction, not because they collect ad valorem taxes on 
them. Thus, a JP A for the maintenance of the streets would be appropriate as long as it does not 
run afoul of any statutory or 
- 5 
§ enter one 
lS 
agreements as as does not violate any statute or the constitution. 
does not dispute a JP A for the joint exercise of powers is appropriate. However, the clause of the 
JP A that is at issue in this case does not encompass either of these aspects. It does not limit its 
terms to joint or cooperative action. The payment provision violates the Idaho Constitution and 
Idaho statutes. 
Statutory jurisdiction of an agency may not be altered by a JP A. LC. § 67-2328(a). 
Wnen the jurisdiction portion of the agreement is examined, it attempts to impermissibly alter 
IHD'sjurisdiction. The supervisory authority portion is in accordance with the statute. 
The "revenue distribution" clause provides that IHD will levy taxes in accordance with 
Chapter 13, 40. This statement is not a or but merely a reiteration 
ofIHD's statutory powers. The remaining portion of this clause, which is the focus of this 
litigation, provides: 'The District will pay over to the City all property tax funds from such 
District levies on all property located within the city limits." As discussed later in its brief, this 
portion of the JPA violates the Idaho constitution. 
In its opening brief, IHD provided the statutory scheme found at LC.§ 40-801 to inform 
the Court regarding collection of tax revenue for highway districts. The money that is not 
apportioned to City under statute is paid to IHD as part of its general fund. 
The City presents nvo arguments to the court on why it claims IHD's payment of a 
portion of its general tax revenue is constitutionally acceptable. The first is that LC. § 40-801 
does not proscribe a highway district from entering into an agreement to pay its general tax 
s 6 
revenue to another entity. second is it is to 
tax revenues to streets. 
to the first argument, § 40-801 is clear. 50% of tax revenues collected 
on city properties and apportioned to the highway district are part of the highway district's 
general tax revenue fund. The statute does not allocate to the City any percentage greater than 
50% of the collected on city properties. The City argues that the statute does not limit the 
District's expenditure of its general tax revenue funds. While that statement is true, once the 
funds become general revenue funds of the District, then it must expend them within the 
statutory and constitutional limits imposed upon it. 
The City is a creditor ofIHD under the payment clause of the JPA. IHD is required to 
make an annual payment to the City for street maintenance services the City is going to perform 
for IHD. It is no different than ifIHD had contracted in perpetuity with Interstate Concrete and 
Asphalt for Interstate to repair the roads IHD's jurisdiction. Under the city's reasoning, the 
contract could extend one hundred, two hundred or even 300 years. An absurd result indeed. 
The City next advances the argument that I.C. § 40-801 places IHD under a statutory 
duty to maintain the roads lying within its district, and therefore the payment of this money is the 
discharge of IHD 's statutory duty. There is no such statutory obligation under this particular 
code section. The power and duties of IHD to maintain the City's streets are established in its 
general jurisdictional statutes discussed previously. LC. § 40-131 
this duty, IHD may not violate the Idaho constitution. 
Idaho Code§ 40-801 provides in relevant part that the commissioners of a county 
highway system, the commissioners of a county-wide highway district, and the commissioners of 
highway districts are the purpose construction and 
to ad tax statute 
boundaries.2 The coffers 
highway district as its tax revenue for road construction and maintenance. Once it is placed in 
lHD's general fund, any expenditure must be in accordance with Idaho statutes and the Idaho 
Constitution. 
IHD cannot alter the statutory apportionment of tax revenue set forth in I.C. § 40-801. 
The funds apportioned to IHD by the county from revenues collected from levies against city 
properties is part ofIHD's general tax revenue. IHD is unable to change the characterization of 
that tax revenue by means of a JP A. 
The City argues the JP A is nothing more than an agreement to pay funds to the City to 
discharge IHD's statutory obligation to maintain the City's streets. other words, the City is 
providing street maintenance services to IHD. Yet the City seems unable to grasp if that is the 
purpose of the payment, then the City stands in the position of a creditor who is owed payment 
for services performed for IHD. The fact that the City is a municipal entity that has a common 
goal of street maintenance does not change this fundamental fact.3 
Idaho Constitution, Article 8, Section 3 
A. Introduction 
It is the Idaho Supreme Court that interprets the Idaho Constitution ... not the courts of 
California, Washington, or any other state. In its brief, the City has virtually ignored the Idaho 
2 The City points out that in its opening brief, IHD indicated that the money paid to the City was for road 
construction and maintenance. The City takes the position this statement was wrong. LC. § 48-801 is clear that the 
levy must be limited to this purpose. However, it is not as clear that the city to which a portion of the taxes are paid 
must use the money for road construction and maintenance. However, this ambiguity does not change the substance 
of the argument presented by IHD. 
3 Moreover, it is current and future IHD commissioners who are elected to best prioritize the use ofIHD tax 
revenues. The JP A LL'llawfully diminishes or even destroys IHD' s discretion on how to allocate its scarce tax 
revenues. 
s - 8 
8, 3. 
states. 
to Idaho authority to contradict the analysis of Article Section 3 -~, .. ~.u·-~ 
IHD' s initial brief. Based upon Idaho case law, the JP A clearly creates an illegal liability or 
indebtedness in violation of Article 8, Section 3. 
B. The requirement that IHD pay the City is a liability or an indebtedness 
The provision that JP A requires IHD to make payment to the City annually for services 
rendered to benefit streets within IHD's jurisdiction violates the Idaho constitution. The City 
doggedly clings to its argument that IHD has a statutory duty to maintain its streets, and 
therefore the payment is in lieu of work IHD is required to perform. This argument fails to 
address the creditor issue. 
In addressing the constitutional challenge, the City abandons the farce that this agreement 
is a JPA, and claims it is a ''revenue sharing agreement." However, there is no source of revenue 
that the City is sharing with IHD. Instead, there is a multi-year obligation for IHD to pay the 
City from its general fund in perpetuity for contract services the City has agreed to perform. The 
City advances the untenable argument that the payment IHD is required to make under the JP A 
can't be viewed as a debt because LC. §40-801 apportions some of the tax levy revenue collected 
pursuant to this statute to the City. However, that fact has no import to whether the JP A payment 
is a liability or debt to IHD. The ta.x levy is the source of revenue to IHD, as well as the City. 
The mere fact that it sen°es as the source of revenue to two governmental entities is 
inconsequential in determining the constitutional issue. 
The City tries to claim there is a difference between a "disbursement" and a "debt". 
argument that a disbursement is not a debt is ,u-~u, 
-9 
It question was 
obligation in the JP A is not a debt. Similarly, the argument that payment 
occurs in this debt has no bearing on whether it is an indebtedness or liability. Were IHD to 
enter into a 10 vear adiustable rate mort1m2e. the navment would fluctuate. A debt is an amount 
., .., .._; "-' ,,' .L .,; 
owed, whether it is fixed or fluctuates. That is exactly what the JP A encompasses an 
obligation owed every year, even though the amount might fluctuate. 
The City argues that even if the JPA creates a debt, it is only an annual expense and will 
never exceed IHD's revenues because it is paid annually from IHD's revenues. This argument 
ignores the fact that the indebtedness is a recurring liability which exceeded the revenue in the 
year the liability was created . 
The initial IHD brief analyzed definitions of "indebtedness" and "liability" as stated 
by the Idaho Supreme Court. In the City's response brief, the City chooses not to address or 
even acknowledge these definitions. Rather, the City cites numerous California opinions which 
define indebtedness much more narrowly than the Idaho Supreme Court definitions. Surely the 
City is aware that the Idaho Supreme Court is the ultimate authority when it comes to 
interpreting the Idaho Constitution. The definitions provided by California courts or other state 
courts have no binding or even persuasive effect when they contradict the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Our Supreme Court has specifically and repeatedly rejected the decisions of other states 
interpreting similar provisions to Article 8, Section 3. IHD submits that Idaho case law should 
be examined for the definitions of "liability'' and "indebtedness," not case law from other states. 
Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 129 P. 643 (1912) dealt with the definitions of 
and at some length the context of Article 8, See 4-6 
s 
to cases dealt these 
V. 1 
91 Supreme Court held that a commitment by the City of Boise to 
improve river frontage violated Article 8, Section 3, of the Idaho Constitution. The Supreme 
Court thoroughly discussed the breadth of Idaho's prohibitions contained in Article 8, Section 3 
and stated: 
The courts to whose decisions we have above referred have indulged in 
various subtleties and refinements of reasoning to show that no debt or 
indebtedness is incurred where a municipality buys certain property and 
specifically provides that no liability shall be incurred on the part of the 
city, but that the property shall be paid for out of a special fund to be 
raised from the income and revenue from such property. The reasoning, 
however, of those cases utterly fails when applied to our constitution, for 
the reason that none of those cases deals with the word 'liability,' which is 
used in our constitution, and which is a much more sweeping and 
comprehensive term than the word 'indebtedness'; nor are the words 'in 
any manner or for any purpose' given any special attention by the courts 
in the foregoing cases. The framers of our constitution were not content 
to say that no city shall incur any indebtedness 'in any manner or for any 
purpose,' but they rather preferred to say that no city shall incur any 
indebtedness or liability in any manner, or for any purpose. It must be 
clear to the ordinary mind on reading this language that the framers of the 
constitution meant to cover all kinds and character of debts and 
obligations for which a city may become bound, and to preclude 
circuitous and evasive methods of incurring debts and obligations to be 
met by the city or its inhabitants. 
Boise Development Company, Ltd. at 361, 143 P. at 535, quoting from the 
Feil case. 
The Court then rejected arguments based upon the case law from other states that had 
more limited definitions of "indebtedness" and "liability", and the Supreme Court concluded: 
We are of the opinion, therefore, that under the authority of Feil v. City of 
Coeur d'Alene, the contract upon which this action is based by its terms 
plainly incurs a liability, if not a debt, upon the city of Boise, that the 
obligations of said contract do constitute a new debt upon the city, and we 
therefore hold that said contract is void. 
at 1 
stare to define the terms 
at 
it 
and "indebtedness" as contained Article 
case 
3 of the Idaho Constitution. How other states may define those terms for purposes of their unique 
constitutions has no persuasive value Idaho. The City's reliance on out of state cases to define 
the terms "indebtedness" and "liability" for purposes of Article 8, Section 3 is misplaced. This 
Court should carefully consider how Idaho judicial decisions have very broadly defined those 
terms. 
]The City does not argue the JP A meets ordinary and necessary expense exception. Rather, 
the City argues only that the JP A does not create an "indebtedness" or "liability" of IHD. The 
City tries to distinguish the long line of precedent cited by IHD that an ongoing multiple year 
debt is prohibited by indicating that cases discussing multiple year debts arose in the context 
of purchases. This fact is a distinction without a difference. In City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 
Idaho 1, 3, 137 P.3d 388, 390 (2006), the Supreme Court recognized, "[b]roadly speaking, Article 
VIII, § 3 imposes two requirements to be met by local governments before incurring 
indebtedness. The first requirement is a public election securing two-thirds of the vote ... " 
In City of Idaho Falls v. Fuhriman, 149 Idaho 574. 578-579, 237 P.3d 1200, 1204-1205 
(2010), the City of Idaho Falls tried to distinguish the contract debt it incurred in a power 
purchase agreement a period of 17 years from other cases finding a Idaho Falls 
urged the Supreme Court to limit the "necessity-requires-urgency" interpretation of the 
constitutional requirement to cases involving large capital projects, such as the expansion of an 
airport parking garage, and not to apply the analysis to cases of extraordinary indebtedness or 
local 
s 
etc. an 
the 
This rejected exception is exactly the argument the presents to this Court. It wishes 
to characterize the debt as a liability that arises from the ordinary administration of IHD's 
statutory obligation to maintain roads. Even if the City were correct about the characterization of 
the debt, it would still run afoul of the constitutional prohibition. Under the City's reasoning, 
IHD could incur a debt or twenty million over twenty years so long as IHD had revenue of one 
million per year. This reasoning is wholly inconsistent with Idaho Supreme Court cases. The 
debt is a multiple year obligation. 
C. The Special Fund Doctrine does not save the JP A from its unconstitutional 
infirmities. 
The City argues that the JP A does not create an illegal "indebtedness" or "liability" since 
each year's property tax revenues will be used to pay IHD's obligation to the City. The City 
cites several non-Idaho cases in support of its argument. Indeed, it is apparently true that some 
states allow the concept of a special fund to enable goverrnnent agencies to fund capital 
improvements over time without violating the constitutions of those states. 
The Feil and Buhl cases are both good examples of the special fund argument. In both 
cases, the cities hoped to finance long-term water and electricity projects and use the proceeds 
received from customers to pay for the improvements such that the city's general fund would not 
be impacted. The cities argued that because their general funds would not be adversely impacted 
there would be no "liability" or "indebtedness" created and thus no violation of Article 8, Section 
3. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments to recognize special 
s - 3 
to customers received 
utility revenues alone. Notwithstanding this special fund argument, the Court held that 
agreements violated the plain language of Article 8, Section 3. The Court declined to overrule 
Feil and find that the "special fund" arguments removed the taint constitutional violation. 
The Supreme Court flatly rejected the special fund doctrine which is "accepted by a great 
majority of cases, and holds that a municipality does not contract indebtedness or incur liability 
within the constitutional limitation by undertaking an obligation which is to be paid out a 
special fund consisting entirely of revenue or income from the property purchased or 
constructed." Asson v. of Burley, 105 Idaho 432,439,670 P.2d 839,846 (1983). The 
Supreme Court noted 
doctrine does not exempt long-term arrangements by governmental agencies from the 
prohibitions contained Article 8, Section 3. 
The City's argument that the JPA is immune from the prohibitions of Article 8, Section 3 
because the tax revenues involved are special funds is totally without merit. 
Estoppel 
A. Estoppel does not save a Constitutionally Invalid Agreement 
The City repeatedly argues in its brief that IHD should be estopped from asserting that 
the JPA is invalid under the Idaho Constitution and Idaho statutes. The Idaho Supreme Court 
definitively rejected the City's argument in Deer Creek Highway District v. Dournecq Highway 
District, 37 Idaho 601,218 P. 371 (1923). First, the Court held that a contract between highway 
districts for construction of a bridge across the Salmon River was void. Since the contract could 
not be performed \vithin the budget year, it violated 8, Section 3 of the Idaho 
s - 4 
went on 
\Vas 
not used to save an 
that "[ a ]n estoppel can never be invoked in aid of a contract which is expressly prohibited by a 
constitutional or statutory provision." 37 Idaho 601, 609, citing School District v. Falls 
County, 30 Idaho 400, 164 P. 1174. The Court went on to add that both of the public agencies 
who entered into the contract were chargeable with the knowledge of the limitations imposed 
upon the other by Article 8, Section 3 of the Constitution. Accord Village of Heyburn v. 
Security Savings & Trust Co. 55 Idaho 732, 49 P.2d 258 (1935), and 0. T Jones v. Big River 
Irrigation District, 93 Idaho 227, 459 P .2d 1009 ( 1969). Idaho Courts are clear that estoppel 
cannot be used to validate an othenvise illegal agreement, whether equitable estoppel or judicial 
estoppel. 
The City cites three cases in support estoppel arguments. The City first cites City of 
Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway District, 129 Idaho 145,879 P.2d 1078 (1994) 
"Sandpoint I". This case is inapposite to the issue before this Court. In Sandpoint L the trial 
court applied estoppel and the Supreme Court reversed, holding that estoppel was not applicable. 
Further, there was no allegation of a constitutional or statutory violation as there is in the case 
now before this court. 
The City also cites Jvfurtaugh Highway Falls 65 Idaho 260, 
142 P .2d 579 (1943) for the proposition that estoppel may be applied against a highway district. 
However, the Murtaugh case. like Sandpoint I, did not involve an illegal agreement or an 
allegation of violation of statutory or constitutional provisions. Also, although the court stated 
the case was 
s - 5 
I to IS upon 
statutes 
The City next cites Hoaglund v. 154 Idaho 900, 303 P.3d 587 1 
support of its estoppel argument. Hoaglund involved an attempt to resurrect a wrongful death 
claim which Hoaglund had previously voluntarily dismissed. Hoaglund told the Court one thing, 
and then contradicted herself in order to revive her wrongful death action. The Court refused to 
allow this misrepresentation. There was no allegation of an unlawful action based upon a statute 
or the constitution. 
Hoaglund has no application to these facts. the present case the City and IHD entered 
into the JP A in the apparent belief that it was lawful. It has now come to the attention of IHD 
(and probably the City) that the JPA violates the apportionment statute and the Idaho 
constitution. The Idaho Supreme Court decisions cited in this brief clearly do not allow the 
doctrine of estoppel to validate othefV\iise unlawful actions. Estoppel has no application to the 
present case. 
The City also argues that judicial estoppels should apply and cites Buckskin Properties v. 
Valley County, 154 Idaho 486,300 P.3d 18 (2013) to support its position. This case involved a 
developer who agreed to contribute road impact mitigation fees to Valley County as a condition 
of development. A Development Agreement was entered into pursuant to which the developer 
paid fees and received development approval. the fees were paid and the lots \Vere 
approved by the County, the developer sued for return of the fees he had voluntarily paid. 
The Court held that the developer voluntarily paid the fees, received the benefit of the 
development agreement he entered into, and so could not now contend that he entered into the 
agreement involuntarily. Buckskin, the County adopted a made moot some 
s - 6 
to 
court's that rendered moot several 
developer's claims. The Court held that the developer's claims were moot because the County 
no longer engaged in the conduct the developer was seeking to restrain. 
It was in response to the developer's hypothetical that the County might change its 
position and come back after the developer for illegal impact fees that the Supreme Court 
discussed judicial estoppel. In dicta, the Supreme Court responded to the developer's 
hypothetical concern that judicial estoppel would protect the developer from future "'sharp 
dealing or revision of Resolution 11-6 by the County", Buckskin Properties at 500. 
Buckskin has no applicability to the case at bar. In Buckskin, the County's attorney made 
a very specific factual representation to the trial court that the County would not rescind the 
resolution. The Supreme Court responded with dicta to the developer's concern of future county 
action contrary to the attorney's representation that the County would be precluded from acting 
contradictory to the County's factual representations to the trial court. There was no argument 
that the County's Resolution was entered into violation of the Idaho Constitution or in 
violation ofldaho statutes. 
The situation now before this Court is very different from facts in Buckskin. Here there 
was no specific factual representation made to the trial court. The only representation was that 
the parties resolved a former suit by entering into a JP A, which was trne. More significantly in 
the present case, the JP A clearly violates the Idaho Constitution and Idaho statutes. 
The Buckskin case was cited and discussed at length by the City in its response. 
·s discussion of judicial estoppel cites to and is upon 
IN OF DISMISS - 7 
It is does not case. 
not 
argument. is apparently the first Idaho case to 
it is important to examine Loomis to determine when judicial estoppel may be applied versus 
when the application of judicial estoppel is not warranted. 
Loomis was a passenger in a car driven by Church. Loomis was injured when the vehicle 
she was riding in collided with a Garret Freightlines truck. Loomis first sued Garret Freightlines 
and in that case she made sworn statements that Garrett Freightlines was solely responsible for 
the accident and that Church was free from fault. Loomis obtained a settlement from Garret 
Freightlines. 
Loomis then sued Church and alleged directly opposite facts. In her lawsuit against 
Church, Loomis asserted that Church was not at fault, but acted with reckless disregard by 
not stopping at a stop sign before crossing State Highway 26, even though Loomis had asked 
Church to stop and Church verbally refused. 
In other words, Loomis' specific factual allegations in her second lawsuit against Church 
were directly contrary to the specific factual allegations Loomis previously swore to in her 
lawsuit against Garret Freightlines. The Supreme Court was concerned that these directly 
contradictory factual allegations resulted in a fraud on the courts. The Supreme Court first stated 
the parameters of judicial estoppel as: 
It is quite generally held that where a litigant, by means of such sworn 
statements, obtains a judgment, advantage or consideration from one 
party, he will not thereafter, by repudiating such allegations and by means 
of inconsistent and contrary allegations or testimony, be permitted to 
obtain a recovery or a right against another party, arising out of the same 
transaction or subject matter. 
76 Idaho 87, 93,277 P.2d 5621, 565 (citations [all from other states] omitted). 
SUPPORT s - 18 
to a UH,HCUA.i H.Ho.n<U.n.'- at 
as present case. case before court contains no allegations 
sworn factual allegations arising to the level of a fraud upon this Court. 
Finally, the City cites Indian Springs, LLC v. Indian Springs Land Investment, LLC, 147 
Idaho 737,215 P.3d 457 (2009) in support of its judicial estoppel argument. Indian Springs also 
involves inconsistent sworn factual statements presented to the Court. In a mortgage foreclosure 
proceeding, the holder of the mortgage alleged a principal balance of the note of$188,000 at one 
point, but then alleged subsequent bankruptcy proceedings that the principal balance was 
$270,637.50. It is these contradictory factual allegations that trigger the discussion and 
application of judicial estoppeL 
Moreover, the Court stated that "Because judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine 
existing to protect the dignity of the judicial process, it is invoked by the court at its discretion.'· 
147 Idaho 737,748,215 P.3d 457,469. The Court went on to note that "' ... the party asserting 
judicial estoppel must show that the sworn statement at issue was used to obtain a judgment, 
advantage or consideration from another party." Indian Springs at 749,215 P.3d at 469. 
(Emphasis added.) Because the party claiming judicial estoppel failed to show that the other 
party made factual mis-statements to the court with the intent to gain an advantage, the Supreme 
Court dismissed the judicial estoppel argument. Based upon controlling Idaho judicial 
estoppel has no application to this case. First, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that no 
type of estoppel cannot be used to enforce an agreement which violates Article 8, Section 3. 
Second, judicial estoppel applies only to inconsistent sworn factual statements. Here, there is no 
allegation of inconsistent sworn statements. Rather, is a mutual mistake 
OF s - 19 
enter a 
as case on 
estoppel is invoked only at the discretion of the court to prevent an attack on the integrity of the 
judicial system where a litigant is playing fast and loose with the truth of the factual 
representations made to the court. In the case at bar, there are no inconsistent sworn factual 
statements that put the integrity of the Court at risk. Rather, the City and IHD, in 2003, entered 
into a settlement agreement that turns out not to be authorized by statute and violates the Idaho 
Constitution. 
Even if the Court believed it has the discretion to invoke judicial estoppel, it should not do 
so in this case. Any equitable remedies should be invoked only to support and uphold the 
Constitution and statutes; not to allow an agreement to stand which violates the Constitution and 
statutes and the policies behind those provisions. 
Conclusion 
The JP A that is the subject of this litigation was the product of negotiations between the 
parties and a fair attempt to resolve those issues. However, the terms agreed to amounted to an 
agreement to pay the city in perpetuity for services the City rendered for IHD. As such, this 
clause violated Article 8, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution and the payment clause may not be 
upheld. Additionally, as noted in IHD's initial brief, the JPA violates several statutes and public 
policies of the State of Idaho. 
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INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a 
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PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL CITATION 
AUTHORITY 
City wishes to correct reference at page 3 of its Response Memorandum when it refers to 
the District as a "political subdivision". That is not correct. The District is a taxing district without 
governing authority and as such is different than county, city, town or 'village. See 
Strickenfaden v. Greencreek Highway District, 42 Idaho 738, 747-755, 248 P. 456 (1926); Shoshone 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
OF 
THE FIRST nJDICIAL DISTRICT THE 
AND THE BONNER 
15 CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal 
corporation of the State of Idaho, 
16 Case No. CV-13-01342 
17 
18 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INDEPEl\i'DENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEfENDAt"'TT'S MOTION TO 
RESPONSE BRIEF A..'\TD AFFIDAVITS 
19 political subdivision of the State of Idaho, 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1. REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
Plaintiff City of Sa.11dpoint ("the City") requests that this Court Defendant Independent 
Highway District's ('·the District") Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Scot Campbell and Shannon Syt1.. 
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The District brought a Motion to s Complaint for failure to state a claim. 
motion to dismiss is based upon several false predicates about the legality of the agreement, the intent of 
the agreement and impact of the agreement. Further, motion to dismiss misstates fact of and 
8 the scope of the District's continuing obligation to provide for rhe maintenance the Streets of 
9 Sandpoint; all of which was capped by the parties' JPA. The false predicates of the District's briefing 
11 
12 
13 
14 
require a supplementation of the record so the Court has the opportunity to review motion proper 
context. It is the to do such. 
In opposition to the motion, the City filed two affidavits: one from Scot R. Campbell, City 
Attorney Sandpoint, and one Shannon Treasurer 
15 Sandpoint. The District now seeks to strike these affidavits on the sole basis that it is "premature to 
16 convert" the Motion to Dismiss to a Motion for Summary Judgment It is not certain what relief the 
17 District requests. The District does not attack either the admissibility or the veracity of the contents of 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
the affidavits. By quoting to 12(b)'s obligation to permit a party a reasonable opportunity to 
present matters made pertinent, coupled with the statement that 
appears to be that th.e District is making an I.RC.P. 56(f) request 
has not yet COITh'11enced, 
additional time to conduct 
discovery. If that is the request, then the City asks what additional discovery it wishes to conduct before 
the motion is submitted. If the request is just that the Court should not consider the affidavits, then the 
request is not well founded as it would negate the cited provision of LRC.P. 12(b) wbich clearly permits 
the City to offer ar1y pertinent material. 
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as provided in Rule 56." 
pleadings on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, it errs 
for summary judgment. Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 
are 
stL.11unary 
the 
it fails to convert to one 
276, 796 150 App. 1990). 
8 Although court discretion to consider or matters outside the pleadings, there is 
9 no principled reason the Court should not consider the affidavits offered in this case. 
11 
12 
13 
15 
A trial is a search for the tn1th. District's suggestion that it is "premature" for the Court to 
consider the truth ruling on the motion is not a reasonable interpretation uf the rules First, :he 
premature argument negate the very obligation the Court to consider information made 
pertinent and taken in 
arc highly pertinent to the response. Second. there is no law for the proposition that 
16 supporting affidavits are "premature" in considering a motion to dismiss. Indeed, the very rule 
17 contemplates that a responding party can put forth supporting affidavits and the court should consider 
them; then the standard is one on summary judgmenL 18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
The as as attachments tc the Complaint, are evidence the Parties' intent to be 
bound by the JP A, the reliance that the City has invested the JP A. The documents establish that 
the JPA was mutually agreed to as being 
23 District; that there was 
24 than ample mutual advantage to the 
paying into District. 
26 
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a sufficient basis to support clains as a matter 
deriied is the 
For the foregoing reasons, District's Motion to Strike should be denied. 
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De 2 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO 
FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
215 S. FIRST AVENUE 
SANDPOINT, IDAHO 83864 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal corporation of 
the State ofldaho, 
) 
) 
A 
'-r 
) Case No: CV-2013-0001342 
) 
p 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE 
} OF TRIAL SETTING AND INITIAL 
) PRETRIAL ORDER 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a political 
subdivision of the State of Idaho, 
Defendant, 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16} IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
} 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
I. A Jury Trial Scheduled for a 5 day trial will commence at the B0m1er Courthouse at 9:00 a.m. on 
Tuesday, Mnrch 25, 2014. If possible, cases set for the same day will be tried on a "to follow0 basis. 
2. The Court, at its discretion, wiU set the priority for each of the civil matters set for trial 011 the above 
date. Any party may request a priority setting by filing a Request for Priority Setting. copy to the Court in 
chambers. The Court will attempt to give ptiority to cases where such Request for Priority Setting is filed, in 
the order in which they are filed. P1for participation in mediation is a factor in granting priority. Notice is 
hereby given that an civll trial settings a:re subject to being preempted by the court's criminal calendar. 
In 01'der to assist with the lriai of this matter IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED: 
1. a. PRETRIAL EVENTS: Before 11oticing a deposition, hearing or other pi·etrial event, a lawyer shall 
consult and work with opposing counsel to accommodate the needs and reasonable requests of an witnesses and 
pa1ticipating Jawyers. 
h. MOTION PRACTICE: Before setiing a .,.,,.,,,.,v .. for a headng, a lawyer shall a reasonable 
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and aoouraterv articulate 
the ruling. Before submitting the proposed order to the Court; the lawyer shall provide a copy to opposing 
counsel who shall promptly voice any objections. If the lawyers cannot resolve all objections. the drafting lawyer 
shall promptly submit the proposed order to the Court, stating any unresolved objections, 
c. PRETRIAL MOTIONS (other than Summary Judgment): The last day for fiiing pretrial motions 
( other than Summary Judgment1 except for motions in limine concerning witnesses an.d exhibits designated under 
paragraphs 6 and 7 respectively of this Pretrial Order) shall be twenty-one (21) days priol' to Trial Motions in 
llmfne conceming designated witnesses and exhibits shall be submitted in writing at least seven (7) days prior to 
Trial. Motions in limine concerning any designated exhibit shall attach copies of the exhibit in issue. Motions in 
limine regarding designated witnesses shall attach copies of the discovery requests claimed to require the earlier 
disclosure and a representation by counsel regarding the absence of a prior response from the party to whom the 
discove1y was directed. The fact that a party has submitted discovery to another party and has not filed motions to 
compel in advance of trial does not, in and of itselt waive an objection by that party as to the timeliness of 
disclosure of witnesses and exhibits by the other party as requil'ed by this otder. 
d. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: Motions for summary judgment shall be timely 
filed so as to be heard not later than ninety~one (91) days (thirteen weeks) before Trhtl. (NOTICE: DUE TO 
COURT CALENDAR CONGESTION YOU SHOULD CONTACT THE COURT CLERK AT LEAST 
!BREE MONTHS BEFORE THE DATE YOU ARE REQUESTING, FOR A HEARING DATE/fIME 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS). There shall be served and filed with each motion for summary 
judgment a separate condse statement, together with references to the record, of each of the material facts as to 
which the moving pal'ty contends there are no genuine issues of dispute, Any party opposing the motion shall. not 
later than fourteen (14) days prior to the date of the hearing, serve and file a separate concise statement) 
together with references to the record, setting forth all material facts as to which it is contended the1'e exist genuine 
issues necessitating litigation. In determining any motion for summary judgment, the Comt may assume that the 
facts as claimed by the moving party a1·e admitted to exist without controversy, except and to the extent that such 
facts are asserted to be actually in good faith controve11ed by a statement filed in opposition to the motion. 
e. SCHEDULING HEARINGS ON MOTIONS: All hearing dates and times must be arranged by 
contacting the Court's Clerk. When making that request, an estimate of the amount of time needed must be given. 
A Notice of Hearing shall be filed and served in compliance with LRC,P. 7(b)(3)(A). Once a hearing date and 
time has been obtained from the Comfs Clerk, no party may add additional hearings to that time set for hearing 
without obtaining the prior approval of the Coures Clerk. 
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in those circumstances where the obstacles to proceeding with the case cannot be resolved by any means 
other than granting a continuance. Continuances wiH not be granted solely because all parties agree to a 
continuance, ln exercising its clisc1·etion to grant or deny a continuance, the Court may consider the foHowing 
factors: 
~ Availability of alternative court dates. 
> Age of the case and the nature ofany previous continuances or delays attributable to either party. 
> The proximity of the scheduled event. 
> The avaiJabiJi ty of an earlier date fol' the event. 
~ Whether the continuance may be avoided by substitution of other counsel. 
>" The prejudice or inconvenience caused to the party not requesting the continuance. 
> The diligence of counsel in attempting to avoid the continuance and in bringing it to the attention of the 
court and opposing counsel promptly. 
The request for a continuance shall be ii1 a motion signed by counsel and filed immediately upon discovering the 
need for a continuance. The motion should be supported by an affidavit stating: l) when the need for a 
continuance arose, 2) the grounds for requesting the continuance, 3) the request for a continuance has been 
discussed with the client and the client does not object, 4) measures taken to avoid the necessity of a 
continuance, and 5) when, at the eal'Iiest) the parties can be ready to proceed. The affidavit should be 
accompanied by all documentation supporting the request 
2. BRIEFS AND MEMORANDA: In addition to any 01iginal brief or memorandum filed with the Clerk 
of the Court, a chambers' copy shaH be provided to the Court. To the extent counsel rely on legal authorities not 
contained h1 the Idaho Reports, a copy of each case or authority cited shall be attached to the Comt's copy of the 
brief or memorandum. 
3. DISCOVERY DISPUTES: Unless otherwise ordered, the Com't will not ente1tain any discove1y 
motion, except tl1ose brought by a person appearingpro se and those brought pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(c) by a person 
who is not a party, unless counsel for the moving party files with the Court, at the time of filing the motion, a 
certification that the lawyer makin_g the motion has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the 
opposing lawyer to reach agreement without court action, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 37(a)(2). The motion shall not refer 
the Court to other documents in the file. For example. if the sufficiency of an answer to an inte1rogatory is in issue, 
the motion shall contain; verbatim, both the interrogatory and the allegedly insufficient followed each 
party's contentions, separately stated. 
ORDER 
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4. EXPERT WITNESSES: 
called at 
before trial1 to at 
consist of at least the information required to be disclosed pursuant to Notice 
Compliance of all disclosul'es shall be filed with the Clerk of Court. Absent good cause, an expert may not 
testify to matters not included in the disclosure. A pa11y may comply with the disclosure by referencing expe1t 
iviL'1ess depositions) \\'ltliout restating the deposition testimony in the disclosute t'eport 
5. DISCLOSURE OF WITNESSES: No later than foul'teen (14) days (two weeks) before trialj each 
party shall prepare and exchange between the parties and file with the Clerk a list of witnesses with current 
addresses at1d telephone numbers) setting forth a brief statement identifying the general subject matter about which 
the witness may be asked to testify (exclusive of impeachment witnesses). Each party shall provide opposing 
parties with a list of the pal'ty's witnesses and shall pl'ovide the Court with two copies of each list of witnesses. 
6. EXHIBITS AND EXHIBIT LISTS: No later than fourteen (14) days (two weeks) before trial, 
exhibit lists and copies of exhibits shall be exchanged between parties and the exhibit list filed with the Clerk. 
Using the form available at the following website: http://www.kcgov.us./depru:tments/districtcourt/forms.asp (or 
avai]able by calling the Comf s clerk), each party shall prepare a list of exhibits it expects to offe1:. Exhibits should 
be listed in the order that the party anticipates they will be offered. Each party shall affix labels to their exhibits 
before trial. After the labels ate marked and attached to the original exhibit, copies should be made. Plaintiffs 
exhibits shall be marked in numerical sequence. Defendant's exhibits shall be marked in alphabetical sequence. 
The civil action number of the case and the dare of the trial shall also be placed on each exhibit label. The original 
exhibits and a Judge1s copy of the exhibits should be filed with the Clerk at the time of trial. Two copies of the 
exhibit list are to be filed with the Clerk. It is expected that each party will have a copy of all exhibits to be used at 
trial. 
7. JURY INSTRUCTIONS (if JURY trla)): No later than seven (7) days before trial. jury instructions 
shall be prepared and exchanged between the pru.1ies and filed with the Clerk (wlth copies delivered to chambers). 
Each Judge may have prepared stock ju1y Instructions from the Idaho Jmy Instructions. Copies of the Court's 
stock instmctions may be obtajned from the Com1, and are avaiiable on the Kootenai County website: 
ht1p;//www.kcgov ,tJs/departments/djstrictcourVforms.asp. The pa11ies shall meet in good faith to agree on a 
statement of claims instruction which shall be submitted to the Comt with the other proposed jnstructions. Absent 
agreement, each party shall submit their ovm statement of claims instruction. All instructions shall be prepared in 
accordance with LR.C,P. 5I(a). 
8. TRIAL BRIEFS: No later than seven (7) days before trial, trial briefs shall be prepared and 
exchanged between the pmties and filed with the Clerk (with copies to chambers) 
D 2 3 an E: r, 
9. PROPOSED FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS COURT seven 
proposed findings and conclusions should provided to the Court's 
accomplished by e-mail. 
10. TRIAL PRACTICE: At least a week before trial the lawyers shall meet and confer to discuss any 
stipulations Lliat can be made at the beginning of trial and to identify exhibits w'hich can be admitted by stipu!atio:n. 
Following this meeting, the parties shall immediately alert the Court to any matters that need to be taken up before 
the time scheduled for trial to begin. 
11. ·TRIAL DAY: Call the Judge's Comt Clerk or Law Clerk for the start and finish times of u·ial dates 
Uuit folJow the first day of trial. 
12. MODIFICATION. This Pretrial Order may be modified by stipulation of the parties upon entry of an 
order by the Court approving such stipulation. Any pai1y may, upon motion and for good cause shown, seek leave 
of the Cm.ut modifying the terms of this order, upon such terms and conditions tis the Coul't deems fit. Any party 
may request a pretrial conference pursuant to LR.C.P. 16(d) or mediation pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(k). 
1:3. REQUEST TO VACATE TRJAL SEITING: Paragraph Lf above applies in its entirety. Any 
vacation or continuance of the trial day shall not change or alter the time frames for the deadlines set fo1·th 
herein, but the dates for such deadlines wHI change to fhe new dates as are established by the date of the new 
tl'ial setti11g. Any paity may, upon motion and for good cause shown, request diffe1·ent discovery and disclosm·e 
dates upon vacation or continuance of the trial date. 
14. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: It is expected that all lawyers will educate their 
clients early in the legal process about the various methods of resolving their dispute without trial (alternative 
dispute resolution/ADR), including mediation, arbitration, settlement conference and neutral case evaluation. The 
parties are expected to engage in ADR as soon as possible. The Comt will facilitate ADR ifrequested. The parties 
are ordered to report jointly to the Court in writing at least sixt:y~three (63) days (9 weeks) prior to trial, setting 
forth when ADR occurred and the results of ADR. If no ADR has taken place, the joint repmt must state the 
reason the patties failed to use ADR. 
15. SANCTIONS FOR NONCOMPLIANCE: Failure to timely comply In all respects with the 
provisions of this order shall subject non-complying parties to sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(i), which may 
include: 
(A) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support OJ' oppose designated claims or defenses, 
or prohibiting such party from introducing designated matters in evidence; 
(B) order striking pleadings or parts thereof: or staying fm1her proceedings the order is obeyed, 
scmmuuNG AND PRETRIAL ORDER 
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(D) In Heu of or in addition to any other sanction. the judge shall require the party or the attorney 
representing such party 01· both to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any noncompliance with this 
rule, incJuding attoiney's fees. unless the judge finds that the noncompliance was substantially justified or that 
othe1' ci1·cumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no party may rely upon any deadline set forth in this pretrial order as a 
reason for failing to timely respond to discovery or to timely supplement discovery l'esponses pursuant to I.R.C,P. 
26(f), 
Notice is hereby given> pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d)(l)(G), that an alternate judge may 
be assigned to preside in this case. The following is a list of potential altem.ate judges: Hon. John P. Luster; Hon. 
Fred Gibler, Hon. John T. Mitchen, Hon. Steve Verby1 Hon. Lansing L Haynes, Hon. Benjamin R. Simpson, Hon. 
Charles W. Hosack or Hon. George R. Reinlun'dt; IIL 
Unless a party has previously exercised their right to disqualification without cause under Rule 40( d)(i ). 
each party shall have the right to file one (1) motion for disqualification without cause as to any alternate judge not 
later than ten (I 0) days after service of this notice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any party who brings in an additional party shall serve a copy of this 
''Scheduling Order, Notice of T1iaI Setting" upon that added party at the time the pleading adding the party is 
served on the added party. and proof of such service shall then be filed with the Court by the party adding an 
additional party 
DATED this (~ ~ day of December. 2013, 
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Plaintiffls Counsel: 
Defendant's Counsel: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Scot R. CampbeH 
Sandpoint City Attorney 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, lD 83864 
Mailed~ Faxed __ 
C. Matthew Andersen 
WINSTON & CASHATT, LA WYERS 
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Mailed_s_ Faxed __ 
David E. Wynkoop 
SHERER & WYNKOOP, LLP 
P.O. Box31 
Boise, ID 83680 
Mailed~ Faxed __ 
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b,ATE OF IDAHO 
County of BONNER 
Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a Municipal 
Corporation of the State of Idaho, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
case No. BON CV 2013 1342 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a ) 
political subdivision of the State of Idaho, ) 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
_______________ ) 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND. 
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant 
Independent Highway District (IHD) on September 9, 2013. 
On August 15, 2013, plaintiff City of Sandpoint (City) filed this lawsuit alleging a 
breach of contract claim against IHD for an alleged failure to perform an obligation 
under a 2003 contractual agreement between the two entities. The 2003 contractual 
agreement was a "Joint Powers Agreement," which had settled about a decade of 
litigation between the two parties. 
The original dispute that eventually led to the settlement agreement began in the 
1990s. when City and IHD in a different lawsuit brought to the district court the question 
of which entity was responsible for street maintenance within common boundaries. 
Aithough the district court declared the parties' respective responsibiiities, the district 
court's decision was appealed and the district court's holding was vacated on appeal 
Page 
because the Idaho Supreme Court held the district court erred in exceeding the 
scope a of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent 
1 Supreme 
Court found that Highway District had general authority to maintain the streets absent a 
showing by the City that it has a functioning street department. 126 Idaho 145, 150-51, 
879 P.2d 1078, 1083-84. 
In 2000 the City established a street department of its own and brought suit 
again, which resulted in two decisions from the Idaho Supreme Court in 2003. The City 
sought a declaratory judgment that, because of its functioning street department, the 
City had exclusive general supervisory authority over street maintenance, construction, 
snow removal, etc. within the City. City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent 
Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 66-67, 72 P.3d 905, 905-07 (June 19, 2003). The City 
also sought to enjoin the IHD from exercising supervisory authority over the City's 
streets, and from levying any real property within the City. 139 Idaho 65, 67, 72 P.3d 
905, 907. On summary judgment, the district court held the City had a functioning 
street department and therefore had control over the public streets within the City. Id. 
This decision was certified as a partial summary judgment and appealed Id. 
Interpreting the relevant statutes, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed, holding: "There is 
no indication that the legislature intended that a city included within an existing highway 
district could exclude its streets from the highway district simply by creating a city street 
department capable of assuming the maintenance, construction, repair, snow removal, 
sanding and traffic control of city streets." 139 Idaho 65, 70, 72 P.3d 905, 910. The 
Idaho Supreme Court held the City was required to follow statutes that provided 
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procedures for lawful termination of a Highway District's authority within a city's 
Idaho 
held that the City could not be the succeeding operational unit to a dissolved highway 
district. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist. v. Board of County Commissioners, 138 
Idaho 887, 892, 71 P.3d 1034, 1039 (June 4, 2003). The Idaho Supreme Court 
reached this conclusion by a plain reading of the statutes that address the dissolution 
funds and property of a highway district. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held that, 
because the statute prohibited surplus funds of a dissolved district to go to a city and no 
statute prescribed where the money would go if not to the successor, the City, 
therefore, could not be the successor to a dissolved highway district. /d. 1 
The contract at issue was the result of a settlement entered into July 3, 2003, 
after these last two Idaho Supreme Court decisions but before the Board of County 
Commissioners set a date for a dissolution election. Complaint, Exhibit A, p. 3. The 
Stipulation for Settlement is attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint. The parties 
entered into it upon general agreement that further litigation was not in the best interest 
of the public. Id., p. 4. This contract entitled, "Joint Powers Agreement between the 
City of Sandpoint and the Sandpoint Independent Highway District", was dated July 8, 
2003, and is attached to the verified complaint. Complaint, Exhibit B, p. 1 
The Joint Powers Agreement was intended to be a permanent resolution as it 
stated, under the heading "Duration": "The duration of this agreement shall be 
1 The Court was also asked to interpret Idaho Code§ 40-1805 to determine what "district" 
meant for the commissioners' determination that disso!v!ng the high\AJay district "would be to the 
best interest of the district." See Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist. v. Board of County 
Commissioners, 138 idaho 887, 890 (2003). The Court held that the "best interests of the 
district" meant "consideration of geographical area and the interests of the people living in the 
district." Id. at 891. 
Page 
perpetual or such time as the District and the City and together agree to 
or all 
promised 
tax funds from levies of properties within the City limits. Id., p. 3. return, the City, 
which had jointly petitioned for the IHD's dissolution election, would request the Bonner 
County Board of Commissioners to vacate the dissolution election and dismiss the 
action with prejudice. Id., p 5. The parties stipulated that the Joint Powers Agreement 
could only be terminated by mutual agreement of both parties. Id., pp. 1, 4. 
In this case, the City has brought an action alleging IHD has breached the 
agreement by unilaterally terminating it and withholding funds that the City alleges it 
needs to operate its street department. Complaint, p. 8. The City alleges that on 
July 11, 2013, the IHD notified the City that they were withholding funds and were not 
going to perform a material term of the agreement. Id., ,r 40. 
On September 9, 2013, IHD filed its Motion to Dismiss, and on October 11, 
2013, IHD filed its "Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss." On November 7, 2013, City 
filed its "Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss." On November 12, 
2013, IHD filed its "Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss." Oral 
argument was held on November 13, 2013. IHD' Motion to Strike was granted. 
IHD's Motion to Dismiss was taken under advisement at the end of that hearing. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
An I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted" must be considered against the I.R.C.P. 8(a) requirement that a 
complaint contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief." I R.C.P. 12(b)(6); 8(a){1 Harperv. Harper, 122 Idaho 535,536,835 
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1346, 1347 1992). motions dismiss, the is look only at the 
the 
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Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n. 6 (8th Cir. 1990) (regarding 12(b)(1) 
motions raising facial challenges to jurisdiction); Serv. Emp. Intern. V. Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare, 106 Idaho 756,758,683 P.2d 404,406 (1984 
(regarding 12(b) challenges generally). 'The nonmoving party is entitled to have all 
inferences from the record viewed in his favor and only then may the question be asked 
whether a claim for relief has been stated." Idaho Branch Inc. of Associated General 
Contractors of America, Inc. v. Nampa Highway Dist. No. 1, 123 Idaho 237, 240, 846 
P.2d 239, 242 (Ct. App. 1993); see a/so Independent School Dist. of Boise City v. 
Harris Family Ltd. Partnership, 150 Idaho 583, 587, 249 P.3d 382, 386 (2011). 
Complaints should not be dismissed under I.RC.P. 12(b) unless the non-moving party 
can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief. Dumas v. Ropp, 98 Idaho 
61, 62, 558 P.2d 632, 633 (1977). And any doubts must be resolved in favor of the 
survival of the complaint. Gardnerv. Hollifield, 96 ldaho 609, 610-11, 533 P.2d 730, 
731-32 (1975). An I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss may be granted "when it appears 
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which 
would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Harper, 122 Idaho at 536, 835 P.2d at 1347 (Ct. App. 
1992) (internal quotations omitted). 
Ill. ANALYSIS. 
A. Introduction. 
!HD makes five arguments as to why the agreement entered into was unlawful 
First, IHD argues the Joint Powers Agreement constitutes an indebtedness that IHD 
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has incurred violation of Article VIII, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution. Second, I 
1 requires an equal division ad property taxes oe1rweien 
ad 
valorem property tax funds from levies of properties within the City limits; therefore, 
since the agreement does not provide an equal division it is in violation of that statute 
and an unlawful agreement. Third, IHD argues the agreement is unlawful under the 
Joint Powers Act because there is no termination provision. Fourth, IHD argues the 
agreement is unlawful because it was intended to last in perpetuity and Idaho courts 
disfavor such contract provisions. Finally, IHD argues the contract is void because 
there was no consideration. 
Based on these arguments, IHD asks the Court to dismiss this case on the 
grounds that the contract was illegal and therefore the City has asserted no claim upon 
which relief can be granted. 
Of concern to the Court is the fact that the parties have obviously considered this 
to be a binding agreement for the past ten years. Apparently, IHD recently received 
legal advice indicating there are legal arguments to be made as to the legitimacy of that 
agreement. Obviously, the City relies on these revenues being paid from IHD to the 
City each year. Rather than IHD bringing a declaratory action against the City where 
the IHD would continue to pay the City under the contract until those legal arguments 
are decided by a court, IHD instead chose to simply not pay the under the agreement, 
leaving the City in the lurch financially and forcing the City to sue IHD. 
8. Positions of the Parties and Analysis by the Court. 
1. Indebtedness in Violation of the Idaho Constitution. 
IHD argues this agreement constitutes an indebtedness and violates Article VIII, 
Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, p. 4. That 
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section prohibits a political subdivision incurring any indebtedness or liability that 
exceeds what the can a year assent 
qualified argues an , or 
on the part of IHO, where if the levy amount were $350,000 and the agreement lasted 
twenty years, it would create a $7 million dollar liability. Id., p. 9. 
The City argues, "This case does not involve a debt." Plaintiff's Response to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 12. The City claims, "This case is about how the 
District has agreed to 'divide' the funds it statutorily has available annually to meet its 
statutory duty to maintain the streets in its boundaries." Id. The City notes LC. § 40-
801 (a) gives the IHO the power to levy a tax, and if that levy is made upon property 
within an incorporated city, then 50% of the funds are apportioned to that incorporated 
city. Id. The City argues that it obviously is not unconstitutional up to that point, as that 
is what the statute requires and the statute has never been held to be unconstitutional. 
Id., pp. 12-13. Simply because !HO contractually agreed in the Joint Powers 
Agreement to go over the 50% and give all funds taxed to the City does not make the 
agreement unconstitutional. The City argues the disbursement from IHO to the City 
each year is not a debt, the IHO receives revenues from the taxpayers and has 
contractually agreed to pay all those revenues to the City. ld. 1 p. 13. The City notes the 
Idaho Supreme Court held a municipality does not violate the constitutional prohibition 
on indebtedness when it pays expenses out of revenue for that year, citing Ball v. 
Bannock County, 5 Idaho 602, 51 P. 454,455 (1897). Id., p. 14. The City argues, 
"Here, the District's disbursements to the City pursuant to the JPA are limited to a 
portion of that year's revenues, as no disbursement will ever require funds beyond what 
the District has already collected." Id. The City correctly notes the cases cited by !HD 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO-·-····-- Page 
of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 137 P.3d 388 (2006); Feil v. of Coeur 
Idaho 
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1 643 
all deal 
and of Idaho Falls 49 
municipal purchases of systems or 
private parties that necessarily require the municipality to incur liabilities beyond the 
current year and for which the municipality would be liable from its general revenues, 
where "In contrast, this case deals only with contingent periodic disbursements from the 
District to fulfill its statutory duty to maintain City roads." Id., pp. 14-15. 
IHD's reply argument, in its entirety is as follows: 
It is the Idaho Supreme Court that interprets the Idaho 
Constitution .. not the courts of California, V\/ashington, or any other state. 
In its brief, the City has virtually ignored the Idaho Supreme Court 
decisions interpreting Article 8, Section 3. Instead, the city has cited to 
and quoted from court decisions from California and other states. 
Apparently, the City has been unable to find Idaho authority to contradict 
the analysis of Article 8, Section 3 contained in IHO's initial brief. Based 
upon Idaho case law, the JPA clearly creates an illegal liability or 
indebtedness in violation of Article 8, Section 3. 
Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 9. The Court finds this 
argument by IHD to the points made by the City, to be disingenuous, and unpersuasive. 
The IHD completely ignores the fact that Frazier, Feil, and Fuhriman are all cases 
involving municipal purchases of systems or goods from private parties that required 
the municipality to incur liabilities beyond the current year and for which the municipality 
would be liable from its general revenues, and those are simply not the facts in this 
case. The present case concerns contingent periodic disbursements from the District, 
half of which are to fulfill its statutory duty to maintain City roads, the other half are to 
fulfill its contractual duty to pay the City under the Joint Powers Agreement. 
The Court must deny IHO's motion to dismiss on this basis because the case law 
cited by IHD simply does not apply to this case. The Idaho Constitution limits the 
manner in which a county or municipality may incur indebtedness: 
Pages 
No ... subdivision .. shall incur any ... liability .. exceeding that year, the 
income and revenue provided for it for such year, without the assent 
two-thirds qualified electors thereof voting at an election be held 
Constitution of the State of Idaho, Article 8, Section 3. "[A] city may anticipate both the 
income and revenue provided for it for such year, and incur debts or liabilities against 
the city which can be met and discharged out of the aggregate income and revenue for 
that year." Charles Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, _, 129 P.643, 650 
(1912); see also City of Idaho Falls v. Fuhriman, 149 Idaho 574, 580, 237 P.3d 1200, 
1206 (2010) (holding that the liability incurred by a power sales agreement exceeded 
the income in the year that it was incurred, and that it was the type of expenditure that 
needed the assent of two-thirds of the voting electorate); City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 
Idaho 1, 7, 137 P .3d 388, 394 (2005) (holding that this constitutional provision 
prohibited the city from entering into a lease agreement for the expansion of airport 
parking facilities absent a public vote that authorized the expense); Miller v. City of 
Buhl, 48 Idaho 668, 284 P. 843, 845 (1930) (prohibiting a city from incurring a debt to 
purchase an electric-generating system); Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, _, 
129 P.643, 652 (1912) {holding that a bond funding $180,000 to fund a waterworks 
system would create a liability against the city and was therefore invalid under this 
constitutional provision without a vote). Feil and Miller were cases where expenses 
were invalidated because neither fell into a special fund exception (i.e., bonds paid by 
revenue from the services of the plant that was financed by the bond), but this later 
became an exception that was amended into Article 8, § 3. See Asson v. City of 
Burley, 105 Idaho 432,439, 670 P.2d 839, 846 (1983). A contract that violates this 
section is void and cannot be enforced. See Deer Creek Highway Dist. v. Doumecq 
Highway Dist., 37 Idaho 601, _, 218 P. 371, 372 (1923). IHD argues the Joint Powers 
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Agreement is illegal because it falls under a "liability" and that, because a twenty-year 
this agreement would demonstrate that the Highway District has indebted itself 
it has taken on more indebtedness than it can 
simply not true when looking at the plain meaning of the statute. 
is 
"[T]he statutory rules of construction apply to the interpretation of constitutional 
provisions." Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho 135, 138, 804 P.2d 308, 311 (1990) (citing 
Lewis v. Woodall, 72 Idaho 16, 18, 236 P.2d 91, 93 (1951)). "Liability" means "the state 
of being bound or obligated in law or justice to do, pay, or make good something." Feil 
v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, _ 129 P. 643,649 (1912) (relying on this 
definition and other comparable definitions of "liability"). Because IHD has obligated 
itself to pay a percentage of the annual revenue it collected on ad valorem taxes, it did 
incur a liability. However, the liability does not exceed the income received a year. The 
IHD has apportioned a portion, or a percentage of the revenue collected; the portion 
that the City receives only reflects the percentage of the revenue that is generated from 
the property located within the city. So long as the IHD's boundaries equal or exceed 
the City's boundaries, the IHD will always receive more revenue than what it has 
apportioned the City each year because it will receive levies from property in the City 
limits as well as levies from property outside the City limits. Because the IHD has not 
incurred a liability that exceeds its revenue, the Court must deny IHD's motion to 
dismiss upon this basis. 
2. Legality of Contract Under Idaho Code § 40-801. 
IHD argues I.C. §40-801 governs distribution of ad valorem taxes levied within 
city limits. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss. pp. 10-11. Under that statute, half of 
funds for property within the limits of an incorporated city are apportioned to the city. 
IHD argues that by entering into an agreement which provides for anything other than 
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an even split of levies between I and the City, violates the division of the levy as 
299 
P.3d 232,252 (2013); Millerv. Haller, 129 Idaho 345,351,924 P.2d 607,613 (1996) 
("The general rule is that a contract prohibited by law is illegal and hence 
unenforceable."). Id. p. 11 IHD argues, "The statutory 50/50 tax distribution ratio is 
mandatory", because the statute uses the word "shall" not "may". Id. IHD argues, ''The 
statue does not authorize a 75/25 split or a 100/0 split." Id. For this proposition, IHD 
cites Rexburg v. Madison County, 115 Idaho 88, 764 P.2d 838 (1988). Id. 
The City correctly points out City of Rexburg does not support IHD's argument 
that I.C. §40-801 does not permit anything other than a 50/50 tax distribution ratio as 
that case dealt with an inadvertent decimal point error, where the City of Rexburg 
received only 5% rather than the statutory 50% revenue. Plaintiff's Response to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, pp. 10-11. This Court finds the Idaho Supreme Court in 
City of Rexburg did not address whether a disbursement greater than 50% would have 
violated the statute; it simply held the county in that case had duty to allocate at least 
the 50% under that statute. 115 Idaho 88, 89-90, 764 P .2d 838, 839-90. 
Idaho Code §40-801(1)(a) reads: 
40-801. Authority and procedure for levies. (1) The commissioners of a 
county highway system, the commissioners of a county-wide highway 
district, and the commissioners of highway districts are empowered, for 
the purpose of construction and maintenance of highways and bridges 
under their respective jurisdictions, to make the following highway ad 
valorem tax levies as applied to the market value for assessment 
purposes within their districts: 
(a) Two-tenths per cent (0.2%) of market value for assessment purposes 
for construction and maintenance of highways and bridges; provided that 
if the levy is made upon property within the limits of any incorporated city, 
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fifty per cent (50%) of the funds shall be apportioned to that incorporated 
made it clear Madison a 
"statutory duty" (and specifically not a duty "based in common law, contact, or any other 
theory of law") to pay the City of Rexburg the amounts due under I. C. §40-801. 115 
Idaho 88, 89-90, 764 P.2d 838, 839-90. City of Rexburg makes it ciear that the county 
has a statutory duty to pay the city the amount due under I.C. §40-801. Id. The word 
"shall" in I.C. §40-801 applies to IHD's statutory duty to pay City 50% of revenues 
raised by taxes on property owners within the City of Sandpoint. City of Rexburg 
makes it clear this statutory duty of paying revenues is mandatory under the statute, 
and must be in the statutory amount of 50% of revenues, and in that case the 
mispayment of .5% was a breach of that statutory duty. This Court can find nothing in 
City of Rexburg or in I.C. §40-801 that prohibits a county from contractually agreeing to 
pay more than the statutory amount. This Court finds IHD's argument "IHD cannot alter 
the statutory apportionment of tax revenue set forth in I.C. §40-801" to be completely 
without merit. Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 8. There is 
nothing in LC. §40-801 which prohibits the highway district from allocating the 
remaining revenues (those above the statutorily mandated 50%) to a city by agreement. 
IHD's argument that the statutory language "fifty per cent (50%) of the funds shall 
be apportioned" means that the defendant cannot legally apportion more than fifty 
percent to the City, is a strained interpretation which this Court simply cannot make. 
"Judicial interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the statute's literal 
words." State, Dept. of Transp. v. HJ Grathol, 153 Idaho 87, 91,278 P.3d 957,961 
(2012); State v. Bumight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999). Statutes are 
interpreted by their plain and express meaning. HJ Grathol, 153 Idaho at 91, 278 P.3d 
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at 961 . A rational meaning of a statute is always preferred to any curious, 
1 11 
if is 
incomplete, absurd, or arguably in conflict with other laws." Arel v. T & L Enterprises, 
Inc., 146 Idaho 29, 32, 189 P.3d 1149, 1152 (2008). 
A plain reading of Idaho Code § 40-801 is that a highway district owes a city 50% 
of ad valorem statutes within city limits. The statute does not designate what is to be 
done with the other fifty percent. Thus, interpreting the 50% amount as a minimum 
amount is much more logical than to interpret such as a limit 
IHD's argument that this 50% amount is a limit ignores the powers given to 
highway commissioners. "[S]tatutes that are in pari materia (of the same matter or 
subject), are to be construed together as one system to effect legislative intent. City of 
Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway District, 126 Idaho 145. 150 (1994). 
Idaho Code § 40-1310 outlines the powers of the highway district commissioners, 
among which includes the following: 
The commissioners of a highway district have exclusive general 
supervision and jurisdiction over all highways and public rights-of-way 
within their highway system, with full power to construct, maintain, repair, 
acquire, purchase and improve all highways within their highway system, 
whether directly or by their own agents and employees or by contract. .. 
The highway district shall have power to manage and conduct the 
business and affairs of the district; establish and post speed and other 
regulatory signs; make and execute all necessary contracts; have an 
office and employ and appoint agents, attorneys, officers and employees 
as may be required, and prescribe their duties and fix their compensation. 
Highway district commissioners and their agents and employees have the 
right to enter upon any lands to make a survey, and may locate the 
necessary works on the line of any highways on any land which may be 
deemed best for the location. 
LC. §40-1310(1). A plain reading of this statute illustrates that the commissioners have 
the power to contract for services and to conduct its own business. Therefore, the 
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commissioners have discretion of what to do with its funds, the discretion 
a the fifty percent above what it is required so maintain 
fifty-percent to be a 
commissioners may not exceed would put ITO's reading of I.C. §40-801 in conflict with 
the powers set forth in I.C. §40-1310(1). To hold otherwise would limit the 
Commissioners' discretion of how to spend the other 50 percent of the taxes collected. 
Interpreting the fifty-percent apportionment as a minimum creates no such conflict. 
Thus, this Court's interpretation is LC. §40-1310(1) mandates IHO to pay a minimum 
fifty percent of ad valorem city taxes to the city and IHO has the discretion on how to 
use the other half of its funds. !HO chose ten years ago, with the advice of counsel, to 
contractually agree the remaining fifty percent goes to the City as well, and that is not 
prohibited under§ 40-801, and thus, the agreement is not illegal. IHO's motion to 
dismiss on this ground must be denied. 
3. Legality under the Joint Powers Act. 
IHO argues that the agreement is unlawful under the Joint Powers Act (JPA), I.C. 
§67-2326 et seq. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 11-13. IHO argues JPA 
mandates an agency cannot delegate away or exceed its statutory or constitutional 
authority when entering into a joint agreement. LC. § 67-2328. Id., p. 12. Additionally, 
IHO argues there must be a termination clause and there is no termination because the 
contract states that it will be "perpetual." Id. !HO also argues that the provision stating 
that the agreement may terminate by "mutuai agreement" is not a termination provision; 
rather, the IHO argues that it functions as a prohibition of termination unless there can 
be a mutual agreement. Id. The defendant argues that because the City receives 
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benefits excess of what the statute authorizes, the never have an incentive 
1 
argues: 
The District's contention that the JPA is void for want of an effective 
termination clause is misguided. I.C. § 67-2328 requires, "Any such 
agreement shall specify the following: (1) Its duration." The plain meaning 
of the statue does not require duration of a specific number of months or 
years. The JPA satisfies the Act's duration requirement by providing 
express terms of the JPA's duration, and an additional vehicle for its 
termination upon certain dissolving acts. The Parties did not leave any 
room for ambiguity when they mutually agreed on the JPA term to meet 
the mutual obligation to maintain City streets: 
DURATION: The duration of this [A]greement shall be perpetual or 
until such time as the District and the City jointly and together agree 
to amend or terminate the same. 
(Complaint, Ex. B) The JPA further provides: 
DISSOLUTION: This JPA will automatically terminate if the District 
is dissolved. It will also terminate if the City supports any future 
petition for dissolution of District. 
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 1 
A joint powers agreement must specify the following: 
(1) Its duration. 
(2) The precise organization, composition and nature of any separate 
legal or administrative entity created thereby together with the powers 
delegated thereto, provided such entity may be legally created. 
(3) Its purpose or purposes. 
(4) The manner of financing the joint or cooperative undertaking and of 
establishing and maintaining a budget therefore. 
(5) The permissible method or methods to be employed in accomplishing 
the partial or complete termination of the agreement and for disposing of 
property upon such partial or complete termination. 
(6) Any other necessary and proper matters. 
I.C. § 67-2328(c). This Court agrees with the City that the statutory mandate of 
LC. § 67-2738 has been satisfied, the agreement's "duration" is "perpetual." The 
duration is not unknown, it is perpetual. The fact that !HD ten years later regrets 
entering into that agreement is of no import. This Court also agrees that there is a 
method of termination, and that is "mutual agreement." There is no Idaho appellate 
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court precedent on Idaho Code § 67-2328 which interprets "duration" "method 
The language must be given its plain meaning. Given 
and "method , those requirements been 
The Joint Powers Act allows for state or public agencies to exercise their powers 
jointly provided each has power over the common subject matter. LC.§ 67-2328(a). 
!HD is correct that neither entity may exceed its authority and that a joint power 
agreement must address some specific provisions. Id. The Court's decision above that 
IHD has not violated the Idaho Constitution in entering into this agreement thus effects 
this Joint Powers argument raised by !HD. Had the Court bought IHD's argument that 
IHD had indebted itself in violation of the Idaho Constitution, then the agreement would 
also be unlawful under the Joint Powers Act. However, as this Court holds there is no 
violation of the Idaho Constitution and IHD acted in a constitutionally permissible way, 
then this secondary argument by IHD must be rejected as well. 
Additionally, for the same reasons discussed in the next section, the argument 
that perpetual contracts are in violation of public policy are, best case for IHD at this 
juncture, not a basis for granting a motion to dismiss because a court must consider 
factual circumstances, which would require an examination of evidence outside the 
pleading. In any event, IHD's motion to dismiss on this ground must be denied. 
4. Invalidity Because of Perpetuity. 
!HD argues Idaho courts disfavor perpetual agreements. Brief Support of 
Motion to Dismiss, pp. 13-14. IHD cites Barton v. State, 104 Idaho 338, 659 P.2d 92 
(1983). Id., p. 13. IHD notes in that case the Idaho Supreme Court declined to read a 
contract as containing a perpetuity clause which would have bound the State of Idaho 
Transportation Department. 104 Idaho 338, 340, 659 P.2d 92, 94. 
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City is correct that Barton is " particularly distinguishable, as the court there 
was asked an intent for be perpetually a purported 
Response Defendant's Dismiss, 18. 
the Idaho Supreme Court actually wrote is, "Where a contract is not expressly made 
perpetual by its terms, construction of such contract as perpetual is disfavored." 104 
Idaho 338, 340, 659 P.2d 92, 94, citations omitted. In the present case, IHD and City 
specifically agreed the duration was "perpetual." There is nothing about that term which 
is ambiguous. Thus, the implication under Barton is where the parties expressly agree 
the duration of the agreement is "perpetual", the Court should not look upon that 
agreement with disfavor. In Barton, the Idaho Department of Transportation entered 
into an agreement with a landowner where the State would provide access to the 
owner's business properties and purchase her land at $1,000.104 Idaho 338,339,659 
P.2d 92, 93. In return, the landowner agreed to forebear from legal action and to 
encourage other landowners who were dealing with the Department of Transportation 
to be reasonable in their dealings. Id. The contract did not address how long this 
arrangement would continue, and in 1977, the Department of Transportation closed the 
access points. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court refused to imply that the contract was 
perpetual absent clear indication that the parties intended to be perpetually bound: 
"Where a contract is not expressly made perpetual by its terms, construction of such 
contract as perpetual is disfavored." 104 Idaho 338, 340, 659 P.2d 92, 94. Again, the 
Idaho Supreme Court's statement only disfavors interpreting a contract to be perpetual 
when the contract is silent as to duration. When there is express language that a 
contract is intended to be perpetual, this holding suggests that the Idaho Supreme 
Court would uphold such an express provision. 
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In any event, the Court must deny the motion to dismiss on this basis because 
even if contract is against public policy (which the does the 
determine a reasonable time for performance, and this determination requires 
factual findings that are outside of the pleadings. Barton, 104 Idaho 338,341,659 P.2d 
92, 95. A court determines "reasonable time" by examining "the subject matter of the 
contract, the relationship of the parties and the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction." Id. In addition to a reasonable time of performance, a party must also 
give reasonable notice of its intent to terminate the contract. Id. In Barton, the Court 
held that twenty-two years of performance under the contract between the Idaho 
Department of Transportation and the landowner was reasonable. Id. 
5. Idaho Code §40-1333. 
!HD argues LC.§ 40-1333 requires cities which have city highway systems, shall 
be responsible for the maintenance of highways in their system, except as provided in 
LC.§ 40-607; and cities may make agreements with a highway district to do the city 
work, but the city shall compensate the district for any work performed. Brief in Support 
of Motion to Dismiss, p. 14. IHD argues: "The Idaho legislature has established a clear 
policy that a city must use its own revenues to maintain city streets and may not use 
highway district revenues to do so, except as provided in I.C. §40-801." Id. The IHD 
then claims "If a highway district constructs or maintains a city street, the city must 
repay the highway district for all expenditures made within the city by the highway 
district." Id. While that is an accurate summary of LC. $40-1333, it has nothing to do 
with the facts of this case, because IHD has not counterclaimed against the City to 
recompense IHD for maintenance work IHD has performed for the City its briefing, 
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the did not respond !HD's argument under LC.§ 40-1333. The Court finds IHD's 
under § 333 have no merit 
6. Sufficient Consideration. 
Finally, IHD argues that there was no consideration for IHD providing 100% of its 
ad valorem property taxes. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 14-15. This Court 
finds this argument by IHD is especially inapt. As pointed out by the City, the Joint 
Powers Agreement itself recited mutual consideration, as it ended all the protracted 
litigation. Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, pp. 20-21; citing 
Complaint, Exhibit A. The City correctly notes: 
The JPA is the result of the Parties' Stipulation for Settlement 
("Settlement"), entered into July 3, 2003. (Complaint, Ex. A) By its terms, 
the Settlement grants the City jurisdiction over city streets, requires the 
formation of a the JPA, compels the City to vacate its petition for a 
dissolution election, requires dismissal of the civil case with prejudice, 
requires the City to not oppose future annexation elections sought be the 
District, and stipulates that the District waives its costs awarded on appeal 
by the Idaho Supreme Court in Docket No. 27 441. (Complaint, Ex. A) 
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 20. The City also correctly 
notes: 
This Court approved the Settlement. The Idaho Court of Appeals recently 
held that a settlement, the terms of which are incorporated into a court 
order, does not need additional consideration to be effective. Davidson v. 
Sae/berg, 154 Idaho 227, 296 P.3d 433,438 (Ct.App. 2013). The same 
rationale should apply here, where the Parties provided mutual 
consideration in the settlement, a part of which was the exercise of their 
rights under I.C. §67-2326, et seq. 
Id., p. 21. IHD did not respond to the City's arguments in its Reply Brief in Support of 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
A contract that contains no consideration is illusory and therefore unenforceable. 
There is consideration in the present case because the IHD has agreed to pay money 
and the City has agreed to forbear its legal efforts to dissolve the IHD. An agreement 
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must have consideration, a benefit of the bargain, order to be enforceable. Weisel v. 
Springs Owners Ass'n, 152 Idaho 519,526,272 P.3d 491,498 (2012). 
consideration an issue. agreement, benefited 
because it received the responsibility to maintain its own streets in addition to funds to 
do so. The Highway District benefitted because the City ceased its pursuit to legally 
dissolve the Highway District within Bonner County. There was consideration and 
therefore the motion to dismiss must be denied under this argument. 
7. Estoppel. 
The City correctly notes: 
The District is taking a position contrary to which it agreed when it entered 
into the JPA, and consented to this Court's Order. It was the Court's 
dismissal based on the stipulation that permitted the JPA. 
Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 22. The City then argues, "As 
a matter of equity, the District is either judicially estopped from reversing its position 
taken in open court, or is equitably estopped from harming the City by reversing its 
position. Id. IHD argues "Estoppel does not save a Constitutionally Invalid Agreement." 
Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, pp.14-20. Because this Court 
does not find the Joint Powers Agreement to be Constitutionally invalid, there is no 
need to discuss the judicial estoppel or equitable estoppel arguments. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER. 
The complaint here has been sufficiently pleaded. For that reason alone, IHD's 
motion to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for "failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted" must be denied. Claims grounded in a breach of contract are 
sufficiently pleaded if they allege the formation of a contract, the obligations under the 
contract, the right of the plaintiff pursuant to the contract, and the breach by the 
defendant. See State ex rel. Robins v. Clinger, 72 Idaho 222 951). In this case, City 
has alleged an agreement between it and !HD, has alleged City's agreed-upon right to 
and has alleged 
alleged 
contract claim, IHD's motion to dismiss must be denied. 
breach 
a 
Additionally, when an illegal contract is alleged, the Court might have an 
affirmative duty to examine the legality of the contract when it appears in the pleading 
through a verified complaint. It is generally not appropriate for a court to consider 
affirmative defenses in considering a motion to dismiss at the pleading stage of 
litigation. See Gardner v. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609, 611 (1975). There are exceptions, 
however. One exception is when an affirmative defense appears on the face of the 
complaint itself. Gardner v. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609, 611 (1975). Another exception, 
raised in contract-related defenses, is whether the alleged agreement is illegal. "The 
illegality of a contract can be raised at any stage in litigation. In fact, the court has the 
duty to raise the issue of illegality sua sponte." Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 
608 (2009)(citing Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6 (2002). Illegal contracts constitute 
questions of law for the court. Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6 (2002). Here, the 
verified complaint has attached a copy of the contract, so the contract itself is part of 
the proceedings and the illegality would be evident from the face of the contract. 
Additionally, the defendant has questioned the contract's legality. Based on the 
affirmative duty of a court to evaluate the illegality of the contract, based on the contract 
that is part of the verified complaint, and based on the defendant's challenge of the 
contract's legality, this Court may proceed to make a determination of the legality of the 
contract in the record in deciding whether to dismiss the complaint 
Page 
·jf rf >:reli,Ha. ES, ri di d r, 
contract 1s as arguments 
agreement is attached the Complaint and is part these proceedings, can 
make determinations regarding the legality of the contract, and has done so. Based on 
the above reasons, the Court must deny the motion to dismiss on all the arguments 
presented by IHD. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the defendant IHD's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED in all 
aspects. 
Entered this 9th day of December, 2013. 
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Case No. CV-13-01342 
STIPULATION FOR RECIPROCAL 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Plaintiff. City of Sandpoint ("Sandpoint"), filed its Complaint For Breach of Contract and for 
Pennanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief on August 16, 2013. The Independent Highway 
District ("Distrid') filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 9, 2013. On December 9, 2013, the Court 
issued its Memorandum Decision and Order denying the District's Motion to Dismiss ("DecisionH) 
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further stipulate as follows: 
l. This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this case and jurisdiction of all parties 
hereto. 
2. 
3. 
Venue lies properly with this Court. 
Entry of a reciprocal preliminary injunction pending final resolution of the case is in the 
9 best :interests of citizens represented by the parties pending final resolution of this action. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
4. 
5. 
No security is required. Rule 65(c), LR.C.P. 
The parties agree that the reciprocal preliminary injunction is binding in form and scope 
pursuant to Rule 6S(d), I.R.C.P. 
6. The parties by agreeing and stipulating to entry of a preliminary injunction make no 
!5 admissions as to the truth of Plaintiff's allegations or to Defendant's defenses. Each party reserves its 
16 rights to, and defenses to, any claim made in this matter. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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7. The parties stipulate to entry of an injunction that requires conduct in accordance with the 
terms of the Joint Powers Agreement dated July 8, 2003 until further order of the Court. IHD shall 
disburse any sums withheld from Sandpoint and continue the contractual disbursements unless absolved 
from such by the Comt. Any distribution made during the pendency of this case shall not be deemed 
"voluntary" by !HD to Sandpoint. Sandpoint's right to asse1i entitlement to all distributions made to it is 
reserved for fu1ther action of the Court, 
STIPULATION FOR RECIPROCAL 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
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8. Counsel for both patties stipulated that they accept service for their respective party 
2 clients and such service is effective on each party. 
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DATED this ~day of December, 2013. 
TTHEW ANDERSEN, ISB No. 3581 
TON & CASHATT, LAWYERS, 
a Professional Service Corporation 
SCOTR. CAMPBELL, ISB No. 4121 
SANDPOINT CITY ATTORNEY 
Attorneys for City of Sandpoint 
STIPULATION FOR RECIPROCAL 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
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SUS~ P. WEEKS, ISB No, 4255 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, PA 
DAVID W. WYNKOOP 
SHERER & WYNKOOP, LLP 
Attorneys for Independent Highway District 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND OF THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal corporation ) 
of the State of Idaho, ) 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT; a 
political subdivision of the State ofldaho, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV 2013-01342 
RECIPROCAL PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION ORDER 
The Comt having considered the stipulation of City of Sandpoint ("Cityu) and 
Independent Highway District ("IHD") for entry of a preliminary injunction, and being advised 
in the premises, finds that: 
1, This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this case and jurisdiction of all 
patties hereto. 
2. Venue lies properly with this Court. 
3. Entry of a reciprocal preliminary injunction is in the best interests of all citizens 
represented by the parties pending final resolution of this action. 
4. Security is not required. Rule 65(c), I.R.C.P. 
5. The parties stipulate that the preliminary injunction is binding in form and scope 
to Rule 65(d), I.R.C.P. 
PRELIMINARY 
D d , < f: N , 5 3 
a 
reserves made matter. 
7. The parties are enjoined to conduct themselves in accordance with the terms of 
the Joint Powers Agreement dated July 8, 2003 until further order of the Court. IHD shall 
disburse sums withheld from Sandpoint and continue the contractual disbursements unless 
absolved from such by the Court. Any distribution made during the pendency of this case shall 
not be deemed "voluntary" by IHD to Sandpoint Sandpoint's right to assert entitlement to all 
distributions made to it is reserved for further action of the Comt. 
8. Counsel for both parties stipulated that they accept service for their respective 
party clients and such service is effective on each party. 
'
~-fl--
Dated this _U_ day ofDecember, 2013. 
APPROVED: 
C. M tthew Andersen 
Scot ampbell 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
b-20~ 
avidynkoop' 
Susan P. Weeks 
Attorneys for Defendants 
RECIPROCAL PRELIMINARY 
6HN T. MITCHELL 
' ) 
"'-·· 
r, 
L 
2 3 2 9 
I HEREBY 
correct of the 1"n'l',Qrrnn1 
Scot R. Campbell 
Sandpoint City Attorney 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Facsimile: (208) 255-1368 
C. Matthew Ander.sen 
Winston & Cashatt; Lawyers 
a Professional Service Corporation 
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121 Neu-v::l- Der \l!?rd__ 
David R. Wynkoop 
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP 
730 N. Main Street 
P.O. Box 31 
Meridian, ID 83680 
(208) 887-4865 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 664-1684 \---\ b--Aol Pe I~ v l vet(_, 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
N , ~. j 
03/2014 3.57 20855457'11 
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4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
.,_,...,,_,,._,,. lSB 
SA.~TIPOINT CITY A TTORJ.'\JEY 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83 864 
Telephone: (208) 263-0534 
Facsimile: (208) 255-1368 
scai.J1t2bell@,ci.sand12oint.id. us 
C. MATTHEW A1'.TIERSEN, ISB No. 3581 
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS1 
a Professional Service Corporation 
9 250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-2103 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121 
cma:@vvinstoncashatt.com 
10 
11 
Attorneys for City of Sandpoint 
JAMES VERN PAGE 01 02 
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13 
14 
15 
16 
THE DISTRICT COlJRT OF TI-IE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
CITY OF SA.:"\i-UPOfNT, a municipal 
17 corporation of the State ofidaho, 
18 Case No. CV-13-01342 Plaintiff; 
19 vs. STIPULATED MOTION TO VACATE 
TRIAL DATE 
20 INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a 
political subdivision of the State ofidaho, 
21 
Defendant 22 
23 
24 
25 
Plaintiff, City of Sandpoint and Defendant, Independent Highway District, by and through their 
undersigned com1Sel hereby stipulate to entry of an order vacating the t."ial date presently set on 
March The request is made 
STIPULATED MOTION TO 
TRIAL DATE 
1 
reason that the parties originally contemplated an 
~~~~ 
A~OW.Sa:!Va~ 
2l5'0 ~ 811,d,. ~20& 
Ocltllr d' Alane. ldlho :&aml4 
~~eti-2103 
[ 03/201 3:57 20855457'11 JAMES 
matter consent 
research the parties 
3 proper procedure for an inter]ocutory appeal. The parties 
4 J steps to take to effectuate an appeal of the Court's order. 
s I ,.~rc1 
6 I DATED this-;;:,L-daY of March, 2014. 
7 
I. MATTHEW A:Nl)ERSEN, ISB No. 3581 11 WINSTON & CASHA TI. LA WYERS, 
! .a Professional Service Corporation 12 
13 SCOT R. CA,.\1PBELL, ISB No. 21 SANDPOINT CITY ATTORNEY 
14 I I Attorneys for City of Sandpoint 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 I 
24 ll 
25 I I 
26 11 
TRIAL DATE 
PAGE2 
MOTION TO 
PAGE 02/02 
54(b) certificate was not 
continue to confer to determine the proper 
SUSA..'N" P. \VEEKS, ISB No. 4255 
JAMES. VERNON & \\iEEKS, PA 
DAVIDW. WYNKOOP 
SHERER & VlYNKOOP, LLP 
Attorneys for Independent Highway District 
'I 
I 
l 
1 I 
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5 
6 
7 
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9 
20 a N 85L3 
JN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOJ\1NER 
02/04 
10 CITY OF SA1'H)P01NT~ a muofoipal 
corporation of the St.ate ofldahoi 
CaseNo. CV-13-01342 
11 
12 vs. 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER VACATJNG TRIAL DATE 
13 INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRJCT, a 
14 
political subdivision of the State ofidaho, 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Defendant. 
THIS MATTER crune before the Court on the parties! Stipulated Motion to Vacate Trial Date. 
The court having considered the stipulated motio» and the pleadings fifod in this matter and being fully 
advised, finds good cause to grant the motion. 19 
20 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the trial date presently set on March 25, 2014 in the above 
21 
22 
action is vacated~ ,?-G.SJ 't, &QJt ~ t?c_fo her .2. 8; 'µ} l 4 ,../- 1 : DO I\"" , 
Z3 
24 
25 
26 
DONElliOPENCOURTthis 6rt{dayof Mo..vL ii014, 
ORDER ON MOTION TOVA CATE TRIA 
DATE-PAGE J 
~~~~ 
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C. MATIHEW ANDERSEN, ISB No, 3581 
5 WINSTON & CASHATT 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
6 
7 ~~ f ulza.La.-_ 
8 SUSAN P. \\'EEKS, ISB No. 4255 
JAMES. VERNON & WEEKS, PA 
9 Attorneys for Independent Highway District 
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ORDER ON MOTION VACATE TRIAL 
DATE-PAGE2 
\ . 851.1 IP 2 03/0'1 
II 
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J. II hereby that a true and 
complete copy of the foregoing to 
2 postage prepaid; delivered; sent 
3 via facsLrpJle on March~ 2014, to: 
4 C. Matthew Andersen 
Winston & Cashatt 
5 601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1900 
Spokane, WA 99201 
6 509-838-141.6 (fax) 
7 R Scot Campbell 
8 Sandpoint City Attorney 
1123 Lake Street 
9 Sandpoint, ID &3864 
10 
(208) 255-1368 (fax) 
ll David E. Wynkoop 
Sherer & Wynkoop~ LLP 
12 P.O. Box 31 
Boise, ID 83680 
13 (208) 887-4865 (fax) 
14 Susan P. Week~ 
15 James, Vernon & Weeks 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 664-1684 (fax) 
16 
17 
19 CLERK OF THE cotrRT 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
ORDER ON MOTION TO 
DATE-PAGE3 
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~~ttffe~ 
A P~IONA.lse:MOI:. OOAroRATIOH 
250 Honhtlf(ft BIi/id~ Sui'nt :ml 
Co9llf d' Al~. ldllhc 93914 
~: !206) W,ZfOtl 
Cashatt LFax: !509\ 202-4304 To: 2082B51447@rcfax.crm Fax: +12082651447 
l1 
ll 
,II 
-1 
3 SCOT R. CAMPBELL, ISB No. 4121 SANDPOINT CITY AITORNEY 
4 1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
5 Telephone: (208) 263-0534 
Facsimile: (208) 255-1368 
6 scru:npbell@ci.sandpoint.id. us 
7 
C. MATTHEW A.'IDERSEN, ISB No. 3581 
8 WINSTON & CASHAIT, LAWYERS, 
a Professional Service Corporation 
9 250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
10 Telephone: (208) 667-2103 
12 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121 
cma@winstoncashatt.com 
I Attorneys for Plaintiff 13 
14 
15 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE ST A TE 
OF IDAHO, IN A.ND FOR THE COlJr-.'TY OF BONNER 
16 
CITY OF SAfmPOINT' a municipal 
17 corporation of the State of Idaho, 
18 
19 vs. 
Plaintiff, 
20 . INDEPENDE:r-..'T HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a 
political subdivision of the State of Idaho, 
21 I 
I 
22 Defendant. 
CaseNo. CV-13-01342 
CITY OF SANDPOINT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Oral Argument Requested 
23 
24 
The City of Sandpoint (the "City") requests pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56, 57, 65 and LC. §10-1201 et 
seq. that the Court enter declaratory judgment establishing that the Joint Powers Agreement and the 
25 
26 CITY OF SM"DPOINT'S MOTION FOR 
StJMMARY JUDGMENT I PAGE 1 
11 
~n1Jk,n,.#~ 
A ?f!Oi'ESS!ONAL SEiMCE COR.l>OMOON 
250No~Blvd~ &lil&200 
Coeur If Ak!ne, idaho83!ii4 
Phml&: (2091657-2100 
1/'<Jlnston Cashatt 
! 
11 
II 
1
/ Memorandum 
2 I Order «;:,c;'uu.u,i; th,, !ndle!J!'mllent 
2082651447@rcfa;:.con Fax: +12082651447 Dage of 4 06/04/2014 I :35 
were 
to f"nmnhr with 
·- --- r·. .. ... 
3 form of a permanent injunction. Further, the City of Sandpoint requests an award of costs and attorney 
4 
5 
fees incurred in this action as allowed law, I.C. §12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54. 
6 
7 
This Motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support filed herewith, the Affidavits of Scot 
Campbell and Shannon Syth filed on November 7, 2013 and the Court's Memorandum Decision and 
8 Order entered December 9, 2013. 
9 l DATED this day of June, 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 , 
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21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 CITY OF SA.1\IDPOINT'S MOTION FOR 
I
' SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PAGE2 
I 
W ANDERSEN, ISB No. 3581 
& CASHATT, LAWYERS 
SCOT R. CAMPBELL, ISB No. 4121 
SANDPOINT CITY ATTORL'IBY 
Attorneys for City of Sandpoint 
?P'~~~ 
A~ESS!ONALSER\l!CE~O!i 
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202-4304 
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nnct~OP 'l'"ff'"Pn,;'iif1~ n r-~-o- r~-r-...., l.....l 
via facsimile on June --i---' 
4 David R Wynkoop 
Sherer & Wynkoop. LLP 
5 730 N. Main Street 
P.O.Box31 
6 
, Meridian, ID 83680 
7 I 
I
! Susan P. Weeks 
8 1 James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. 
1 1626 Lincoln Way 
9 Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
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22 
231 
l 
24 
To: 2082651447@n::fax.con Fax: +12082651447 
to: 
25 
26 OF SA.'IDPOINT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGME:!•rr 
3 
Page 4 of 4 0!3iD4i20i4 :36 
?t'~Ab~ 
A i"P.Oi'ESSIONAI. SERVICE CQR!"OR}fflQN 
250 ~S!vd.. Suire 200 
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~: !20l!l W-211li.'> 
Fmm: Winston Cashatt, L,Fax: (509) 202-4304 To 208265144 7@rcfax .cor Fax: + i 208265144 7 5 06/04/2014 
3 SCOT R. CA,.\1PBELL, No. SANDPOINT CITY ATTORNEY 
4 1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
5 Telephone: (208) 263-0534 
I Facsimile: (208) 255-1368 6 scampbell@ci.sandpoint.id.us 
7 j 
IC. MATTHEW ANDERSEN, ISB No. 3581 
8 I WINSTON & CASHATT, LA WYERS, 
1 a Professional Service Corporation 
9 1 250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene. Idaho 83814 
10 Telephone: (208) 667-2103 
11 Facsimile: (208) 765-2121 
cma@winstoncashattcom 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
12 
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14 
15 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
I 
16 I CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal 
corporation of the State of Idaho, 
17 
18 
19 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a 
20 political subdivision oft.he State of Idaho, 
21 
22 
23 I 1· 
Defendant. 
Relief Requested. 
Case No. CV-13-01342 
CITY OF SANDPOINT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I The City of Sandpoint (the 11City") requests that the Court enter declaratory judgment 
24 
establishing that the Joint Powers Agreement and the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by 
25 
26 I CITY OF SA...~l)POINT'S MEMORANDIJM IN 
.. SUPPORT OF SlJMM..J\.RY JUDGMENT -· l 
I 
11 
~~ell~ 
A!"RO!'ESSIONAI. SERVICE COR.r'OflAT',ON 
250 Narlflweet Bllld.. S,Jila 208 
Coeur d' Al-. idaho83814 
~: (21)8} 667-21(1'3 
From: Winston & Cashatt LFax: (509) 202-4304 2082651447@rcfax.con Fax: -1-12082651447 06/04/2014 11 :44 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
II 
the Sandpoint requests an award costs attorney fees incurred action. 
2. Undisputed Facts. 
The undisputed facts are established in the body of the verified Complaint filed on August 16, 
2013, and as outlined in the Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss filed on November 
8 2013, along with the previously filed affidavits of Scot R. Campbell and Shannon Syth and exhibits 
9 . thereto. As those pleadings provide, the City and Il-ID entered into a Joint Powers Agreement ("JPA'') 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
and Memorandum of Understanding (which settled litigation between the parties, all of which is public 
record), requiring the IHD to disburse ad volorem tax funds raised within the City to the City for the 
operation, maintenance and snow removal of the streets within the City limits. The JP A was entered 
into in compromise pending litigation and to terminate a petition to abolish the llID. 
15 IHD inexplicably ceased disbursing the funds and challenged the validity of the ten year old 
16 agreement it had executed. The City was forced to sue to obtain the withheld amounts. Without 
17 disputing the underlying facts, IHD moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to IC 12{b)(6). IHD's 
18 
1 argument is based on its view of the controlling law. This Court entered a detailed Memorandum 
' 19 I 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on December 9. 2013. That order 
affirmatively established the law of this case and by its ruling; the court has determined the Joint Powers 
Agreement was legally enforceable. 
The parties have stipulated to entry a Preliminary Injunction which was entered on 
24 December 18, 2013. (Without the Preliminary Injunction Il-ID would have continued to withhold 
25 
26 CITY OF SANDPOINTS MEMOR.i\NDlJM IN 
SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
~~AWddAa# 
A ?ROrESSIONALSS:WlCE COR."'ORAnON 
250 Nal'tlrHeat 131vd.. Sult9 2118 
Coeur d' Alane. !doho 113814 
~: (208! &l7-2100 
3 
4 
LFax: (509) 202-4304 2082651447@rcfax.con Fax: +12082651447 P~qe of 5 06/04/2014 
its motion to dismiss, which has been granted. However, the matter has not been stayed and IBD will 
1 not consent to such a 
5 
Given the posture the case and pending scheduling deadlines, it is 
6 
7 
appropriate for the City to request summary judgment because there is no genuine issue of material fact 
which would necessitate a trial 
8 3. Points of Authority and Argument. 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
To expedite argument on this matter, the City incorporates the authority and argument made in 
its Response to IHD1s Motion to Dismiss, as well as the Court's reasoning set out in its Memorandum 
Decision and Order. IHD's challenges to the agreement were based on the legal claims that Idaho's 
statutory scheme prohibited the parties from having the authority to enter into the JP A, that the JP A 
created an illegal future "debt" prohibited by statute and constitution, that the JPA's express terms 
15 improperly lacked termination terms as required statute, and that the JPA lacked consideration, all of 
16 
17 
18 
19 
which rendered it illegal and unenforceable. Each of these claims rests solely on the legal interpretation 
of the statutes, the Constitution, and the express unambiguous terms of the agreement. As a result, there 
are no issues of fact which are disputed to create any genuine issue for trial; if the JPA was legal, it is 
enforceable, and the City is entitled to all of its declaratory relief and fees and costs. IRCP 56; 
20 !' !I I.C. §12-121; IRCP 54. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
CITY OF SANDPOINT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
SCPPORT OF SUMM.ARY Ji.JDGMENT -- 3 ~~AW~ A PROfESSIONAl. SERVICE OORi"ORsmON 
250 l\lor!hweat Blvd.,. Suil9 206 
Coeur If A!SM. kfaho83814 
l"hcln9: l20BI 687-2103 
(509) 202-4304 To: 2082651447@rcfruccoc Fax: +12082651447 Page 5 06/04/2014 :44 
3 declaring the JPA and ordering enforcement the a permanent 
I!:! 
11 
12 
DATED this day of June, 
13 I hereby certify that I caused a true and 
complete copy of the foregoing to be D mailed, 
14 postage prepaid; D ha.'ld delivered; 18'.l sent 
15 
via facsimile on June 2014, to: 
16 David R. Wynkoop 
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP 
17 1730 N. Main Street 
1
1 P.O. Box 31 
18 Meridian, ID 83680 
19 Susan P. Weeks 
20 
1 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
21 
22 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
CITY OF SANDPOTh'T'S MEMORA..l'IDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT -- 4 
C. MA W ANDERSEN, ISB No. 3581 
WINSTO. 1 & CASHATT, LAWYERS 
SCOT R. CAMPBELL, ISB No. 4121 
SANDPOINT CITY ATTORNEY 
Attorneys for City of Sandpoint 
~~AP~ 
A i'ROR:SSIONAL SErMCE OOA.:>Ol'lA.TION 
250 ~Blvd. Suite 21]8 
Coeul' d' Afeoo. lrl:lho83814 
f'ham: (208) 661-2103 
Main 
P.O.Box31 
Meridian, ID 83 680 
Telephone: (208) 887-4800 
Facsimile (208) 887-4865 
ISB No. 2429 
SusanP, Weaks 
James, Vernon& Weeks, P.A 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d1 Alene, ID 83 814 
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
Facsimile; (208) 664-1684 
ISB No, 4255 
a, a a e r 
Attorneys for Defendant Independent Highway District 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STA TE OF 
IDAHDO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal 
corporation of the State of Idaho, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a 
political subdivision of the State of Idaho~ 
Defendant 
ORDER GRANTING RULE 12 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 
CERTIFICATION 
For the reasons enunciated on the record this matter at the hearing held May 
Defendant's motion for Leave to File an Interlocutory Appeal pursuant to lAR. 12 oft.he 
4, 
Coun's December 9, 2013, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss is hereby granted. 
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STATE IDAHO 
County of BONNER 
AT ,,:t.: IO O'C!ock_e._M 
CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT 
Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a Municipal 
Corporation of the State of Idaho, 
vs. 
) 
} 
) 
) 
) 
} 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a ) 
political subdivision of the State of Idaho, ) 
Defendant 
) 
) 
______________ ,) 
case No. BON CV 2013 1342 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
i. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND. 
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant 
Independent Highway District (IHD) on September 9, 2013. 
On August 151 2013, plaintiff City of Sandpoint {City) filed this lawsuit alleging a 
breach of contract claim against IHD for an alleged failure to perform an obligation 
under a 2003 contractual agreement between the two entities. The 2003 contractual 
agreement was a "Joint Powers Agreement," which had settled about a decade of 
litigation between the two parties. 
The original dispute that eventually led to the settlement agreement began in the 
1990s, when City and IHO in a different lawsuit brought to the district court the question 
of which entity was responsible for street maintenance within common boundaries. 
Although the district court deciared ti-te parties' respective responsibilities, the district 
court's decision was appealed and the district court's holding was vacated on appeal 
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of Sandpoint v. Sanc!po!.11t Independent 
Highway Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 148, 879 P.2d 1078, 1081 (1994). The Idaho Supreme 
Court found that Highway District had general authority to maintain the streets absent a 
showing by the City that it has a functioning street department 126 Idaho 145, 150-51, 
879 P.2d 1078, 1083-84. 
In 2000 the City established a street department of its own and brought suit 
again, which resulted in two decisions from the Idaho Supreme Court in 2003. The City 
sought a declaratory judgment that, because of its functioning street department, the 
City had exclusive general supervisory authority over street maintenance, construction, 
snow removal, etc. within the City. City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent 
Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 66-67, 72 P.3d 905, 905-07 (June 19, 2003}. The City 
also sought to enjoin the 1HD from exercising supervisory authority over the City's 
streets, and from levying any real properfl;within the City. 139 Idaho 65, 67, 72 P.3d 
905, 907. On summary judgment, the district court held the City had a functioning 
street department and therefore had control over the public streets within the City. Id. 
This decision was certified as a partial summary jtJdgment and appealed. Id. 
Interpreting the relevant statutes, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed, holding: "There is 
no indication that the legisfature intended that a city included within an existing highway 
district could exclude its streets from the highway district simply by creating a city street 
department capable of assuming the maintenance, construction, repair, snow removal, 
sanding and traffic control of city streets." 139 Idaho 65, 70, 72 P.3d 905, 910. The 
Idaho Supreme Court held the City was required to follow statutes that provided 
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In the counterpart decision issued earlier that month, the Idaho Supreme Court 
held that the City could not be the succeeding operational unit to a dissolved highway 
district. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist. v. Board of County Commissioners, 138 
Idaho 887, 892, 71 P.3d 1034, 1039 (June 4, 2003). The Idaho Supreme Court 
reached this conclusion by a plain reading of the statutes that address the dissolution 
funds and property of a highway district.· Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held that, 
because the statute prohibited surplus funds of a dissolved district to go to a city and no 
statute prescribed where the money would go if not to the successor, the City, 
therefore, could not be the successor to a dissolved highway district Id. 1 
The contract at issue was the result of a settlement entered into July 3, 2003, 
after these last two Idaho Supreme Court decisions but before the Board of County 
Commissioners set a date for a dissolution election. Complaint, Exhibit A, p. 3. The 
Stipulation for Settlement is attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint The parties 
entered into it upon general agreement that further litigation was not in the best interest 
of the public. Id., p. 4. This contract entitled, UJoint Powers Agreement between the 
City of Sandpoint and the Sandpoint Independent Highway District", was dated July a, 
2003, and is attached to the verified complaint Complaint, Exhibit B, p. 1. 
The Joint Powers Agreement was intended to be a permanent resolution as it 
stated, under the heading "Duration": "The duration of this agreement shaH be 
1 The Court was afso asked to interpret Idaho Code§ 40-1805 to determine what adistrlct" 
meant for the commissioners' determination that dissolving the highway district "would be to the 
best interest of the district." See Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist. v. Board of County 
Commissioners, 138 Idaho 887,890 (2003). The Court held that the "best interest,!;! of the 
district" meant «consideration of geographical area and the interests of the people living in the 
district." Id. at 891. 
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or as together agree 
amend or terminate the same11 • Id. The City would assume responsibility for all the 
streets within its limits. Id. The IHD promised to pay the City aH ad valorem property 
tax funds from levies of properties within the City limits. Id., p. 3. In return, the City, 
which had jointly petitioned for the IHD's dissolution election, would request the Bonner 
County Board of Commissioners to vacate the dissolution election and dismiss the 
action with prejudice. Id., p. 5. The parties stipulated that the Joint Powers Agreement 
could only be terminated by mutual agreement of both parties. Id., pp. 1, 4. 
In this case, the City has brought an action alleging IHD has breached the 
agreement by unilaterally terminating it and withholding funds that the City alleges it 
needs to operate its street department. Complaint, p. 8. The City alleges that on 
July 11, 2013, the IHD notified the City that they were withholding funds and were not 
going to perform a material term of the agreement. Id., 1I 40. 
On September 9, 2013, IHD filed its Motion to Dismiss, and on October 11, 
2013, IHD filed its "Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss." On November 7, 2013, City 
flied its "Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss." On November 12, 
2013, IHD filed its "Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss." Oral 
argument was held on November 13, 2013. !HD' Motion to Strike was granted. 
IHD's Motion to Dismiss was taken under advisement at the end of that hearing. 
11. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
An I.R.C.P. 12{b)(6) motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted" must be considered against the I.R.C.P. 8(a) requirement that a 
complaint contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief." l.R.C.P. 12(b)(6); 8(a)(1): Harperv. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 536, 835 
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1 (Ct.App. 1992). dismiss, the Is look 
pleadings and view all inferences in favor of the non-moving part<;. Young v. City of 
Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002) (regarding 12{b)(6) motions); 
Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n. 6 (8t11 Cir. 1990) (regarding 12(b)(1) 
motions raising faciaf chaffenges to jurisdiction); Sent. Emp. lntem. V. Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfar.e, 106 Idaho 756i 758,683 P.2d 404,406 (1984 
(regarding 12(b) challenges generally). "The nonmoving party is entitled to have all 
inferences from the record viewed in his favor and only then may the question be asked 
whether a claim for relief has been stated." Idaho Branch Inc. of Associated General 
Contractors of America, Inc. v. Nampa Highway Dist. No. 1, 123 (daho 237, 240, 846 
P.2d 239, 242 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Independent School Dist. of Bolse City v. 
Harris Family Ltd. Partnership, 150 Idaho 583,587,249 P.3d 382, 386 (2011). 
Complaints should not be dismissed under I.R.C.P. 12(b) unless the non-moving party 
can prove no set of facts whieh would entitle him to relief. Dumas v. Ropp, 98 Idaho 
61, 62, 558 P.2d 632, 633 (1977). And ar.y doubts must be resolved in favor of the 
survival of the complaint. Garclnerv. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609, 610-11, 533 P.2d 730, 
731-32 (1975}. An I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss may be granted 'when it appears 
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which 
would entitle the pfaintiff to relief." Harper, 122 Idaho at 536,835 P.2d at 1347 (Ct. App. 
1992) (internal quotations omitted). 
Hr. ANALYSIS. 
A Introduction. 
IHD makes five arguments as to why the agreement entered into was unlawful. 
First, IHD argues the Joint Powers Agreement constitutes an Indebtedness that IHD 
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has violation of Article Section 3 the 
argues §40-801 requires an equal division ofad valorem property taxes between 
the City and !HD, and in the Joint Power Agreement !HD promised to pay the City all ad 
valorem property tax funds from levies of properties within the City limits; therefore, 
since the agreement does not provide an equal division it is in violation of that statute 
and an unlawful agreement. Third, IHD argues the agreement is unlawful under the 
Joint Powers Act because there is no termination provision. Fourth, IHD argues the 
agreement is unlawful because it was intended to last in perpetuity and Jdaho courts 
disfavor such contract provisions. Finally, IHD argues the contract is void because 
there was no consideration. 
Based on these arguments, (HD asks the Court to dismiss this case on the 
grounds that the contract was illegal and therefore the City has asserted no claim upon 
which relief can be granted, 
Of concern to the Court is the fact that the parties have obviously considered this 
to be a binding agreement for the past ten years. Apparently, IHD recently received 
regal advice indicating there are legaf arguments.to be made as to the legitimacy of that 
agreement. Obviously, the City relies on these revenues being paid from IHD to the 
City each year. Rather than IHD bringing a declaratory action against the City where 
the IHD would continue to pay the City under the contract until those legal arguments 
are decided by a court, IHO instead chose to simply not pay the under the agreement, 
leaving the City in the lurch financially and forcing the City to sue IHO. 
B. Positions of the Parties and Analysis by the Court 
1. Indebtedness in Violation of the Idaho Constitution. 
[HD argues this agreement constitutes an indebtedness and violates Article vm, 
Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, p. 4. That 
05/ 
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prohibits a political subdivision indebtedness or liabiiity 
exceeds what the subdivision can satisfy in a year without the assent of two-thirds of 
the qualified electors. f HD argues the agreement constitutes an obligation, or liability, 
on the part of !HD, where if the levy amount were $350,000 and the agreement lasted 
twenty years, it would create a $7 miilion dollar liability. Id., p. 9. 
The City argues, "This case does not invoive a debt" Plaintiff's Response to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 12. The City claims, "This case is about how the 
District has agreed to 'divide' the funds it statutorily has available annually to meet its 
statutory duty to maintain the streets in its boundaries." Jd. The City notes I.C. § 40-
801 (a) gives the IHD the power to levy a tax, and if that levy is made upon property 
within an incorporated city, then 50% of the funds are apportioned to that incorporated 
city. Id. The City argues that it obviously is not unconstitutional up to that point, as that 
is what the statute requires and the statute has never been held to be unconstitutional. 
Id., pp. 12-13. Simply because IHD contractualfy agreed in the Joint Powers 
Agreement to go over the 50% and give all funds taxed to the City does not make the 
agreement unconstitutional. The City argues the disbursement from !HD to the City 
each year is not a debt, the IHD receives revenues from the taxpayers and has 
contractually agreed to pay all those revenues to the Cit'f. Jd., p. 13. The City notes the 
Idaho Supreme Court held a municipality does not violate the constitutional prohibition 
on indebtedness when tt pays expenses out of revenue for that year, citing Ball v. 
Bannock County, 5 Idaho 602, 51 P. 454, 455 (1897). Id., p. 14. The City argues, 
"Here, the District's disbursements to the City pursuant to the JPA are limited to a 
portion of that year's revenues, as no disbursement wm ever require funds beyond what 
the District has already collected." Id. The City correctly notes the cases cited by IHD 
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Idaho 1, 1 (2006); Feil V. of Boise 
d'Alene, 23 Idaho 129 P. 643 (1912); and City of Idaho Falls v. Fuhriman, 149 Idaho 
57 4, 237 P. 3d 1200 (2010)) afl deal with municrpal purchases of systems or goods from 
private parties that necessarily require the municipality to incur liabilities beyond the 
current year and for which the municipality would be liabie from its general revenues, 
where uin contrast, this case deals only with contingent periodic disbursements from the 
District to fulfill its statutory duty to maintain City roads." Id., pp. 14-15. 
JHD's reply argument, in its entirety ls as follows: 
It is the Idaho Supreme Court that interprets the Idaho 
Constitution ... not the courts of California, Washington, or any other state. 
In its brief, the City has virtually ignored the Idaho Supreme Court 
decisions interpreting Article 8, Section 3. Instead, the city has cited to 
and quoted from court decisions from California and other states. 
Apparently, the City has been unable to find Idaho authority to contradict 
the analysis of Article 8, Section 3 contained in IHD's initial brief. Based 
upon Idaho case law1 the JPA clearly creates an illegal liability or 
indebtedness in violation of Article 8, Section 3. 
Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 9. The Court finds this 
argument by IHD to the points made by the City, to be disingenuous, and unpersuasive. 
The fHD completely ignores the fact that Frazier, Feil, and Fuhriman are all cases 
involving municipal purchases of systems or goods from private parties that required 
the municipality to incur liabilities beyond the current year and for which the municipality 
would be fiable from its general revenues, and those are simply not the facts in this 
case. The present case concerns contingent periodic disbursements from the District, 
half of which are to fulfill its statutory duty to maintain City roads, the other half are to 
fulfill its contractual duty to pay the City under the Joint Powers Agreement. 
The Court must deny IHD's motion to dismiss on this basis because the case !aw 
cited by IHD simply does not apply to this case. The Idaho Constitution limits the 
manner in which a county or municipality may incur indebtedness: 
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'"shall incur any .. .iiabillty."'exceeding in that year, 
income and revenue provided for it for such year, without the assent of 
two-thirds of the qualified electors thereof voting at an election tc be held 
for that purpose .... 
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Constitution of the State of Idaho, Article 8, Section 3. "[A] city may anticipate both the 
income and revenue provided for it for such year, and incur debts or liabilities against 
the city which· can be met and discharged out of the aggregate income and revenue for 
that year_~ Charles Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, _, 129 P .643, 650 
(1912); see also City of Idaho Falls v. Fuhriman, 149 Idaho 574, 580, 237 P.3d 1200, 
1206 (2010) (holding that the liability incurred by a power sales agreement exceeded 
the income in the year that It was incurred, and that it was the type of expenditure that 
needed the assent of two-thirds of the voting electorate); City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 
idaho 1, 7, 137 P.3d 388, 394 (2005) {holding that this constitutional provision 
prohibited the city from entering into a lease agreement for the expansion of airport 
parking facilities absent a public vote that authorized the expense); Milter 11. City of 
Buhl, 48 Idaho 668, 284 P. 843, 845 (1930) (prohibiting a city from incurring a debt to 
purchase an electric-generating system); Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, _, 
129 P.643, 652 (1912) (holding that a bond funding $180,000 to fund a waterworks 
system would create a liability against the city and was therefore invalid under this 
constitutional provision without a vote). Feil and Miller were cases where expenses 
were invalidated because neither fell into a special fund exception (i.e., bonds paid by 
revenue from the services of the plant that was financed by the bond), but this later 
became an exception that was amended into Article 8, § 3, See Asson v. City of 
Burley, 105 Idaho 432, 439, 670 P.2d 839, 846 {1983). A contract that violates this 
section is void and cannot be enforced. See Deer Creek Highway Dist. v. Doumecq 
Highway Dist., 37 fdaho 601, _, 218 P. 371,372 (1923). 1HD argues the Joint Powers 
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Agreement is illegal because it falls under a 
view of this agreement would demonstrate that the Highway District has indebted itseif 
upwards of $7 million, It has taken on more indebtedness than it can pay. This is 
simply not true when looking at the plain meaning of the statute_ 
"[T]he statutory rules of construction appfy to the interpretation of constitutional 
provisions." Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho 135, 138, 804 P.2d 308, 311 {1990) (citing 
Lewis v. Woodall, 72 Idaho 16, 18,236 P.2d 91, 93 (1951)). "Uabi!ity" means ''the state 
of being bound or obligated in Jaw or justice to do, pay, or make good something." Feil 
v. City of Coeurd'Alene1 23 Idaho 32, ~ 129 P. 643,649 (1912) (relying on this 
definition and other comparable definitions of "liabUity'l Because IHD has obligated 
itself to pay a percentage of the annual revenue it collected on ad valorem taxes, It did 
incur a fiability. However, the liability does not exceed the income received a year, The 
IHD has apportioned a portion, or a percentage of the !'evenue collected; the portion 
that the City receives only reflects the percentage of the revenue that is generated from 
the property located within the city. So long as the IHD's boundaries equal or exceed 
the City's boundaries, the JHD will always receive more revenue than what it has 
apportioned the City each year because it will receive levies from property in the City 
limits as well as levies from property outside the City limits. Because the IHD has not 
incurred a liability that exceeds its revenue, the Court must deny IHD's motion to 
dismiss upon this basis. 
2. Legality of Contract Under Idaho Code § 40--801. 
IHD argues I.C. §40-801 governs distribution of ad valorem taxes levied within 
city limits. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 10-11. Under that statute, half of 
the funds for property within the limits of an incorporated city are apportioned to the city. 
IHO argues that by entering into an agreement which provides for anything other than 
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an even between IHD and the violates the division the levy as 
Powers Agreement is illegal and thus mandated argues the 
void and unenforceable, citing City of Meridian v. Petra, lnc. 1 154 idaho 425, _ 299 
P.3d 232,252 (2013); Miflerv. Haller, 129 Idaho 345,351,924 P.2d 607,613 (1996) 
("The general rule is that a contract prohibited by law is illegal and hence 
unenforceable. Id. p. 11. IHD argues, "The statutory 50/50 tax distribution ratio is 
mandatory", because the statute uses the word "shall" not "may". Id. IHD argues1 "The 
statue does not authorize a 75/25 split or a 100/0 split" Id. For this proposition, IHD 
cites Rexburg v. Madison County, 115 Idaho 88, 764 P.2d 838 (1988). Id. 
The City correctly points out City of Rexburg does not support IHD's argument 
that I.C. §40--801 does not permit anything other than a 50/50 tax distribution ratio as 
that case dealt with an inadvertent decimal point error, where the City of Rexburg 
received only 5% rather than the statutory 50% revenue. Plaintiff's Response to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, pp. 10-11. This Court finds the Idaho Supreme Court in 
City of Rexburg did not address whether a disbursement greater than 50% would have 
violated the statute; it simply held the counfy in that case had duty to allocate at least 
the 50% under that statute. 115 Idaho 88, 89-90, 764 P.2d 838, 839-90. 
Idaho Code §40-801(1)(a) reads: 
40-801. Authority and procedure for levies. (1) The commissioners of a 
county highway system, the commissioners of a county-wide highway 
district, and the commissioners of highway districts are empowered, for 
the purpose of constrnction and maintenance of highways and bridges 
under their respective jurisdictions, to make the following highway ad 
valorem tax revies as applied to the market value for assessment 
purposes within their districts: 
(a} Two-tenths per cent (0.2%) of market vafue for assessment purposes 
for construction and maintenance of highways and bridges; provided that 
if the levy is made upon property within the limits of any incorporated city, 
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flffy per (50%) ttie shall be apportioned that incorporated 
The Idaho Supreme Court in City of Rexburg made It clear that Madison County had a 
"statutory duty" (and specifically not a duty "based in common law, contact, or any other 
theory of law") to pay the City of Rexburg the amounts due under I. C. §40-801. 115 
Idaho 88, 89-90. 764 P.2d 838, 839-90. City of Rexburg makes it clear that the county 
has a statutory duty to pay the city the amount due under f.C. §40-801. Id. The word 
"shalll)' in I.C. §40-801 applies to IHD's ~tatutory duty to pay City 50% of revenues 
raised by taxes on property owners within the City of Sandpoint. City of Rexburg 
makes it clear this statutory duty of paying revenues is mandatory under the statute, 
and must be in the statutory amount of 50% of revenues, and in that case the 
mispayment of .5% was a breach of that statutory duty. This Court can find nothing in 
City of Rexburg or in I.C. §40-801 that prohibits a county from contractually agreeing to 
pay more than the statutory amount. This Court finds IHO's argument "iHO cannot alter 
the statutory apportionment of tax revenue set forth in LC. §40-801" to be completely 
without merit. Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 8. There is 
nothing in I.C. §40-801 which prohibits the highway district from allocating the 
remaining revenues (those above the statutorify mandated 50%) to a city by agreement 
rHD's argument that the statutory language "fifty per cent (50%) of the funds shall 
be apportioned" means that the defendant cannot legally apportion more than fifty 
percent to the City, is a strained interpretation which this Court simply cannot make. 
"Judicial interpretation of a statute begins with an examlnation of the statute's literal 
words." State, Dept. of Transp. v. HJ Grathol, 153 Idaho 87, 91,278 P.3d 957,961 
(2012); State v. Bumight, 132 Idaho 654,659, 978 P.2d 214,219 (1999). Statutes are 
interpreted by their plafn and express meaning. HJ Grathol, 153 Idaho at 91, 278 P.3d 
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at 961. obvious a statute is always preferred any 
Hensley Trucking, 1 Idaho 5721 691 P.2d 11 
(1984). A court will resort to judicial construction "only if the statute is ambiguous, 
incomplete, absurd, or arguably in conflict with other laws." Arel v. T & L Enterprises, 
Inc., 146 Idaho 29, 32, 189 P.3d 1149, 1152 (2008). 
A plain reading of Idaho Code § 40-801 is that a highway district owes a city 50% 
of ad valorem statutes within city limits. The statute does not designate what is to be 
done with the other fifty percent Thus1 interpreting the 50% amount as a minimum 
amount is much more logical than to interpret such as a limit. 
IHD's argument that this 50% amount is a limit ignores the powers given to 
highway commissioners. "[SJtatutes that are in pari materia {of the same matter or 
subject), are to be construed together as one system to effect legislative intent." City of 
Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway District, 126 Idaho 145, 150 (1994). 
Idaho Code § 40-131 O outlines the powers of the highway district commissioners, 
among which includes the followrng: 
The commissioners of a highway district have exclusive general 
supervision and jurisdiction over all highways and public rights-of-way 
within their highway system, with full power to construct, maintain, repair, 
acquire, purchase and improve all highways within their highway system, 
whether directly or by their own agents and employees or by contract .. 
The highway district shall have power to manage and conduct the 
business and affairs of the district; establish and post speed and other 
regulatory signs; make and execute all necessary contracts; have an 
office and employ and appoint agents, attorneys, officers and employees 
as may be required, and prescribe tlieir duties and fix their compensation. 
Highway district commissioners and their agents and employees have the 
right to enter upon any lands to make a survey, and may locate the 
necessary works on the line of any highways on any rand which may be 
deemed best for the location. 
l.C. §40-1310(1). A plain reading of this statute mustrates that the commissioners have 
the power to contract for services and to conduct its own business. Therefore, the 
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discretion what to its discretion 
give a the fifty percent above what it is required so that the city may maintain 
the roads. To read the fifty-percent apportionment to be a Hmlt upon which the 
commissioners may not exceed would put !TD's reading of tC. §40-801 in conflict with 
the powers setforth in LC. §40-1310(1). To hold otherwise would limit the 
Commissioners' discretion of how to spend the other 50 percent of the taxes collected. 
Interpreting the frfty-percent apportionment as a minimum creates no such conflict. 
Thus, this Court's interpretation is LC. §40-1310{1) mandates IHD to pay a minimum 
fifty percent of ad valorem city taxes to the city and IHO has the discretion on how to 
use the other half of its funds. !HD chose ten years ago, with the advice of counsel, to 
contractually agree the remaining fifty percent goes to the City as well, and that is not 
prohibited under§ 40-801, and thus, the agreement is not illegal. IHO's motion to 
dismiss on this ground must be denied. 
3, Legality under the Joint Powers Act. 
IHD argues that the agreement is unlawful under the Joint Powers Act (JPA), !. C. 
§67-2326 et seq. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 11-13. IHD argues JPA 
mandates an agency cannot delegate away or exceed its statutory or constitutional 
authority when entering into a joint agreement. I.C. § 67-2328. id., p. 12. Additionally, 
iHD argues there must be a termination clause and there is no termination because the 
contract states that it wm be "perpetual." Id. IHO also argues that the provision stating 
that the agreement may terminate by "mutual agreement" is not a termination provision; 
rather, the lHD argues that it functions as a prohibition of tennination unless there can 
be a mutual agreement. Id. The defendant argues that because the City receives 
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benefits In excess what the statute authorizes, never an 
terminate the agreement p. 1 
City argues: 
The District's contention that the JPA is void for want of an effective 
termination dause is misguided. I.C. § 67-2328 requires, ~Any such 
agreement shall specify the following: (1) Its duration." The plain meaning 
of the statue does not require duration of a specific number of months or 
years. The JPA satisfies the Act's duration requirement by providing 
express terms of the JPA's duration, and an additional vehicle for its 
termination upon certain dissolving acts. The Parties did not leave any 
room for ambiguity when they mutually agreed on the JPA term to meet 
the mutual obrigation to maintain City streets: 
DURATION: The duration of this [A]greement shall be perpetual or 
until such time as the District and the City jointly and together agree 
to amend or terminate the same. 
(Complaint, Ex. B) The JPA further provides: 
DISSOLUTION: This JPA will automatica!ry terminate if the District 
is dissofved. ft will also terminate if the City supports any future 
petition for dissolution of District. 
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 17. 
A joint powers agreement must specify the following: 
(1) Its duration. 
(2) The precise organization, composition and nature of any separate 
legal or administrative entity created thereby together with the powers 
delegated thereto, provided such entity may be legaHy created. 
(3) Its purpose or purposes. 
(4) The manner of financing the joint or cooperative undertaking and of 
establishing and maintaining a budget therefore. 
(5} The permissible method or methods to be employed in accomplishing 
the partial or complete termination of the agreement and for disposing of 
property upon such partiaf or complete termination. 
(6) Any other necessary and proper matters. 
I.C. § 67~2328(c). This Court agrees with the City that the statutory mandate of 
I.C. § 67-2738 has been satisfied, the agreement's "duration" is "perpetuaL" The 
duration is not unknown, it is perpetual. The fact that IHO ten years later regrets 
entering into that agreement is of no import This Court also agrees that there is a 
method of termination, and that is «mutual agreement." There is no Idaho appellate 
MEMORANDUM D=CISION ANO OROiR DENYING D!f'eNDANT'S MO'TION TO DISMISS 
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court precedent on § interprets 
termination." The language must be given its plain meaning. Given the plain meaning 
of "duration" and ''method of termination", those requirements have been met 
The Joint Powers Act allows for state or public agencies to exercise their powers 
jointly provided each has power over the common subject matter. LC.§ 67-2328(a). 
IHD is correct that neither entity may exceed its authority and that a joint power 
agreement must address some specific provisions. Id. The Court's decision above that 
IHD has not violated the Idaho Constitution entering into this agreement thus effects 
this Joint Powers argument raised by IHD. Had the Court bought IHD's argument that 
IHD had indebted itself in violation of the Idaho Constitution, then the agreement would 
also be unlawful under the Joint Powers Act. However, as this Court holds there is no 
violation of the Idaho Constitution and !HD acted ln a constitutionaf!y permissible way, 
then this secondary argument by IHD must be rejected as welL 
Additionally, for the same reasons discussed in the next section, the argument 
that perpetual contracts are in violation of pubfic policy are, best case for IHD at this 
juncture, not a basis for granting a motion to dismiss because a court must consider 
factual circumstances, which would require an examination of evidence outside the 
pleading. In any event, IHD's motion to dismiss on this ground must be denied. 
4. Invalidity Because of Perpetuity. 
IHD argues Idaho courts disfavor perpetual agreements. Brief in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss, pp. 13-14. IHD cites Barton v. state, 104 Idaho 338, 659 P.2d 92 
(1983). Id., p. 13. IHD notes in that case the fdaho Supreme Court declined to read a 
contract as containing a perpetuity clause which would have bound the State of Jdaho 
Transportation Department. 104 fdaho 338. 340,659 P.2d 92, 94. 
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Is correct that Barton is . particularly distinguishable, as 
was asked to infer an Intent for the state be perpetually bound by a purported JPA" 
Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 18. (bold in original). What 
the Idaho Supreme Court actually wrote is, 'Where a contract is not expressly made 
perpetual by its terms, construction of such contract as perpetual is disfavored." 104 
fdaho 338, 340) 659 P.2d 92, 94, citations omitted. In the present case, IHD and City 
specifically agreed the duration was "perpetual." There is nothing about that term which 
is ambiguous. Thus, the implication under Barton is where the parties expressly agree 
the duration of the agreement is "perpetual", the Court should not look. upon that 
agreement with disfavor, In Berton, the Idaho Department of Transportation entered 
into an agreement with a landowner where the State would provide access to the 
owner's business properties and purchase her land at $1,000. 104 Idaho 338, 339, 659 
P .2d 92, 93. In return, the landowner agreed to forebear from legal action and to 
encourage other landowners who were dealing with the Department of Transportation 
to be reasonable in their dealings. Id. The contract did not address how long this 
arrangement wouid continue, and in 1977, the Department of Transportation closed the 
access points. Id, The Idaho Supreme Court refused to imply that the contract was 
perpetual absent clear indication that the parties intended to be perpetually bound: 
"Where a contract is not expressly made perpetual by its tenns, construction of such 
contract as perpetuat is disfavored." 104 Idaho 338,340,659 P.2d 92, 94. Again, the 
Idaho Supreme Court's statement only disfavors interpreting a contract to be perpetual 
when the contract Is s;Jent as to duration. When there is express language that a 
contract is intended to be perpetual, this holding suggests that the Idaho Supreme 
Court would uphold such an express provision. 
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any dismiss on 
even if the contract is against public policy (which the Court does 
basis because 
the 
must determine a reasonable time for performance, and this determination requires 
factual findings that are outside of the pleadings. Barton, 104 Idaho 338, 341, 659 P.2d 
92, 95. A court determines "reasonable time" by examining "the subject matter of the 
contract, the relationship of the parties and the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction." Id. In addition to a reasonable time of performance, a party must also 
give reasonable notice of its intent to terminate the contract Id. Jn Barton, the Court 
held that twenty-two years of performance under the contract between the Idaho 
Department of Transportation and the landowner was reasonable. Id. 
5. Idaho Code §40•1333. 
!HD argues LC.§ 40-1333 requires cities which have city highway systems, shall 
be responsible for the maintenance of highways in their system, except as provided in 
i.C. § 40-607; and cities may make agreements with a highway district to do the city 
work, but the city shall compensate the district for any work performed. Brief in Support 
of Motion to Dismiss, p. 14. fHD argues: "The Idaho legislature has established a clear 
policy that a city must use its own revenues to maintain city streets and may not use 
highway district revenues to do so, except as provided in I.C. §40-801." The !HD 
then claims "If a highway district constructs or maintains a city street, the city must 
repay the highway district for all expenditures made within the city by the highway 
district." Id. While that is an accurate summary of I.C. $40-1333, it has nothing to do 
with the facts of this case, because IHD has not oounterdaimed against the City to 
recompense IHD for maintenance work IHD has performed for the City In its briefing, 
M5UORANOUM DECISION ANO ORDeR DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
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not respond argument § 40-1333. The finds 
argument under § 40-1333 to have no merit 
6. Sufficient Consideration. 
Finally, IHD argues that there was no consideration for fHD providing 100% of its 
ad valorem property taxes. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 14-15. This Court 
finds this argument by IHD is especially inapt /ls pointed out by the City, the Joint 
Powers Agreement itself recr.:ed mutual consideration, as it ended all the protracted 
litigation. Plaintiff's Response to Defendanfs Motion to Dismiss, pp. 20-21; citing 
Complaint, Exhibit A. The City correctly notes: 
The JPA is the result of the Parties' Stipulation for Settlement 
f'Settlement"}, entered into July 3, 2003. (Complaint, Ex. A) By its terms, 
the Settlement grants the City jurisdiction over city streets, requires the 
formation of a the JPA, compels the City to vacate its petition for a 
dissorution election, requires dismissal of the cMI case with prejudice, 
requires the City to not oppose future annexation elections sought be the 
District, and stipulates that the District waives its costs awarded on appeal 
by the ldaho Supreme Court in Docket No. 27 441. (Complaint, Ex. A) 
Plaintiff's Response to Defendanfs Motion to Dismiss. p. 20. The City also correctly 
notes: 
This Court approved the Settlement The Idaho Court of Appeals recently 
held that a settlement, the terms of which are incorporated into a court 
order, does not need additional consideration to be effective. Davidson v. 
Soelberg, 154 Idaho 227,296 P.3d 433,438 (Ct.App. 2013). The same 
rationale should apply here, where the ·Parties provided mutual 
consideration in the settlement, a part of which was the exercise of their 
rights under J.C. §67-2326, ~-
Id., p. 21. IHD did not respond to the City's arguments in its Rep!y Brief in Support of 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
A contract that contains no consideration is illusory and therefore unenforceable. 
There is consideration in the present case because the IHD has agreed to pay money 
and the City has agreed to forbear its legs! efforts to dissohte the IHD. An agreement 
MEMORANDUM DECISIOfol AND ORD!!~ Dl:IMNG ~FENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
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have consideration, a benefit bargain, order be 
52 Idaho 9, 526, 272 
Welselv_ 
Beaver Springs owners , 498 (2012). 
Here, consideration is not an issue. According to the agreement1 the City benefited 
because it received the responsibility to maintain its own streets in addition to funds to 
do so. The Highway District benefitted because the City ceased its pursuit to legally 
dissolve the Highway District within Bonner County. There was consideration and 
therefore the motion to dismiss must be denied under this argument 
7. Estoppel. 
The City correctly notes: 
The District is taking a position contrary to which it agreed when it entered 
into the JPA, and consented to this Court's Order. It was the Court's 
dismissal based on the stipulation that permitted the JPA 
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 22. The City then argues, "As 
a matter of equity, the District is erther judicially estopped from reversing its position 
taken in open court, or is equitably estopped from harming the City by reversing its 
position. Id. IHD argues "Estoppel does not save a Constitutionally Invalid Agreement." 
Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, pp. 14-20. Because this Court 
does not find the Joint Powers Agreement to be Constitutionally invalid, there is no 
need to discuss the judicial estoppel or equitable estoppei arguments. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER. 
The complaint here has been sufficiently pleaded. For that reason alone, IHD's 
motion to dismiss under LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) for "failure to state a cfarm upon which relief 
can be granted" must be denfed. Claims grounded in a breach of contract are 
sufficiently pleaded if they allege the formation of a contract; the obligations under the 
contract, the right of the plaintiff pursuant to thti! contract, and the breach by the 
defendant. See State ex rel. Robins v. Clinger, 72 ldaho 222 (1951). this case, City 
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alleged an agreement between it has alleged City's agreed·upon 
share in the ad valorem taxes collected and has alleged breach 
withholding those funds. Because City has alleged all of the elements of a breach of 
contract claim, IHD1s motion to dismiss must be denied. 
Additionally, when an megal contract is alleged, the Court might have an 
affirmative duty to examine the legality of the contract when it appears in the pleading 
through a verified complaint. rt is generally not appropriate for a court to consider 
affirmative defenses in considering a motion to dismiss at the pleading stage of 
litigation. See Gardnerv. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609, 611 (1975). There are exceptions, 
however. One exception is when an affirmative defense appears on the face of the 
complaint itseff. Gardner v. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609, 811 (1975). Another exception, 
raised in contract-related defenses, fs whether the alleged agreement is illegal. "The 
illegality of a contract can be raised at any stage in litigation. In fact, the court has the 
duty to raise the issue of illegality sua sponte." Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 
608 (2009){citing Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6 (2002}. lffegal contracts constitute 
questions of faw for the court. Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6 (2002). Here, the 
verified complaint has attached a copy of the contract, so the contract itself is part of 
the proceedings and the illegality would be evident from the face of the contract 
Additionally, the defendant has questioned the contract's legality. Based on the 
affinnatrve duty of a court to evaluate the illegality of the contract, based on the contract 
that is part of the verified complaint, and based on the defendant's challenge of the 
contract's regality, this Court may proceed to make a determination of the legality of the 
contract in the record in deciding whether to dismiss the complaint 
, BONNER COUNTY CLERKS 
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As fhis Court's decision shows, this Court has analyzed the merits 
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whether the contract is illegal as made in the arguments by IHD. Because the 
agreement Is attached to the Complaint and is part of these prooeedlngsJ the Court can 
make determinations regarding the legality of the contract, a.nd has done so. Based on 
the above reasons, the Court must deny fhe motion to dismiss on all the arguments 
presented by iHD. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the defendant IHD's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED in aff 
aspects. 
Entered this 91.>i day of December, 2013. 
itohell, District Judge 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR APPEAL 
PERivHSSION 
I. PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
Plaintiff 
13 against Independent Highway District (''District") a failure the District to 
taxes contract, 
FOR 1 
Under 
as 
arid together agree to w.uend or terminate t}1e saine .. " 
On September 9, 2013, the District filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted, wbich was heard on November 13, 2013. The District 
advanced five different arguments for why the contract was unconstitutional and unlavvful. Toe 
district court entered Order Re: Motion to Dismiss, a copy of which is attached to the Motion 
for Appeal by Permission. The district court rejected each of the District's argum.ents as a matter 
oflaw and denied the District's Motion to Dismiss. 
Trial was scheduled to commence on March 25, 2014. On March 3, 2014, a stipulation 
prepared by the City, after discussion and input from the District, was filed with the district 
court. The stipulation requested the district court vacate the trial date because there were no 
remaining disputed material facts for trial, and the issues remaining were of law. On May 7, 
2014, the District made timely application to the district court to appeal by permission by :filing 
its Motion for Leave to File Interlocutory Appeal. On June 13, 2014, the district court granted 
the District's motion. The Order from which the District seeks permission to appeal is the order 
denying its Motion to Dismiss. 
II. THE STANDARD FOR APPEAL UNDER I.A.R. 12 
In Aardema v. US. Dairy Systems, Inc., 147 Idaho 785,215 P.3d 505 (2009) the Idaho 
Supreme Court recited t.h.e rules for consideration of an application for appeal by permission. 
Permission may be granted by the Supreme Court to appeal from 
an interlocutory order or decree of a district court in a civil or 
criminal action, or from an interlocutory order of an administrative 
agency, which is not otherwise appealable under t.hese rules, but 
which involves a controlling question of law as to which there is 
substantial grounds for difference opinion and which an 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR APPEAL BY PERMISSION: 2 
!.Illlme,mat~ appeal from the order or decree may 
litigation. 
llU.Jlllv<~Lasvappeal an 
substantial legal issues great public interest or legal 
questions first impression are involved." Budell v. Todd, 105 
Idaho 2, 4, 665 P.2d 701, 703 (1983) (per curiam ). A permissive 
appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 12 is "a.'1 unusual posture." Winn v. 
Frasher, 116 Idaho 500, 501, 777 P.2d 722, 723 (1989). Due to 
"the unusual posture cf the case, we are constrained to rnle 
narrowly and address only the precise question that was framed by 
the motion and answered by the trial cou.rt." Id. "Such appeal, 
[ after acceptance by this Court,] shall proceed in the same manner 
as an appeal as a matter of right, unless otherwise ordered by [this 
Court]." I.A.R. 12(d). 
* * * 
Rule 12 appeals are only accepted in the most exceptional cases 
with the intent to resolve "substantial legal issues of great public 
interest or legal questions of first impression[.]" Budell, 105 Idaho 
at 4, 665 P.2d at 703. 
This Court, citing the "confusion" about the application of the economic loss rule to 
plaintiffs tort action, accepted the appeal by permission. Aardema v. Dairy Systems, Inc., 
147 Idaho 785, 789-790, 215 P.3d 505, 509-510 (2009). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also granted motions for permission to appeal in cases 
involving the retroactive application of a statute of limitations to claims of sexual abuse of 
minors, Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 148 Idaho 427,224 P.3d 494 (2009); liability of a 
corporation for the tort of injury to a child under Idaho Code§ 6-1701(4), Steed v. Grand Teton 
Council of the Boy Scouts of America, Inc., Idaho 848, 172 P .3d 1123 (2007); whether a 
beneficiary of a trust may sue a lawyer for malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty, Taylor v. 
Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005); enforcement of a forum selection clause in a 
contract for the transportation a passenger on the high seas, a aw;;:m,on of federal law, Fisk v. 
Royal Caribbean Cruises, , 14 I Idaho 290, 108 P .3d 990 (2005); 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT MOTION FOR APPEAL BY PERMISSION: 3 
a 
statutes, Moon v. !dah..o Farmers Association, Idaho 536, P.3d 
defendants' motions to suppress in criminal cases, State v. Becknell, 140 Idaho 201,203, 91 P.3d 
1105, 1107 (2004) (the issues were significant and of practical importa.11ce the ad..uinistration 
of the criminal justice system); whether comparative fault was available as a defense in a dram 
shop case, Idaho Department of Labor v. Sunset Mart, Inc., 140 Idaho 207, 91 P .3d 1111 (2004 ); 
the application of general provisions of SRBA orders to test basins, A & B Irr. Dist. v. Idaho 
Conservation League, 131 Idaho 411, 958 P.2d 568 (1997); questions ofinsurance coverage, 
North Pacific Insurance Co. v. Mai, 130 Idaho 251,939 P.2d 570 (1997); denial ofthe State's 
motion in Iimine as to evidence establishing the defense of necessity, State v. Howley, 128 Idaho 
874, 920 P.2d 391 (1996); denial of motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in 
case involving the Industrial Commission, Walters v. Industrial Commission, 127 Idaho 933, 908 
P .2d 1240 (1996); whether the administrative suspension of a driver's license and prosecution of 
a DUI charge put the defendant in double jeopardy, State v. Talavera, 127 Idaho 700, 905 P .2d 
633 (1995); the constitutionality of the 1994 amendments to the SRBA, In re SRBA Case No. 
39576, 128 Idaho 246,912 P.2d 614 (1994); apportionment of benefits under a prior version of 
Idaho Code § 72-332, Doh/ v. PSF Ind, Inc., 127 Idaho 232, 899 P.2d 3445 (1995); whether a 
commercial tenant who is required to return the property in good condition at the end of the lease 
and who obtains fire insurance is an additional insured under the landlord's fire insurance policy, 
Bannock Building Co. v. Sahlberg, 126 Idaho 545, 887 P .2d 1052 (1984 ); a denial by the 
Industrial Commission of a motion for clarification of an award, Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar 
Co., 118 Idaho 147, 795 P.2d 309 (1990); the application of the "fireman's rule," Winn v. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR APPEAL BY PERMISSION: 4 
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& 
P2d 722 
Idaho subrogation 
u...r1der the third pa.rty provisions of the worker's compensation act, Barringer v. State, 111 Idaho 
794, 727 P.2d 1122 (1986); denial of a motion in limine on the use of a blood alcohol test of the 
deceased in a wrongful death action against the city, Stattner v. City ofCalcfwell, 111Idar10714, 
727 P .2d 1142 (1986); venue of an action against a public official, Priest Lake Coalition, Inc. v. 
State ex rel. Evans, 111 Idaho 354, 723 P.2d 898 (1986); whether the legislature's declaration of 
an emergency is subject to judicial review, Idaho State AFL-CJO v. Leroy, 110 Idaho 691, 718 
P.2d 1129 (1986); order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, Evans v. 
Galloway, 108 Idaho 711, 701 P.2d 659 (1985); application of the statute oflimitations to a 
claim against a surety for the defalcations of a former treasurer and tax collector, Lincoln County 
v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 102 Idaho 489, 632 P.2d 567 (1980); denial of an 
insurer's motion for summary judgment on a coverage question under a blanket endorsement, 
Wright v. Johnson, 101 Idaho 208, 610 P .2d 567 (1980); and a review of a summary judgment to 
the State in a highway sign case, Gavica v. Hansen, 101 Idaho 58,608 P.2d 861 (1980). 
With respect to a motion to dismiss specifically, in In re Text .Messaging Antitrust 
Litigation, 630 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2010), t.he 7th Circuit held that a denial of a Rule I2(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss was an order suitable for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 
In Budell v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2,665 P.2d 701, (1983), this Court indicated L.1-iat I.AR. 12 was the 
equivalent rule to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b ), stating: 
I.A.R. 12 was adopted by the Court in 1977 and implemented a 
procedure similar to an appeal from an interlocutory order from a 
federal district court to a court of appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(b) and Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
for the United States Courts of Appeals. Under the Idaho rule a 
party to an action in a district court or a proceeding in an 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR APPEAL BY PERMISSION: 5 
administrative agency may seek permission to appeal from an 
interlocutory order which is not otherwise appealable as a matter of 
right under LA.R. 1 . consideration 
an appeal by certification an interlocutory order under Rule 
12 is that the order "involves a controlling question of law as to 
which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion," and 
that an lllliilediate appeal from the order "may materially advance 
the orderly resolution of the litigation . . . . " The rule requires a 
party to first make application to t.iie district court or administrative 
agency for its advisory ruling, and thereafter the party files a 
motion with the Supreme Court requesting it to accept the appeal 
from the interlocutory order. The defendant in this case properly 
followed the procedures set forth in the rule and did obtain an 
order of the district court recom..rnending the appeal by 
certification. 
In Rudell, this Court denied a Rule 12 motion for appeal of the district court's order 
denying a motion for summary judgment seeking an order that a prior judgment in favor of the 
defendant in a small claims case barred a subsequent personal injury action. The Supreme Court, 
per curiam, noted that just because a reversal would obviate a trial did not by itself justify a Rule 
12 appeal where there was no argument by the defendant that an appeal would materially 
advance the orderly resolution of the litigation. The Court stated: 
It was the intent of I.A.R. 12 to provide an immediate appeal from 
an interiocutory order if substantial legal issues of great public 
interest or legal questions of first in1pression are involved. The 
Court also considers such factors as the impact of an immediate 
appeal upon the parties, the effect of the delay of the proceedings 
in the district court pending the appeal, the likelihood or possibility 
of a second appeal after judgment is finally entered by the district 
court, and the case workload of the appellate courts. No single 
factor is controlling in the Court's decision of acceptance or 
rejection of an appeal by certification, but the court intends by 
Rule 12 to create an appeal in the exceptional case and does not 
intend by the rule to broaden the appeals which may be taken as a 
matter of right under I.AR. 11. 
105 Idaho at 4, 665 P .2d at 703. 
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No clear thread emerges cases 
appeals. cases 
groups for difference of ai~d orderly advruicement litigation; such as the 
constitutionality of statutes, subject matter and personal jurisdiction, or the application of the 
Double Jeopardy clause. Other cases have high profiles, such as those involving salacious 
allegations against the Boy Scouts. Other cases less apparently pass muster under the Buddell 
test; such as, cases involving venue, insurance coverage, motions to suppress, availability of 
affinnative defenses or evidentiary issues. Most of the time this Court simply recites that a 
motion for appeal by permission was granted. 
So, in the absence of a bright line rule and with a multi-factor test that this Court 
exercises on a case-by-case basis, the job of the applicant is to marshal arguments to satisfy each 
of the requirements of the rule to persuade this Court to accept the appeal. 
IIL THE ISSUES RAISED BY the MOTION TO DISMISS 
Under I.A.R. l 2(b ), the first criterion to grant a motion for permission to appeal from an 
interlocutory order is that the interlocutory order must involve a controlling question of law as to 
which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion. The second criterion in order to grant a 
motion to appeal is that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the orderly 
resolution of the litigation. Both criteria must be present before this Court will grant permission to 
appeal from the interlocutory order denying the District's motion to dismiss. Further, "the intent of 
I.A.R. 12 [is] to provide an immediate appeal from lh~ interlocutory order if substa.11.tial legal 
issues of great public interest or legal questions of first impression are involved. Aardema v. 
US. Dairy Systems, Inc, supra. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR APPEAL BY PERMISSION: 7 
Controlling of law as to 
opinion. court re,:og;m~~ 
t..lie agreement entered was u.'Jlavvf..ll. Memorru1dfuu Decision a11d Order Denying 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, page 5. The district court decided as a matter of !aw that all of the 
District's arguments failed. The decision was not based upon any disputed issues of fact. It was 
based upon an interpretation of a provision of the Idaho Constitution (Article VIII, Section 3), the 
application of Idaho statutes, as well as an application as a matter of law of contract principals. 
Therefore, the District submits that the court's decision was based upon controlling questions of 
law. The City seemingly agreed to this view when it sought a stipulated continuance of the trial. 
The next issue for this Court to examine is whether there exists substantial grounds for 
differences of opinion regarding the law as applied by this Court. The briefing submitted in support 
of the motion to dismiss presented substantial grou.11ds under the law for which there was a 
difference of opirilon based upon existing law. The district court disagreed with District's 
constitutional and statutory analysis and agreed with t.he City's position. However, the District's 
position was supported by existing constitutional interpretations by this Court. The district court 
recognized the same when it granted leave to file the interlocutory appeal. 
Fu.rther, as previously noted, it is appropriate to grant permissive appeal where substantial 
legal issues of great public interest are involved. The present case involves such an issue. The 
duration of the contract requiring a tum over of ad valorem goes in perpetuity. This Court has 
held that contracts requiring performance of a series of acts in perpetuity may be against public 
policy. Barton v. State, 104 Idaho 338, 340, 659 P.2d 92, 94; Shultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 775, 
554 P.2d 948,953 (1976). 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR APPEAL BY PER.MISSION: 8 
case involves a matter great 
streets ,,......,,,..,,..,.,.,..,..,,= to 
as pointed out by· the District below, th.e use valorem funds in perpetuity is of great 
public interest to its taxpayers, not all of whom reside within the City. Thus, this case specific 
concern is also met by the present case. 
The final arbiter of the differences of opinion regarding the application of the law will 
necessarily be this Court. A permissive appeal the district court's interlocutory order on the 
motion to disJT1iss is appropriate in this case. 
Orderly advancement of the litigation. If the District is right about the application of 
law in this matter, the case ends upon appeal. Whatever decision this Court makes will shape the 
outcome of the case on remand. The appeal of the interlocutory order will reduce the cost of 
litigation between the parties, both of which are fonded by taxpayer revenues. Further, the 
parties have stipulated to a joint preliminary injunction that continues the operations of the 
entities as was occurring under the disputed contract, so the public is not disadvantaged in any 
manner by the appeal. An appeal, especially of the constitutional issue, may materially advance 
the orderly resolution of the litigation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Defendants' Motion for Appeal by Permission under I.A.R. 12( c) meets each prong 
of the test set for under the rule, and the holding of Aardema v. US. Dairy Systems, Inc., supra. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY on this 
foregoing upon following, by the 
C. Matthew 
Winston & Cashatt 
Coeur 
Scot 
Sandpoint City Attorney 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
MEMORAl'fDUM OF 
& 
correct 
21 
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MERIDIAN, 83680 
208-887~4800 
FAX 208~887-4865 
2429 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
.TAMEST VERl~ON & WEEKS, PA 
1626 LINCOLN WAY 
COEL;R D-ALENE, 83814 
208-667-0683 
FAX 208~664-1684 
r.s.B. 4255 
Attorneys for Defendant 
fodependent Highway District 
INTHE 
STATE 
CITY OF 
the State of Idaho, 
vs. 
a 
COURT OF 
IDAHO,IN 
Plai.ntiff, 
INDEPENDENT HfGHWA Y DISTRICT, a 
) 
) 
) 
subdivision of the State ofldaho. ) 
IDAI-fO ) 
) 
ss. 
) 
Dcfoodant, 
DISTRJCT OF 
COUNTY OF BOl'·r!,rnR 
CASE 201 
AFFIDA VlT OF 
MARJ TILLEY 
County of Ada 
M/\RJ 
L 
being first duly sworn deposes and states: 
I make statem1.;nts own persona! knowledge; 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARJ TILLEY - 1 
PAGE 01 03 
07/08/ 25 2085545 7 ,, 1_ JAMES VERN PAGE 02/03 
3. serve as of the hldcpcndent of 
an.d have served in that capacity for approximately eight years: 
r have 1,cver understood a prior Board Commissioners could create an 
obligation perpeti..!ity all future Boards Cornmlssioners to pay to the City of Sandpoint 
Sandpoint properties; 
5. The Board or Commissioiters has made numerous to contact 
Sandpoint officials lo renegotiate the Joint Powers Agreement which purported to crnate an 
obligation to pay over all such property taxes into perpeinity; 
of 
6. The 
occasions to approach 
Board of Commissioners instructed its former artomey on numerous 
Sandpoint officials to negotiate a temrination or amendment to the 
Joint Powers Agreement so as to modify in perpetuity to disburse ail such IHD 
property tax revenues to the ('if Sandpoint; 
i ,. or modification to the Joint Powers 
Agreement were unsuccessful. 
DATED 4. 
Marj 
SUBSCRJBED SWORN before me this ·- _2JiJ)_ day of 
Notary Publlc Idaho 
Residing at: \,J-·0 ~(" / 
My Commission Expi;;s: 
APFIDA VIT OF MARJ LLEY - 2 
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l HERE.BY CERTIFY that on this _b_'+_A-_ day of July, 2014, 1. served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing OF MARJ TILLEY upon the following, by the 
mfi,thod indicated below: 
Scot R, Campbell 
Sandpoint City Attorney 
1 I23 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
C. Matthew Anderson 
WINSTON & CASHATT, LA WYERS 
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Jdaho 83814 
AFFrDAVrT OF MARJ TILLEY - 3 
~ via facsimile to 208-255-1368 
facsimile to 208-765-212! 
PAGE 03/03 
07/08/2014 14:27 2085545741 JAMES VERN 
DAVIDE. w').'NKOOP 
SHERER & WYI\1KOOP, LLP 
1\1AIN 
B0X31 
M.bKlUJAN, lJJA.tlU €5.:HJ~U 
208-887-4800 
FAX 208-887-4865 
LS.B. 2429 
SUSANP. WEEKS 
JAl'1ES, VER.t~ON & WEEKS, PA 
1626 LINCOLN WAY 
COEUR D-ALENE, IDAHO 83814 
208-667-0683 
FAX 208-664-1684 
LS.B. 4255 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Independent Highway District 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN fo.J\1) OF COLNTY OF BUNNER 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal corporation 
the State of Idaho, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
l};DEPENDENT IDGHW A Y DISTRJCT~ a ) 
political subdivision of the State of Idaho, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
STATEOFIDAHO ) 
) ss. 
of Ada ) 
CASE NO, CV 2013-01342 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF 
M . .1...R.J TILLEY 
MARJ TILLEY being first duly sworn deposes ~nd states: 
1. I make the following statements of my QW1J personal knowledge: 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF MARJ TILLEY -
PAGE 01 03 
4 4:27 2085545741 JAMES VERN 
2- am an elected Commissioner oftbe Independent Highway 
have served in that capacity for approxi."tlately ten years; 
3. I presently serve as Chairman of the Independent Highway District Board of 
Commissioners and have served in that capacity for approximately eight years~ 
4_ f am farrriliar with the ad valorem ta:x:es paid to the Citv of Sandpoint pursuant to 
the Joint Powers Agreement that is the subject of this lawsuit. IHD has never paid any penalties 
or interest collected on late payment of ad valorem taxes to the City of Sandpoint. 
DATED this day of July, 20i4. 
~:/,?olrf 
SlJBSCRIBED AND SWOR,~ before me 7 r_k day of July. 2014. 
~a-n -tr'!. v~ 
Nota.ry PubHc for Idaho 
Residing at: B-, fl n..v... LP . Idaho 
My Commission Expires: /t){t / I (.a 
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Scot R. Campbell 
Sandpoint City Attorney 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
C. Matthew Anderson 
WINSTON & CASHATT. LA WYERS 
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Ida..110 83814 
SEC01'rD AFFIDAVIT OF MARJ TILLEY - 3 
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XX via facsimile to 208-255-1368 
XX via facsimile to 208-765-2121 
XX via facsimile to 208-446-1132 
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P.O. BOX 31 
MERIDIAN, IDAHO 
208-887-4800 
FAX 208-887-4865 
LS.R 2429 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
.JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, PA 
1626 LINCOLN WAY 
COEUR D-ALENE, IDAHO 838.14 
208-667-068} 
F 1-\X 208-664-1684 
LS.B. 4255 
Attorneys Dcfendani 
Independent Highway District 
JAMES VERN 
IN DrSTRTCT COURT OF TI IE FlRST 
CITY OF SA1'..TDP0fNT, a municipal corporation ) 
the State Idaho, 
OFTHE 
ER 
J 
) 
} 
) 
) 
) 
CASENO. 201 342 
Plaintiff, 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DtSTRICT, a 
political subdivision of tlic State ofldaho, 
Defe11dant. 
STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
) SS, 
County of Ada ) 
l\FFIDAVTT OF 
BISHOP 
BISHOP being fitst duly sworn deposes and states: 
I make the following statements rny own personal knowledge~ 
2. I am the Clerk of the Tndepcndent Highway Dii;trict 
3. As part my the 
,H;u t.· I? f' 
AfFlDAVff OF MI\RJ TrLl.&V' l 
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located the attached 
20 4. 
[e Bishop 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me 2014. 
07/08/2014 5:12 2086545741 
Scot R. Campbell 
Sandpoint Attorn<-.:y 
i 123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
C. Matthew Anderson 
WINSTON & 
250 Kortbwest Boulevard, 
Coeur Idaho 83 8 
i....tt>- ~IC 
FFlOr'\ VIT OF ~H'ft:t:;f'-Y - 3 
JAMES VERN PAGE 03/05 
to I368 
ti) 208~ 765-2 i 2 
201 15:12 
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S<.nl (;imf>lmil 
Tmisduy, )um~ 12, 7.0l:?. 11,114 PM 
hmcchgmi:me@Trmiti!lr.<:c,1 n 
Mar!;ha Ofjilvic; Kody V,,,, fJyk 
Indt~p,~ndent Ht1-;hwny t:>i~h'kJ fHiyrncnts V) 
Tl!!'. em11il l$ i!: rns1Hm51! H, ll\H ,n,:i::tinf! you h:.d wHh tin: City wl,f:H: y,1u ::1mvcyml !mfotlnmJi•m Di!:trlcls 
PAGE 04/05 
cl,H,i, ,.: w 1·t.'linnut,h Ci,11 uf Snndp(>im'. !:fFN!!.<. {to r1,,11nnr llnO ,li:;r.onUnvr·! pny1twn(s ,.id vnlorm11 !l1i•.!S 
,h;~ (:ity. IH rnc!lli m,: 'lllrl position, yc,u fei!I that th1: r>bflmit!on for fHl, to r.oliUnmi r,aymrrnts 1nro tho fotur!: i~ iit1i11al 
bt:cause It!!; a dclH of !l!D mid bind:, ruwr<: 111D llmmls, If thi:i ii. net yo11r posilhm, fllm1sc let 1m1 know, will 
m1drc.~.; t!1is ismm. 
On .tuly l, ;,mil:? Ii-If) m11f ttw C!tv cntar~6 into a 5tipu!!Jtlon !o-t 5~1tlemrmi which ,1:u;h pll!'i.\f dmNrnkH!d it w,rn In !liclr 
i:Jest lnternst m i:mnp1·omrsu wh,1tn111~r daltns !lir:y mny lmvr, hi1d ai,:i:tlMt imr.h otl'.<n and :,et!/o a l,1wsi!it trial l\,l(l b!i,m 
goi11r, nn fot;; tmul 3 vears. 
111 the ,;eHlcnumt, llw rmrtics ngmmJ to rmter into u mint Jiowcm; 1'\gmc1110n1 (/\13ni.:1mmlt} t!m following: 
1. samlp,<iilH rntalns }urlsdl<:tion :w,i i:ontrol ovHr Ws stmt<!~; 
7.., IND woo Id p;iy over to the City ail i,a va!orem r;ro1lcrly tux f1mrfa rnoiived from lo vies by 1!11) (Hl r>mpe rtier. 
wlthin City limits; 
:l. City v.muld rr.q11i'l.~l l:h.it !lom1cr County viH:11t11 ~he dlssolwion election [with 
,1. City wo\Jfd not uµpo!;c lliD ,mnEx<l'.tion e!m::tioni; il!H.l 
::i. !HD woalt! wnivc co.sis pmvlot,sly aw,mled. 
Pw·;;wmt to the ~ti1mlritl<in far .SeHlemm1l, whlrh was 11ctr!ptud ;.rnd i:onfirmml by th<? Crn1rt, ri.: July B, :W03 tho p;:inii;!,; 
m,rnr-ed Into .r Joint Powers 1'\l{1'e1m11mt 
J., the <lur.,tron of th<: ,1gnnmwnt ls 1rnrp,Gtm1l ur until i;oth pnith,rn <1/l'rm~ u~ formim1fo it; 
2. !l·lD 111:rnflci !(1 i,,vv ,1mi ,ipvly mr ;,d valornm prnpc;rty imic~; 1111d 
3. '"nm Distr!cl wi!I pny ovnr w tile City all rwopll1 ty t(l)( f11mli. frum ,,11d1 Dlsuict !cvhi.t tlll :r!I pmp<:rtv foc.:ni.id 
wi!hh1 tile cHy limit:.." 
fli!'ia19·rw wlt:h t!H, ,,f ll m th,1t tlm floym,~nts to the Cily arc .a ,fd)t of the fJist!'i1;t Hml thm the D!~trl<:t cnn 
d!sr.cmtinue p;iymnntr. lo the City, 
l\tt!r.!c Viii Section;! of the h.luh!J Com,titutlon places a rcstrlcHm1 ml Cifa;,,; tliat th~y :im i::s:mm1lly barred frum lncurrinri 
di}bt~ or i!ahilitir;.,, in 1:x,.l!S~ of the !nt:nnHc nml rmmmit, prmridcd for (lehts. arid linl,Jllltl,::; in sur:h vm1t, unlrH,s tlwy flrst · 
c1mduc\ ami clci:tilm irnd Si!Wf~ vtih~r nm:irov;:,! oi the prnpu!,IJd c!ipcnditmH (unless t!rn exp11t1<litllm k: :w "otdlnary nod 
n~c,:ss.1ry r.x1um!tt>", ' 
!tntilN tli,iri hmtc IHD 01mrntf! nm/ m1J!nt;ii11 City :i;trcets, till: City's Public Works i)t!p,.rtrncnt mnm;"w.s that frnu:tlnn, 1,1 
c;1ch,Hlf.!l!, IHD pm:.,l'S thmueh to tHc CiW that portion of the «ti v.'lionm, tnxr,•s that nrc coilccwct within the !J:1Jmitli1ri~::; 
of the City. 
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:.on\111 hinf: 10 r,Nik !lie !11wsulL nm r1~,c1!lpt hy ll1t·! Ci1y of ltr. rdrn1,: nf \he ;,If v;ilomm l ,tlWS It the irnw,11! ni 1 In: 
!i:mdpnini n::t:eilve1 hJf taklna tl1t1 nrnin1r.'1wnr:c and opr.r;Jlion (1(' ll, :,t1 et:ts, dmr,pii\H !hG lnwml\ ,iml ~Wppi"tl i he 
,ii~:;o!utitJ11 r.lnr,tim,, 
11101)11 ll\1:; HlllkO~ llm ,mi;it!nn the C!cy d,•;1r wilh r,•g;v,i W H·liY1. de,lni tn ,:lop p;,yim:ll!~ nf the Cilf'.; 5h;1rc :1rl 
v:1IMcm ui;r1:s n, th,: f.icv. 
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Telephone: (208) 887-4800 
Facsimile (208) 887~4865 
No. 2429 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks, 
1626 Lincoin 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838I4 
T elephonc: (208) 667-0683 
facsimile: (208) 664-1684 
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Attorneys for Defendant f ndependent Highway Districr 
COURT OF THE 
IDAHDO, n-; AKD 
OF SANDPOINT, a municipal 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
THE COu'"l\TY BONNER 
CASE NO. CV-2013-01342 
corporation State Idaho. 
VS. 
subdi 
Plainti~ 
WAY DISTRICT, a 
of the State ofidaho, 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO CITY 
OF SANl)POINrs MOTION FOR 
SUM?vIARY JtJDGMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Plainfrff City Sandpoint (''Cicy") filed a Complaint and Request for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief against Independent Highway District ("IHD"). In its Complaint, the Cicy 
the District's letter to the City (Exhibits and E to the Complaint) violated Idaho 
Code 67-2332 cir 45); that s actions violated the Supreme 
IN RESPONSE l'O CITY Of SANDPOlNT"S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
07/08/2014 '19 2085545741 JAMES VERN PAGE 02/09 
judgment was benefit of the bargain negotiated between 
Powers Agreement did not violate Article the and District; a decl,:U'ation that the 
Section Three the Idaho · the settlement did not violate § 40-801; and 
was a enforceable contract between the City and District 
48). The City preliminary and permanent injunction requiring the district to cease 
anc desi5t imerforing the operation and maintena."1ce of its streets under the 
Joint Powers Agrccm:;nt; and immediately transferring to the Chy tax revenues, including 
pcnalt[es withheld the City (~ 51 in its prayer for 
l a declarat0ry judgment upholding the Stipulation for Settlement 
parties and approved by the Court: a declaratory judgment that the Joint 
Pov,/crs is a and exercise or governmental authority under Jdaho Code §§ 
67-2326 through 67-23 for a declaratory judgment that the Memorandum of 
by the: pa1ties on September 1 2005, was a exercise () f 
an cJrder enjoining Distr1ct from interterine: with the Citv's 
-· , ,.; 
operation and maintenance of streets under the foint Powers ,~.grccment; (5) for an order 
the to immedialely transfer tO the aH ad valorem taxes collected by the 
a ""_,,,..,,.,.,,_,. order against the District recruiting the District to comply with the 
Agreement while the matter was under consideration by the Com1: and 
including attorney fees- The City has now moved for summary judgment 
RESPONSE OF s 
costs of suit 
FOR SUMMARY 
07/08/ 4 2. 9 2085545741 JAMES VERN PAGE 03/09 
on 
pending 
, the argued against by this an 
interlocatory because the delay a stay creare. IHD noted that a stay was not 
an appeal. Based on co11cems expressed the City opposition 
to interlocutory Court did not consider a sfay. its interlocutory appeal request 
to tbe Supreme Couit, requested a stay. 
H. STANDARD FOR GRANT OF SUMMARY .JuDGMENT 
The district court the same standard in on a motion for summary judgment as docs 
an appellate court review a district court Siale v. Rubbermaid 
353, 65,617-8(1 
P,O i:. Loucks Irrevocable 144 Idaho 233, 237, 159 
874 (2007), our Suprer:1e Court reviewed the standard of review for summary judgment 
when no my was requested and held: 
appeal from grnm o a for si:m:1,ary Judgment. this Comi's 
standard of review is the same as the standard used by the district court originally 
ling nr: the motion. !nter111m,1J1fain Forest Nfanagement v. Louisiana Pacific 
136 Idaho 233,235, 3 t P.3d 921,923 (2001 ). Summary judgment is 
appropriate "i the pleadi11gs, depositions, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that 
rrnty ,s w a judgment ss a r:rntter lavv I.R.CP. 56(c). 
The h:rc:cn of proving the absence of material facts is upon the moving party. 
Thomson, . , City of Lewiston, 1 Idaho 473, 476, 50 P.3d 488, 491 (2002): see 
also v. Salrnon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 452 P.2d 362 (1969} 
The adverse party, however. '\miy not rest upon the mere aHegations or denials 
pleadlngs, but his i'Csponse, by uffidavits or as Otherwise provided in this rule, 
specific facts showing that there 1s a genuine issue for trial." 
1s tbercfore entitled to 
07/08/2014 12: 9 20855457'11 JAMES VERN PAGE 04/09 
the court without the trial 
is cr:titled to arrive at the most probable inferences based 
before it 
inference.f;_ Forest 
31 P .3d at 923. Resolution of the possible 
between the inferences is the responsibilities the fact finder. Cameron v. 
130 1237, 239(1 Courtexerciscsfree 
over the entire record was before tl1c district judge to determine 
was entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw and reviews the 
ir:farcnccs the district judge to detennine whether the record reasonably 
[ntermounta/11 Forest A!cmagement, 136 Idaho at 236, 
3 l P at 
IL ARGCMENT 
A. :'v1 . .atcrial 
Claim 
Disputed Fact Exists on the Breach of Contract 
its arguments motion to disrniss. The undisputed facts 
upc)n it seeks a summary judgment. there arc material disputed 
issues fa.ct related to the of comract 
relation :o 
agrccmenrs 
complainL claimed was due penalties and interest collected in 
taxes owed under 
to complaint indic~1le 
T • 
,,Ol.lil Agreement. None the 
anything than ad 
valorem taxes coJ:ected residents the City. The second aflidavit Mazi Tilley 
indicates '.ms never paid penalties and intzrcst over to the City. This material issue of fact 
prevenl:, judgment in contract claim. 
07/08/2014 12: 2086545741 JAMES VERN PAGE 05/09 
tole whether 
facts of IHD on summary 
judgment, is a question to support the 
powcts agreement 
Althot;gh not a the argued 111 motion to dismiss that 
it had no k:s;:u THD had concerns tile JPA to discuss those conccms. 
herein is correspondence from tO discuss the 
to I10 
H. Upholding tile Stipulation Settlement Entered into by the 
by the 
The a declaration by Court 
entered by the Court The face of this document 
the Stipulation for Settlement 
it was prepared by the City's 
attorney, Scott W. R~ed. stipi..:lation provided that the entities would enter into a joint 
powers agreement under Chap1er , Idaho provide fr,r 
dJVJSHJ!l all ad funds 8, 40, Idaho Code. The 
stipulal;on nt provide that u.:..nr 
perpetuity, tern over tax funds received from levies by the D1strict upon 
property 
judgmem request regarding item directly relates to 
Agreement. discussion of Joint Povvers 
R CITY OF SJ\T'-"DPO!NT'S S{JMMARY 
07/08/2014 12: g 2085545741 
Declaratory .iudgment 
exercise of governmental 
2332 
The req1..1ested 
under 
JAMES VERN PAGE 05/09 
Powers Agreement is a legal 
under Idaho Code§§ 67-2326 through 
declare the legal 
67-2332. to 
addressed the wa5 nm valid and enforceable. Those arguments 
A arguments Lhe to dismiss is without 
restating is perpetual express language, 
and rl1c The language that a termination 
OCClJf is not 
A the constitution. 
an obligation in favor of the City. The "special doctrine" docs 
noc cure also argued at 
Ar-.c)Lher issue nor raised to is a portion of the JP A the 
City to va(.\1Le I· streets. highway have power and authority to 
abandon or vi:Jcate a district road. § 40-203. 
that power to a city. Sec gcneraily Blaha v. Ada County Board of Commissioners1 134 Idaho 
9 p 6 j Agreement ts invalid and 
MEMORANDC~v1 
JUDGM 6 
07/08/2014 19 2085545741 JAMES VERN PAGE 07/09 
was a exercise of governmental authority. 
agreement. ' also concerned abandonment and IHD streets by 
As 
lS icJ 
power and 
§ 40-203 
to conduct a hearing 
Memorandum of 
E. Request for an Order Enjoining the District from Interfering with the City's 
Operation iiind Maintenance ofits streets under the Joint Powers Agreement. 
also requested Court enter an enjoining District from interfering 
maintenance the Agreement. 
Outside 
interfered the 
C~t; is nnt 
Request 
ad 
an o 
i'bis request 1s moot as 
whereby was transferred 
transfer. 
no facts are presented that IHD ha,:; 
streets i:he boundaries of the 
to such a broad S\:1c·ceping inji..n1ction order. 
to immediately tnrnsfer to the City 
District. 
parties entered a stipulated preliminary 
prejudice to defenses to 
G. !<'01· a restraining order against the District requiring the District to compJy 
with the Agreement while the matter was under consideration by the Court; 
. R To crcY 
07/08/2014 12: 9 
argument or 
issue oi' 
0 
208554574 
o ·udgrnem 
• '1 J,., ' 
14. 
MEMOR.1\NDUM IN 
8 
JAMES VERN PAGE 08/09 
fees. 
12 . The has no 
defense was given a material 
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STATE OF iDAHO 
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SANDPOINT CITY ATTORNEY 
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"· . . . 201~ JUL 9 RA 10 00 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Telephone; (208) 263-0534 
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scampbell(@,ci. sand point.id. us 
C. MATTHEW Al'!\IDERSEN, ISB No. 3581 
WINSTON & CASHATT, LA WYERS, · 
a Professional Service Corporation 
250 Nor..hwest Boulevard, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-2 103 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2 12 1 
cma@winstoncashatt.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
FILED -ORIGtNAl 
I JUL - 3 201'l 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal 
corporation of the State of Idaho, 
Plaintiff, Supreme Court Docket No. 42236-2014 
vs. 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, 
a political subdivision of the State of 
Idaho, 
Defendant. 
1. Introduction. 
Bonner County Case No. CV-2013-0 1342 
CITY OF SANDPOINT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR APPEAL 
BY PERMISSION 
Defendant Independent Highway District CIHD") seeks to appeal by permission pursuant 
to I.A.R. 12(c). The request is based on the denial of an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the 
underlying action. Both the IHD and the City of Sandpoint ("City") are desirous of a prompt 
resolution of the dispute which arises out of a ten (10) year old Joint Power Agreement entered 
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1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Telephone: (208) 263-0534 
Facsimile: 255-1368 
C \;1ATIHE\V 
\\TNSTON & CASHATT, 
a Professional Service Corporation 
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-2103 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121 
cmaialwinstoncashatt.com 
Attorneys for City of Sandpoint 
OF SA . .'.~DPONT, a municipal 
corporation of the State ofldaho, 
Case No. CV-13-01342 
VS. OF S./\_c"\1)P0~1'S 
SC~1I.IA.R Y 
a 
Defendant. 
1, Introduction. 
The City of Sandpoint moved for summary judgment on claim for Declaratory and 
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matters 
E"idence submitted 
response to the summary judgment, none which create 
genuine 1ssues fact In fact, first Marj Telley and affidavit Julie 
contact regarding JPA prior to which 
admits is not a Memorandum Response, p. Ms. also 
her first declaration be created "in 
can create no JPA. 
which she testifies that the 
payment of ad valorem taxes the City Sandpoint; however, whether a specific requested is 
recoverable is an issue amounts lS 
to the court's determination legal propriety 
3. Law. 
A genui.i,e issue fact necessary to summary judgment is one the 
outcome 53 58, 278 937 
(2012). alleged are not material to the decision, summary judgment is properly 
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does not defeat the City's right to summary judgment. 
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right to the Court can determine necessarv scope, and no 
And obviously, at the time the Complaint was filed, the District was not paying under the JP,"\ 
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presumably, the preliminary injunction would need to be made permanent, ensuring the continued 
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case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or \Vithout foundation. 
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
IN THE MA TIER OF n-fE MOTION FOR ) 
APPEAL BY PERMISSION. ) 
· .. , ..... 
---------·- ----+.- ) 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal ) 
·~ rY\. 
ORDER DENYING Mt)TION"FOR 
corporation of the State of Idaho ) APPEAL BY PERMISSION 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
V. ) 
) 
Supreme Court Docket No. 42236-201 4 
Bonner County No. 2013-1142 
0v 
Ref. No. 14-308 
JNDEPENTIENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a ) 
political subdivision of the State of Idaho, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
A MOTION FOR APPEAL BY PERMISSION AND STAY OF f!ROCEEDINGS with 
attachn1ents and a MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR APPEAL BY 
PERMISSION were filed by counsel for Defendant on June 23, 2014, requesting this Court for an 
Order granting an appeal by permission of the district court' s Memorandum Decision and Order 
Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, file-stamped December 9, 2013 in Bonner County case no. 
CV-2013-1342. Thereafter, CITY OF SANDPOINT'S ~MORANDUM It.f OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION FOR APPEAL BY PERMISSION was filed by counsel for Plaintiff on July 3, 201 4. The 
Court is fully advised; therefore, after due consideration, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Defendant 's MOTION FOR APPEAL BY PERMISSION 
AND STAY OF PROCEEDINGS be, and hereby is, DENIED. 
DATED this I''\ July, 2014. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Judge John T. Mitchell 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
272 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR i\PPEAL BY PERMISSION - Docket No. 42236-2014 
~,ATE OF iDAHO 
of BONNER 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO !N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a Municipal 
Corporation of the State of Idaho, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a ) 
political subdivision of the State of Idaho, ) 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
________________ ) 
Case No. BON CV 2013 1342 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF CITY 
OF SANDPOINT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND. 
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the 
plaintiff City of Sandpoint (City). 
The Complaint filed on August 15, 2013, arises out of an alleged breach of 
contract claim initiated by City. Complaint and Request for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief, p. 7. Long before City filed its Complaint, on July 8, 2003, the parties entered 
into the contract, entitled Joint Powers Agreement (Agreement). Id., p. 8. City claims 
the defendant Independent Highway District (IHD) breached the Agreement on July 11, 
2013, when it refused to perform a material term of the Agreement by withholding funds 
from City. Id., Exhibit D. In addition to withholding funds, IHD unilaterally gave notice 
of the termination of the Agreement in its entirety on 25, Id., 
The parties entered into the Agreement as part of a settlement that was reached 
on July 3, 2003, following protracted litigation., 
• C 
generally Memorandum Decision 
~ 
Agreement). Agreement as 
The Joint Powers Agreement was intended to be a permanent resolution 
as it stated, under the heading "Duration": "The duration of this 
agreement shall be perpetual or until such time as the District and the City 
jointly and together agree to amend or terminate the same." [Complaint, 
Exhibit B, p. 1 ]. The City would assume responsibility for all the streets 
within its limits. Id. The IHD promised to pay the City all ad valorem 
property tax funds from levies of properties with the City limits. Id., p. 3. 
In return, the City, which had jointly petitioned for the IHD's dissolution 
election, would request the Bonner County Board of Commissioners to 
vacate the dissolution election and dismiss the action with prejudice. Id., 
p. 5. The parties stipulated that the Joint Powers Agreement could only 
be terminated by mutual agreement of both parties. Id., pp. 1, 4. 
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, pp. 3-4. 
Funds are not currently being withheld due to the stipulated entry of a preliminary 
injunction on December 18, 2013. City of Sandpoint's Memorandum Support of 
Summary Judgment, pp. 2-3. 
On June 4, 2014, City filed the present motion for summary judgment, requesting 
that the Court declare the Agreement and the Memorandum of Understanding to be 
legal and enforceable, and for an Order requiring IHD to comply with all obligations of 
the Agreement in the form of a permanent injunction. City of Sandpoint's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, pp. 1-2. In support of their motion, City filed a supporting 
memorandum that expressly "[i]ncorporates the authority and argument made in its 
Response to the IHD's Motion to Dismiss, as well as the Court's reasoning set out its 
Memorandum Decision and Order." Id., p. 3. Additionally, City has requested an award 
of costs and attorney fees it incurred as a result of the present action. 2. 
!HD responded in opposition to the motion for summary on 8, 
2014, alleging that material issues of fact remain disputed in regards to the breach of 
Julie Bishop." City filed its reply memorandum on July 1 2014, entitled 
Sandpoint's Reply in Support of Summary Judgment." 
Hearing on City's motion for summary judgment was held on 22, 2014, at 
the conclusion of which the Court took City's motion for summary judgment under 
advisement. Because this Court finds no genuine issues of material fact remain for 
trial, summary judgment must be granted in favor of City against IHD for the reasons 
set forth below. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
Summary judgment is proper "[i]f the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
See LRC.P. 56(c). The moving party carries the burden of proving the absence of 
genuine issues of material fact. Rouse v. Household Finance Corp., 144 Idaho 68, 70, 
156 P.3d 569, 571 (2007) (citing Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902, 905, 935 P.2d 165, 
168 (1997). "The burden may be met by establishing the absence of evidence on an 
element that the non moving party will be required to prove at trial." Nelson v. Anderson 
Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702, 707, 99 P.3d 1092, 1097 (2004) (citing Dunnick v. Elder, 
126 Idaho 308, 311, 882 P.2d 475, 478 (Ct. App. 1994)). Any facts in dispute are 
liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party, with any inference reasonably drawn 
from the record done so of the nonmoving party. v. Goss, 144 Idaho 
225, 227, 159 P.3d 862, 864 (citing Lockheed Martin Corp. v. 
1 1 1,644 
a 
shifts 
there is a genuine issue trial. at 228, 159 3d at 864 (citing Hei v. Holzer, 139 
Idaho 81, 85, 73 P.3d 94, 98 (2003)). "[l]f the nonmoving party fails to provide a 
sufficient showing to establish the essential elements of his or her case, judgment shall 
be granted to the moving party." Porterv. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399,403, 195 P.3d 1212, 
1216 (citing Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 113, 138 P.3d 310, 313 (2006)). The 
nonmoving party may use circumstantial evidence to create a genuine issue of material 
fact. Edged In Stone, Inc. v. Northwest Power Systems, LLC, 156 Idaho 176, 321 P.3d 
726, 730 (2014) (citing ParkWest Homes, LLC v. Bamson, 154 Idaho 678, 682, 302 
P.3d 18, 22 (2013)). To create a genuine issue, "[h]owever, the [nonmoving] party may 
not rest on a mere scintilla of evidence." ParkWest Homes, LLC. Barnson, 154 Idaho 
678, 682, 302 P.3d 18, 22 (2013) (citing McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 
360, 364 (1991 )). The nonmoving party may not simply rely upon mere allegations in 
the pleadings, but must set forth in affidavits specific facts showing there is a genuine 
issue for trial. I.R.C.P. 56(e); see Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211, 868 P.2d 
1224, 1227 (1994). If reasonable people might reach conflicting inferences about the 
evidence, the motion for summary judgment must be denied. Ashby v. Hubbard, 100 
Idaho 67, 69, 593 P.2d 402, 404 (1979) (citing Otts v. Brough, 90 Idaho 124, 409 P.2d 
95 (1965)). 
If an action is being tried without a jury, "[t]he trial court as the trier of fact is 
entitled arrive at the most probable inferences based the evidence 
properly before it and grant the summary judgment despite the possibility conflicting 
, 136 Idaho 233, P.3d 921, 923 fact is 
responsible for resolution of conflicts between the possible inferences. Id. (citing 
Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898, 900, 950 P.2d 1237, 1239 997)). If the Idaho 
Supreme Court reviews the decision of a judge serving as fact finder, it "[e]xercises free 
review over the entire record that was before the district judge to determine whether 
either side was entitled to judgment as a matter of law and reviews the inferences 
drawn by the district judge to determine whether the record reasonably supports those 
inferences." Id. (citing lntermountain Forest Management, 136 Idaho at 236, 31 P.3d at 
924). City's Complaint does not demand a jury trial. IHD has yet to file an Answer and 
has not at any time made a demand for a jury trial. Thus, the Court is able to make 
reasonable inferences. 
Ill. ANALYSIS OF CITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. All Provisions of the Joint Powers Agreement and Memorandum of 
Understanding are Legal, Valid, and Enforceable and IHD Materially 
Breached by Withholding Funds and Unilaterally Terminating the 
Agreement. 
City argues summary judgment is appropriate declaring the Agreement and 
Memorandum of Understanding to be legal, valid, and enforceable, because there are 
no genuine issues of material fact remaining for trial. City of Sand point's Memorandum 
Support of Summary Judgment, p. 3. It argues that all of IHD's challenges to the 
Agreement involve the legal interpretation of Idaho law and the unambiguous terms of 
the Agreement itself. Id. Finally, City asserts that if the Agreement is legal, then it is 
also enforceable, and they are entitled to relief. Id. 
In response, IHD claims material issues of fact remain which prevents summary 
C! 
has it is interest ad 
valorem taxes owed under the Joint Powers Agreement," none of the evidence before 
the Court indicates City is entitled to receive anything other than the ad valorem taxes 
collected from City residents. Id. Further, !HD reasserts their arguments from the 
earlier motion to dismiss: that the termination clause is illusory, that proper 
consideration was not given for the agreement, and that a perpetual agreement runs 
counter to Idaho law. Id., pp. 5-7. Finally, IHD claims that only highway districts may 
abandon or vacate a highway district road and that the alleged delegation of the 
authority to City is invalid and unenforceable. Id., p. 6-7. 
this case, there are no genuine issues of material fact that would prevent this 
Court granting the motion for summary judgment. In support of this conclusion, the 
Court must address whether the Agreement obligated IHD to turn over all revenue 
collected from City residents including interest and penalties, whether the consideration 
given by City was sufficient, whether City may share the power to abandon or vacate a 
district road, and whether the relief requested is overly broad. Each of these will be 
discussed in turn below. This Court thoroughly and exhaustively addressed any other 
issue raised by IHD, including the legality of the contract previously its Memorandum 
Decision and Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss. See generally Memorandum 
Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Court's previous 
analysis includes a lengthy discussion of whether the Agreement is invalid due to its 
perpetual nature. 16-18. this memorandum specifically 
the above-mentioned arguments advanced by IHD. 
1. IHD is Obligated to Over AU Revenues District 
on Prooertv located Within . .,, 
revenues were 
allegedly withheld from City. Complaint and Request for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief, p. 11, ,I 51 (b). IHD disputes that City is entitled to penalties and interest from ad 
valorem taxes collected because during the course of performance of the Agreement 
the IHD has never paid those sources of revenue to City. Memorandum Response to 
City of Sandpoint's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 4. IHD apparently claims that 
this discrepancy now creates an ambiguity in the Agreement. Id In response, City 
argues that the issue of whether or not IHD has turned over interest in the past is 
irrelevant to the legal issue of whether City is entitled to those amounts. City of 
Sandpoint's Reply in Support of Summary Judgment, p. 4. City further asserts it is 
undisputed City has previously been paid delinquent taxes and that it makes no sense 
why the accompanying interest and penalties were not also turned over. Id. 
In this case, a plain reading of the Agreement shows IHD was obligated to turn 
over to City all revenue from levies on property within city limits. See Joint Powers 
Agreement Between the City of Sandpoint and the Sandpoint Independent Highway 
District, p. 3. The interpretation of a clear and unambiguous contract is a question of 
law. Lamprech v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 75 P.3d 743 (2003) (citing Iron Eagle 
Dev't, LLC. v. Quality Design Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 487,491, 65 P.3d 509, 513 
(2003)). Contracts that are unambiguous are given their plain meaning. Id. "The 
purpose of interpreting a contract is to determine the intent of the contracting parties at 
the time the contract was entered." Id. Intent of the parties is determined from the 
contract as a whole. Id. ( citing Daugharly v. Post Falls Highway Dist., 134 Idaho 731, 
735, 9 P.3d 534, 538 (2000)). "If a contract is found ambiguous, its interpretation is a 
' 
" is a 
is interpretations 
ambiguous. Id. (citing Lewis v. CEDU Educ. Serv., 
1147, 1152 (2000)). 
, 135 Idaho 139, 144, 15 P.3d 
Here, the Agreement between City and IHD is not reasonably subject to 
conflicting interpretations. Under the relevant section of the Agreement detailing 
revenue distribution, the parties agreed to the following: 
The District at the present time and in the future will ievy and apply for ad 
valorem property taxes under the authority granted in Chapter 13, Title 40, 
Idaho Code. The District will pay over to the City all property tax funds 
from such District levies on all property located within the city limits. 
On the basis of present tax rates this amount is presently approximately 
$350,000 per year. District, upon receipt of tax revenues, forward to the 
City all tax revenues received by the District .... 
Joint Powers Agreement Between the City of Sandpoint and the Sandpoint 
Independent Highway District, p. 3 (emphasis added). "All" is defined as "the whole 
number, quantity, or amount" Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary p. 71 (1983). 
The term "tax," broadly, "embraces all governmental impositions on ... property .. " 
Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). Revenue is defined as "[g]ross income or 
receipts." Id. A definition of the plural form of "fund" is "available pecuniary resources." 
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary p. 498 (1983). Thus, "all tax revenues" or 
"all property tax funds" would encompass the gross amount of money collected for IHD 
from City residents in relation to the ad valorem tax. 
The gross amount of funds collected for the benefit of !HO includes interest and 
costs of delinquent taxes. Under .C. § 40-805, which directs county tax collector 
regarding highway district taxes, the county is to "[p]ay over all moneys then due to the 
{+:> J ~ 
' ,, 
then so "all tax 
revenues" or "all property tax funds" utilized in the Agreement. 
Certainly, it must be taken into consideration that IHD has stated an affidavit to 
have "[n]ever paid any penalties or interest coilected on late payments of ad valorem 
taxes to the City of Sandpoint" Second Affidavit of Marj Tilley, p. 2. As such, they 
dispute that they should pay penalties and interest to City in the future. Memorandum 
in Response to City of Sandpoint's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 4. 
However, failure to distribute exact monies owed to a city by highway districts 
does not in itself imply an ambiguity because such distributions have previously been 
subject to simple human error and oversight See generally City of Rexburg v. Madison 
County, 115 Idaho 88, 89 764 P.2d 838,839 (1988) (county paid city 5% rather than 
statutory minimum of 50% of relevant ad valorem taxes for twenty-two (22) years before 
either party discovered the discrepancy but the Court held that despite this the district 
had a statutory duty to pay the 50% to the city). While neither party has briefed the 
total sum of interest and penalties owing as a result of delinquent taxes collected from 
City residents, it is reasonable to infer that the amount is proportionally less than the 
shortfall in City of Rexburg. If a city can go twenty-two years without noticing it is only 
being paid one-tenth of funds due, it is reasonable to infer that City here may not have 
taken notice of the discrepancy in the decade following the formation of the contract. 
This alone does not create an ambiguity in the contract. It merely shows oversight by 
in failing to realize IHD failed to perform in accordance with the Agreement. 
language of the Agreement is clear. !HD should have been paying all revenue 
ad va!orem taxes, and penalties. 
The Joint Powers 
Consideration. 
is Supported Adequate 
The Agreement, as previously found this is supported by adequate 
consideration. Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss, p. 20. IHD now argues City's agreement to not pursue dissolution of the 
highway district cannot serve as adequate consideration because "[n]o statute allows a 
city to play any role in determining whether the highway district would be dissolved." 
Memorandum in Response to City of Sandpoint's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 5. 
City has previously stated in an incorporated briefing that "[a]s consideration for 
entering into the JPA, the City agreed to assist in withdrawing the petition to dissolve 
the District and agreed not to challenge future annexations to the District The election 
did not occur." Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 7. They 
further argue that the agreement to not pursue dissolution was part of a stipulated 
settlement approved by the District Court for Bonner County and therefore by 
forebearing from exercising their right adequate consideration was given. City of 
Sandpoint's Reply in Support of Summary Judgment, p. 5. Moreover, they claim 
additional consideration was given when "[t]he parties reached an appropriate 
cooperation for the maintenance of streets and payment of taxes." Id., p. 6. 
No statute prevents City from playing a role in the dissolution of the highway 
district. Idaho Code § 40-1802 requires that "All proceedings for the dissolution of 
highway districts shall be initiated by a petition of twenty-five (25) or more qualified 
electors of the district.... LC.§ 40-1802. Upon petition by the requisite number of 
electors, the "[highway district] commissioners shall proceed consider the petition 
and all written objections to it, and shall hear, aJI .fersons in relation to it, and shall 
/y O' 
or take testimony as may be offered " § 
as and as a it no 
capacity to cast a vote, nothing the plain language of the above statute prevents the 
City from testifying or encouraging City residents to vote for dissolution once the 
necessary electors have been found. 
City has previously demonstrated its ability to offer testimony favor of the 
dissolution of the highway district. The Idaho Supreme Court, in a previous action 
involving the present parties, found the testimony of the Sandpoint City Treasurer to be 
illustrative when considering whether dissolution would be in the best interest of the 
district. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist. v. Board of County Com'rs of Bonner 
County, 138 Idaho 887, 892, 71 P.3d 1034, 1039 (2003). that case, the Idaho 
Supreme Court quoted the following testimony of the Sandpoint City Treasurer: 
The net effect of the taxpayers in the City of Sandpoint will be slight. The 
savings in duplicated services and administrative costs will compensate 
for the decreased revenues available to the city Street Departments. 
Except for possible changes unrelated to this issue, county residents 
should see their tax bill for Bonner County and Bridge decrease. 
Id. The reasonable inference to be drawn is that city residents would naturally look to 
city officials for guidance as to whether it was in their interest to support dissolution. 
The Idaho Supreme Court itself looked to a city official to support its findings. It is 
disingenuous for IHD to argue City could play no role in the dissolution process simply 
because it is not immediately apparent from reading the relevant statute. 
As the Court previously stated in its Memorandum Decision and Order Denying 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, "[t]here is consideration the present case because 
the IHD has agreed to pay money and the City has agreed to forebear its legal efforts to 
dissolve the " Memorandum Decision and Order Defendant's 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ORDER GRANTING 
dissolution a valid consideration existed. 
3. City May Share in the Power to Vacate and Abandon IHD Streets. 
IHD argues that summary judgment is not appropriate at this time because 
"[o]nly highway districts have the power and authority to abandon or vacate a highway 
district road." Memorandum in Response to City of Sandpoint's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p. 6 (citing I.C. § 40-203). Further, !HD argues the power cannot be 
delegated. Id. (citing Blaha v. Ada County Board of Commissioners, 134 Idaho 770, 9 
P.3d 1236 (2000)). The issue of whether the district may delegate authority to vacate 
streets was not previously addressed in the motion to dismiss. Id. In response, City 
argues that the Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted the statutory scheme differently. 
City of Sandpoint's Reply in Support of Summary Judgment, p. 7. They further argue 
that the express terms of the Agreement and Memorandum of Understanding, as well 
as the entirety of the Idaho statutory scheme, are issues of law for this court to 
interpret. Id., p. 8. 
City, both of its own authority and sharing in that of IHD pursuant to the 
Agreement, may vacate or abandon district streets. The right of a city to vacate streets 
has been recognized under statutory law. Idaho Code § 40-1323 addresses the powers 
and duties of a city and its city council when included within a highway district. See LC. 
§ 40-1323. The relevant portion of that chapter reads as follows: 
Each incorporated city, or portion of it, within a highway district, shall 
constitute a separate division of the district. The city council of each 
incorporated city within the territory of a highway district, so far as relates 
to their city, shall have the powers and duties as provided by this 
chapter and as provided in chapter 3, title 50, Idaho Code, 
case. 
extend any street, avenue, alley or lane, annul, vacate or discontinue the same 
whenever deemed expedient for the public good .... " LC.§ 50-311 (emphasis added). 
The term "highways" is defined by statute to "[m]ean roads, streets, alleys and bridges . 
. . . " LC.§ 40-109. Thus, the Idaho Legislature has recognized that a city may have 
the authority to vacate streets, including highways. Since cities constitute separate 
divisions of the highway district in which they are included, they still must adhere to any 
statutory requirements for vacation or abandonment. Id. 
The Agreement and Memorandum of Understanding expressly require City to 
adhere to statutory requirements. Under the Memorandum of Understanding, City and 
IHD agreed to the following: 
1. The CITY shall have the right and power to vacate streets and rights-
of-way within CITY limits subject to the provisions of this Agreement 
and Idaho Code. 
2. The CITY shall notify IHD in writing prior to any public hearing regarding 
the vacating of a right-of-way within CITY limits. 
3. If no written objection to the request to vacate is received from !HD within 
thirty (30) days of said notice, the CITY may proceed with such vacation. 
The IHD shall also sign off as need be on any documents relinquishing 
title to the vacated way. 
4. If written objection is received from IHD stating the reasons for the 
objection, the CITY shall deny the request to vacate. 
5. IHD shall defend any claim related to a IHD objection to vacation request. 
6. The CITY shall, at its' sole expense, take all legal steps required by 
law to vacate streets and rights-of-way within CITY limits including 
provisions for all required notices and public hearings. 
Memorandum of Understanding, pp. 1-2 (emphasis added). Thus, City obligated itself 
both contractually and statutorily to comply with the requirements of LC.§ 40-203 
should it choose to abandon or vacate any street. That particular section of the Idaho 
Code does not expressly prohibit City from exercising such power. Rather, the 
reads or whichever 
have jurisdiction of the highway system, use 
abandon and vacate any highway or public right-of-way . . . " § 40-203(1 
(emphasis added). As shown above, through exercise of the Agreement and the 
incorporated Memorandum of Understanding, IHD extended its jurisdictional authority to 
a division of the district that by itself may have already had the authority to vacate 
streets, that being the City of Sandpoint. 
The authority cited by IHD is inapt because it only applies to actions taken by a 
city outside of its boundaries. The defendants cited to Blaha v. Board of Ada County 
Com'rs, 134 Idaho 770, 9 P.3d 1236 (200), for the proposition that a highway district 
could never delegate its authority to vacate streets to a city. That case, however, is 
inapposite to the facts before the Court because it dealt with the exercise of co-equal 
jurisdiction of a separate matter outside the corporate limits of a city. Blaha, 134 Idaho 
at 777, 9 P.3d at 1243. In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that there 
were constitutional limitations because the Court had previously held "[t]hat the power 
of cities and counties only exists within the sovereign boundaries of the cities and the 
counties respectively." Id. (citing Clydes Hess Distributing Co. v. Bonneville County, 69 
Idaho 505,210 P.2d 798; Boise City v. Blaser, 98 Idaho 789, 572 P.2d 892 (1977); 
Hobbs v. Abrams, 104 Idaho 205, 657 P.2d 1073 983)). Thus, if City were exercising 
its authority to abandon or vacate highways outside of its corporate boundaries, there 
would be a very real issue. 
Here, however, there is no accusation or question of fact that City is exercising 
authority outside of its corporate boundaries. Pursuant to the Memorandum of 
Understanding, it is made explicitly apparent that the authority of is limited to its city 
no 
4. The Relief Requested is Not Overly Broad. 
IHD argues City is not entitled to "[a]n order enjoining the District from interfering 
with the City's operation and maintenance of its streets under the Joint Powers 
Agreement." Memorandum in Response to City of Sandpoint's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p. 7. They argue that, excepting the money being withheld from City, there 
are no facts in this case that suggest IHD has interfered with City inside the city limits. 
Id. City responded by asserting that none of IHD's arguments prevent summary 
judgment in this case "[b]ecause the court fashions that remedy, and IHD's claims do 
not defeat the underlying right to the relief." City of Sandpoint's Reply in Support of 
Summary Judgment, p. 9. They state that the Court determines the necessary scope of 
relief, and as such there is no genuine issue for trial. Id. Further, City argues that the 
preliminary injunction in this case needs to be permanent, ensuring that the Agreement 
is complied with. Id. 
Here, there is not an overly broad request for relief. in its Complaint, City 
requested "[a]n order enjoining the District from interference with the City's operation 
and maintenance of its streets pursuant to the Joint Powers Agreement .... " 
Complaint, p. 12. As this Court has already held, the Agreement is a legal and 
enforceable contract. The relief requested by City is only that which the IHD previously 
agreed to under the Agreement, with no additional stipulations. Because IHD 
unilaterally decided to cease complying with the Agreement previously, it is not 
unreasonable to grant relief to City that would prevent the same from happening again 
the future. 
8. City is the Prevailing Party and Might Be Entitled to Attorneys' Fees and 
Costs. 
as 
allowed by law, § 1 21 and I. 54." City of Sandpoinfs Motion Summary 
Judgment, p. 2. In response, IHD argues City "[h]as advanced no argument or authority 
showing that IHD's defense was frivolous. Further, given that a material issue of fact 
prevents entry of judgment in favor of the City, there are no grounds for an award of 
attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121." Memorandum in Response to City of Sandpoint's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 8. In response, City has argued that there was no 
legitimate basis for IHD to cease compliance with the agreements, an action that forced 
City to file suit in order to recover the necessary funds to continue an important public 
service. City of Sandpoint's Reply in Support of Summary Judgment, p. 9. Further, 
they argue IHD has failed to raise any genuine iegai defense as to why payments under 
the Agreement were ceased. Id. 
In this case, an award of attorney's fees is likely appropriate. Idaho Code§ 12-
121 states that "[i]n any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to 
the prevailing party or parties .... " LC.§ 12-121. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
interpreted that section such that "[a]n award of attorney fees under [LC.]§ 12-121 is 
not a matter of right to the prevailing party." Philips v. Blazier-Henry, 154 Idaho 724, 
731, 302 P.3d 349, 356 (2013) (quoting Mi/chalk v. Mi/chalk, 148 Idaho 224, 235, 220 
P.3d 580, 591 (2009)). The Court "permits the award of attorneys fees to the prevailing 
party if the court determines the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation." Id. (quoting Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M. 
Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 218-19, 177 P.3d 955, 965-66 (2008)). Finally, 
the "entire course of the litigation must be taken into account and if there is at least one 
even the 
or 
Mi/chalk, 48 p ). 
under I.C. § 12-121, IHD is correct saying there would need to be a showing that the 
case was defended frivolously. If, at a later time, City persists in requesting fees under 
I.C. § 12-121, the Court will make that analysis. 
However, I.C. § 12-121 might not be the most applicable statute. In 2013, the 
Sixty-First Idaho Legislature adopted Idaho Senate Bill No. 1332, effective March 27, 
2012, revising the language of I.C. § 12-117. Entitled, "Attorney's fees, witness fees, 
and expenses awarded in certain instances", the new language reads: 
In any civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a 
governmental entity and another governmental entity, the court shall 
award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and 
other reasonable expenses. For purposes of this subsection, 
"governmental entity" means any state agency or political subdivision." 
LC.§ 12-117(4). That same Chapter defines "political subdivision" as "[meaning] a city, 
a county, any taxing district, or a health district .... " I.C. § 12-117(5)(b). The Idaho 
Supreme Court has held that "[a] highway district is a "taxing" district" within the 
meaning of I.C. § 12-117." Halvorson v. North Latah County Highway Dist., 151 Idaho 
196,209,254 P.3d 497,510 (2011) (citing LC.§ 63-3101; I.C. § 40-1308). Because 
the City of Sandpoint is a "city" and the Independent Highway district is a "taxing 
district," !.C. § 12-117(4) applies to this case. 
City did not claim fees under I.C. § 12-117(4) in any filings with this Court prior to 
the hearing on the instant motion. At that hearing, the Court inquired of counsel for the 
City why that was the case. 
At this juncture, City's reason is not relevant. The prevailing party is not required 
state with specificity the specific code provision it seeks fees under Rule 
9 
fee see Eighteen 
7 § 
1 17(4), only is whether City was the prevailing There is no in 
the Court's mind that City is in all aspects the prevailing party as compared to IHD. The 
Court so finds City to be the prevailing party in this litigation_ 
Thus, if City requests fees under I.C. § 12-117(4), City is entitled to those fees as 
the prevailing party and the only issue at the time of a motion under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5} 
will be the amount of those fees. Should City request fees only under I.C. § 12-121 
then the Court at that time will address the issue of whether IHD defended this case 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, and, if it concludes that issue in City's 
favor, then at that time the amount of fees will be determined 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER. 
For the reasons stated above, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED plaintiff City's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
GRANTED in all aspects against defendant IHD, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED plaintiff City is the prevailing party in this litigation. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED counsel for plaintiff City shall prepare a judgment 
consistent with this memorandum decision and order, 
Entered this 31st day of July, 2014. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE ST A TE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
CITY OF SANDPOlNT. a municipal 
corporation of the State of Idaho, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV-13-01342 
vs. ORDER GRANTING DECLARATORY 
RELIEF 
12 INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a 
political subdivision of the State of Idaho, 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
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23 
24 
25 
26 
Defendant. 
THIS MATTER came before the Court on City of Sandpaint's Motion for Surnmai·y Judgment 
granting declaratory relief pursuant to I.RC.P. 56, 57, 65 and I.C. §10-1201 et. seq. The court having 
considered the: 
• Plaintiff's Verified Complaint and attachments; 
• The Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
entered December 9, 2013; 
• The Court's Reciprocal Preliminary Injunction Order; 
• City of Sandpoint's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
• Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment; 
• Affidavit of Scot Campbell filed 11/7/13; 
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• Affidavit of Ma1j Tilley~ 
• Second Affidav1t of Marj Tilley; 
• Affidavit of Julie Bishop; 
• City of Sandpoint's Reply in Support of Summary Judgment; 
• and the pleadrngs filed in this matter 
The Cou1t having found; 
1. There is a controversy between the parties that is appropriate for declaratory relief. 
2. 
3. 
There are no genume material issues of fact that are actual and in good faith controverted. 
Based on the reasoning previously stated by the Court, summary judgment in favor of the 
14 City of Sandpoint is appropriate. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
4. It is the Court's abiding conviction that the Independent Highway District's defense of 
this matter was unreasoned and without foundation. 
IT IS NOW THEREFORE ORDERED: 
1. The City of Sandpoint's Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted. 
2. The Memorandum of Understanding of September 14, 2005 between the City of ' 
21 Sandpoint and the Independent Highway District is legal, valid and enforceable. 
The Joint Powers Agreement between the City of Sandpoint and the Independent \ 22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
3. 
Highway District is legal, valid and enforceable. 
4. The Independent Highway District is ordered to comply in all respects wirh its 
obligations set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding and the Joint Powers Agreement 
ORDER GRANTING DECLARATORY 
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1 5. The Independent Highway D1stnct is directed co inciude in its payment of itd vil.i.01cff1 
2 taxes to the City of Sandpoint all truces collected pursuant to I.C. §40-800 et.seq., including withou t 
3 
4 
5 
6 
limitation any collection for delinquent taxes, interest and costs, that are collected as a result of 
Independent Highway District levies on the taxpayers of the City of Sandpoint. 
6. Counsel for the parties shall confer and submit for consideration by the Court the 
7 appropriate Permanent Injunction. 
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7. The City of Sandpoint is awarded its costs as permitted by the rule of rhe Court. 
8. The City of Sandpoint ls awarded its attorney's fees .~ 4i~ J..~~C~- ~'1 tJ...rt'n:~. 
9. The trial date in this matter and all other deadlines are hereby stride.en. ,,. 6 V <-(. u, ... :t ~, 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this 3 l C. +-- day of CL.) l7 , 2014. 
With respect to the issues determine by the ove order, it is hereby CERTIFIED, in accordance 
with I.R.C.P. 54(b), that the Court has determined chat there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a 
final judgment and that the Court has and does herby direct that the above order shall be a final 
judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho 
Appellate Rules. 
.) l sr -DATED this day of ,J 0~ 
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11 Lake 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Telephone: (208) 263-0534 
Facsimile: (208) 1368 
C. MATTHEW At"'J"DERSEN, ISB No. 3581 
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS, 
a Professional Service Corporation 
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 814 
Telephone: (208) 667-2103 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121 
cma@winstoncashatt.com 
Attorneys for City of Sandpoint 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
OF IDAHO, AND FOR COUNTY OF BONNER 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal 
corporation of the State of Idaho, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV-1 1342 
NOTICE OF PRESENTMENT 
14 
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19 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a 
20 political subdivision of the State Idaho, 
(without oral argument) 
21 
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Defendant. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Plaintiff will bring on for presentment, without oral 
argument, its Motion for Award Attorney's Fees and Costs on Wednesday, August 27, 2014, or as 
soon thereafter, before the Honorable John Mitchell. 
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facsimile on __ , to: 
David R. Wynkoop 
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP 
730 N. Main Street 
P.O. Box 31 
Meridian, ID 83680 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
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Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Telephone: (208) 263-0534 
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250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-2103 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121 
cma@winstoncashatt.com 
Attorneys for City of Sandpoint 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal 
corporation of the State of Idaho, 
VS. 
Case No. CV-13-01342 
Plaintiff. 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a 
20 political subdivision of the State of Idaho. 
CITY OF SAiNDPOINT'S MOTION FOR 
AW ARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND 
COSTS 
21 Defendant. 
22 
23 
24 
25 
The City of Sandpoint requests that the Court enter an order and judgment awarding it 
$56,131.75 attorney fees as permitted LC. §12-117 as well as discretionary costs of $775.29 as 
allowed by LR.C.P. 54(d)(l incurred in commencement this action. 
CITY OF SAl~DPOINTS MOTION FOR AWARD OF 
ATTORN'EY'S FEES A.7\fD COSTS 
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I hereby certify that I caused a true and 
complete copy the foregoing to be D mailed, 
postage prepaid; D hand delivered; ~ sent 
facsimile on August 2014, to: 
David R Wynkoop 
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP 
730 N. Main Street 
P.O. Box 31 
Meridian, ID 83680 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
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MATTHEW Al'JDERSEN, ISB 3581 
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS, 
a Professional Service Corporation 
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-2103 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121 
cma@winstoncashatt.com 
Attorneys for City of Sandpoint 
14 
15 
IN DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICL\L DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
FOR COUNTY BONNER 
16 CITY OF SANDPOINT, a .,,~,,,~. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
corporation of the State of Idaho, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a 
political subdivision of the State Idaho, 
1. Relief Requested. 
City of Sandpoint that the 
Case No. CV-13-01342 
CITY OF SANDPOINTS MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES A1'J'D 
COSTS 
enter an order judgment awarding it 
25 $56,131.75 in attorney as permitted LC. §12-117 as well as discretionary costs of $775.29 as 
26 
CITY OF SA.NDPOINTS MEMORANDlTM IN 
SUPPORT OF A TTORl'JEY. S FEES AND COSTS 
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commencement 
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4 
5 
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is the amount s 
the of fees to LC. § 12-1 its for 
pursuant to I. C. § 1 121 as now Further, briefing on the issue entitlement is not necessary. 
As required by I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5), the request 
of Costs as well as supported the Affidavit of C. Matthew Andersen. 
3. Basis for Amount Requested for Award of Attorney Fees. 
The action was commenced the City of Sandpoint' s Attorney, Scot R. Campbell. The City 
12 subsequently engaged Winston & Cashatt to appear in the matter. The City Sandpoint does not 
costs incurred by the 13 request an award of attorney's fees for Mr. Campbell or 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
City of Sandpoint. 
This case has had resolution based on legal principals. There has not been any significant 
discovery beyond the several affidavits filed for the Court·s consideration. Thus, the request for an 
award of attorney's fees consists in the main for the background investigation, significant legal research, 
preparation of filings and argument to the Court. In addition, there has been an LA.R 12(c) request to 
the Supreme Court for appeal by permission, which has been denied. The City of Sandpoint requests its 
fees for responding to the request for permission to appeal both before this Court and before the 
Supreme Court. 
The principal legal matters Court that services were the of the 
Complaint, the response to the IHD · s motion to dismiss, response to the motion for appeal 
26 perrmss1on 
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nature 
determining amount be factors set I.R.C.P. 
applicable to case, are Andersen. 
4. Basis for A ward of Costs. 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l) sets forth recoverable costs. The 
costs requested is $775.29. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). 
of Sandpoint' s recoverable discretionary 
DATED 
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C. MATTHEW ANDERSEN, ISB No. 3581 
WINSTON & CASHATT, LA WYERS, 
a Professional Service Corporation 
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-2103 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121 
cma@winstoncashatt.com 
Attorneys for City of Sandpoint 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
STATE 
CITY OF SAJ~DPOINT, a municipal 
corporation of the State of Idaho, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a 
political subdivision of the State of Idaho, 
Case No. CV-13-01342 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS Al'TD 
AFFIDAVIT OF C. MATTHEW A..NDERSEN 
IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND 
COSTS 
The Court having entered is Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff City 
Sandpoint's Motion for Summary Judgment on July 31, 2014 in the above-entitled action, Plaintiff asks 
that the costs be awarded against Defendant Independent Highway District: 
MEMORANDUM OF COTS AND AFFIDAVIT OF C 
MATTHEW ANDERSEN IN SUPPORT OF 
A TTO&"lEY" S FEES Ail\JD COSTS - PAGE 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
4) Federal Express Charges 
5) Travel Expense to Coeur d'Alene, Idaho for Hearings 
TOTAL COSTS REQUESTED: 
$21.39 
$117.95 
$775.29 
8 The above is a trne bill of costs and disbursements which were necessarily incurred by Plaintiff 
9 in prosecuting this case. To the best of Plaintiffs knowledge and belief the items are correct and the 
10 
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costs claimed are compliance with I.RC.P. 54(d)(5). 
DATED 
ST ATE OF WASHINGTON J 
:ss 
County of Spokane 
Al'\lDERSEN, ISB No. 3581 
& CASHATT, LAWYERS, 
a Professional Corporation 
SCOT R. CAi\,fPBELL. ISB No. 4121 
SANDPOINT CITY ATTORNEY 
Attorneys for City Sandpoint 
I, C. MATTHEW ANDERSEN, being first duly sworn on oath, say: 
1. I am one of the attorneys of record for Plaintiff in this matter. I submit this Affidavit 
support of Plaintiffs request for attorney's fees and costs. The attorneys' fees requested are $56,131.75, 
costs are $77529 for a total 
MEMORANDUM OF COTS AJ'lD AFFIDAVIT OF C 
MATTHEW ANDERSEN IN SUPPORT OF 
ATTORI'\JEY'S FEES AND COSTS - PAGE 2 
of 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Washington providing legal clients in 
My practice 
courts. I have been admitted to practice in the 
litigation matters. My practice 
and appeals federal and state 
courts: Washington State Supreme Court 
8 (October 1976); Federal Court, District of Maryland (May I , United States Supreme Court 
9 (November 1982); U.S. Court Appeals, Ninth Circuit (November 1982): Federal Court of Claims 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
(September 1980); U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington (May 1980); Federal U.S. 
Military Court Appeals (March 1977); Federal v,.r es tern District Washington (December 
1992); U.S. District Court, State Idaho (1987); Idaho State Supreme Court (September 1986); U.S. 
Court of Appeals the Federal ( October 1991 I am a fellow the American College 
15 Lawyers 2006). 
16 3. I have been a principal in the law firm Winston & Cashatt since 1983. Winston & 
17 Cashatt is a of approximately 25 lawyers and has existence since 1972 following the merger 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
of two respected Spokane law The focuses its practice on litigation, with an 
emphasis on complex matters. 
4. My practice is principally focused on commercial and employment litigation. I have 
been retained from to time to represent the interests of public entities. 
5. My partner, Beverly Anderson was first admitted to practice 1984, and has been a 
24 principal at Winston & Cashatt since 1989. Winston & Cashatt offers a unique service to our 
25 
26 I 
Ms. Anderson spearheads our research effort 
conducts or supervises research 
MEMORA.NDUM OF COTS AND AFFIDAVIT OF C 
MATTHEW ANDERSEN IN SUPPORT OF 
A TTORl'{EY' FEES A.~D COSTS - PAGE 
litigation counsel, 
for phases 
4 
5 
6 
numerous cases 
.S. 
state and federal Washington Courts of Appeal, 
7 Appeals, Federal Claims She has also argued cases the Federal Circuit and 
8 the Washington Court Appeals. Ms. Anderson has also been an adjunct professor of legal research 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
representation on identifying and researching !HD legal theories and the law applicable to the motion to 
dismiss and motion for judgment filed this case. Anderson is not admitted to practice 
m state Idaho, but her directed research was done under my supervision. 
6. This case out a Powers Agreement "JPA") executed with Independent 
Plaintiff retained Winston & Cashatt on or about September 2013 to represent its 
I am the principal attorney appearing in the matter. All matters were under my supervision 
REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 
8. In making this affidavit in support of fees, I have considered the effort required to prepare 
this matter for and submission of dispositive motions to resolve the matter short of trial, all in light 
23 of the requirements of Idaho , and after due consideration of the factors in setting a reasonable fee as 
24 set forth I.R.CP. 54( e )(3 ). These factors were considered in my assessment of the appropriateness of 
25 
26 
Based on this review, it is opinion the request is 
are and applicable to request as 
MEMORANDUM OF COTS AND AFFIDAVIT OF C. 
MATTHEW Al'JDERSEN IN SUPPORT OF 
A TTOR:r,..,tY" S FEES AND COSTS - PAGE 4 
In summary, the 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 I Powers Act 
7 -~a .. ,_,-u,,.", set forth in IC 333; as as legal 
8 in positon by the parties operate as legal consideration. 
agreements; that the 
arguments the 
the agreements and changes 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
The arguments by IHD were substantial and required significant legal research to aid the 
court arriving at its order. The necessity of analysis to arrive at a conclusion amply demonstrated 
by the breath of the Court's page order December 13. 
IHD's filings on its LR.CP. l motion presented procedural hurdles to an early appeal. 
The parties attempted to a procedural resolution success. This Court agreed with 
15 request an appeal an appeal. That effort was not 
16 successful. However, while that effort was being pursued, to comply 
it was necessary the of Sandpoint to its motion 
Although the judgment motion relied upon the 
vigorous objection asserting certain matters law should be 
required a more detailed reply. 
The novelty and difficulty of the questions. 
the Court's scheduling order, 
Judgment. 
s earlier ruling, IHD filed a 
as disputed facts. This response 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 issues raised by IHD, and the manner m which they were raised, created a difficult 
24 procedural posture. In essence, the case needed be 
25 
26 
MEMORAl"JDUM OF COTS A.~D AFFIDAVIT OF C 
MATTHEW ANDERSEN IN SUPPORT OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS - PAGE 5 
out on a that was not appealable, but 
are 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
a 
permitted procedures. 
State Supreme and the prospect yet 
& Cassatt's responding to IHD and 
determine. 
d. The prevailin£ charges for like work. 
My current and hourly rate is $375.00 per 
a history of over twenty 
trip matter. 
appeal is for the Court to 
I agreed to charge $325.00 per 
11 hour on this matter as I am representing a public Ms. Anderson has been billed at the rate of 
12 $225.00 per These are commensurate with the skill and of experience necessary to represent 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
The rate is prevailing cases that the level 
work was being performed. 
support, resources for trial preparation, 
travel, expertise and skill trial as are present in this case. Where appropriate, the services other 
lawyers, both principals and associates, at Winston & Cashatt were utilized to minimize the costs to the 
clients. They have been billed at an hourly rate between $195.00 and $350.00 an hour. In my opinion 
19 these rates for legal services are prevailing and competitive m the area. The hourly rates for the 
20 performing on 
21 work. 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
MEMORA.1-~DlJlvI OF COTS AND AFFIDAVIT OF C. 
MATTHEW ANDERSEN IN SUPPORT OF 
FEES COSTS-PAGE 
hourly rates for this type of legal 
7 
8 
9 
A: 
I also directed the use of paralegals and law clerks in this case. Law clerks employed by 
10 Winston & Cashatt are at $95.00 and paralegals at $1 The use of both clerks and 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
paralegals were necessary 
supervised by an attorney; 
services is detailed 
this matter. The services they performed were legal in nature; were 
law clerks and paralegal are qualified to perform the work; the nature 
customary and market rates charged 
decrease the costs to our clients. In 
the 
comparable 
opinion the 
In rates charged are 
area. These services are used to 
clerk and paralegal charged are more than 
17 reasonable and summarized as: 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 case 
! 1 Law Clerk Tyler R. Whitney 
Paralegal 
1 
Cheryl L Krengel 
TOTAL I i 
All of the time worked, the attorneys' 
25 the prevailing party. 
I 26 
MEMOR&T\l'DUM OF COTS AND AFFIDAVIT OF C 
MATTHEW ANDERSEN IN SUPPORT OF 
A TTORt"\fEY' S FEES Ai'l"D COSTS · PAGE 
Hourly Rate Total Hours 
! $95.00 20.5 i 
I $120.00 I 4.4 
i I 
I 24.9 I 
the staff fees and the costs incurred in defending 
and reasonable to obtain the result for Defendants as 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
f 
parties the taxpayers, factor not 
been of significance in the matter. 
g. The amount involved and the results obtained. 
This matter was commenced because IHD ceased making the agreed upon payments. The 
payments annually due to the City of Sandpoint exceed $300,000. This sum is a substantial portion of 
streets. IHD threatened to seek recoupment 
the entire amount paid over the ten (10) years, plus interest. The defense was rejected and summary 
judgment was entered City of Sandpoint. 
h. 
This factor is not applicable. It is respectfully noted that not all firms the area would have the 
resources to pursue the matter on behalf of the City of Sandpoint. 
The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. 
This matter was the first engagement of Winston & Cashatt by the City of Sandpoint. 
J. Awards in similar cases. 
This is known to the Court. 
k. The reasonable cost of automated legal research if the Court finds it was 
reasonably necessary in preparing the parties case. 
Winston & Cashatt regularly and effectively utilizes Westlaw as its principal automated research 
Beverly Anderson, the firm's research partner 
MEMORANDUM OF COTS A..~D AFFIDAVIT OF C. 
MATTHEW ANDERSEN IN SUPPORT OF 
ATTORJ\tY·s FEES At"'l"D COSTS - PAGE 8 
years of experience use 
case 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
working on the case to reduce the costs to Electronic research is critical to the 
for a The use 
electronic research is cost effective. As shown by the briefing filed the Court has 
8 significant legal research in this case. 
The Westlaw charges incurred this case were $586.50. Without benefit of this electronic 
tooL the charges for attorney research time would have been greateL 
9. Time billed on an hourly basis for legal services provided & Cashatt is kept 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
by each individual performing legal services who record their effort with the use of a computer based 
program. The computer program used by Winston & Cashatt is as 
15 alia, for tracking time. Billing the time keeper are 
16 with the service rendered. Bills are produced from the recorded data 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
and the time expanded that effort. The City of Sandpoint was 
remained current on the billings in this case. 
10. A copy of the recorded data for the legal services rendered 
attached as Exhibit . The work performed is identified by the 
and is tailored, 
contemporaneously 
a computer-
performed 
basis and has 
this matter is 
individual performing 
23 the work, the type of work done and the date of the work and the time spent performing work. 
24 
25 
26 
IL Exhibit includes a summary of the requested attorneys' 
amount $56,13L 
case. 
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fees and law 
to defend the 
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I hereby certify that I caused a true and 
complete copy of the foregoing to be D mailed, 
postage prepaid; hand delivered; ~ sent 
via facsimile on August to: 
David R. Wynkoop 
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP 
730 N. Main Street 
P.O. Box 31 
Meridian, ID 83680 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
MEMORAt"l'DUM OF COTS AND AFFIDAVIT OF C. 
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of August, 14. 
Washington 
Residing at_;_--::..~--::..~"--""= 
My appointment expires: ----'--'-'=-+-"--
LAVVTEriS 
PROFESSIONAL SERV!CE CORPORATION 
601 Riverside Suite 900 
Spokane, WA 99201 
(509)838-6131 
E-MAIL ADDRESS: info@winsioncashatt.com 
WEB SITE: www.winstoncashatt.com 
Tax ID. No. 
1""14 4r\A"1".)-..,>"': 
;;;; 1- !V""t l.J>J&'-
City of Sandpoint 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Statement Date: 
ReferTo: 
Invoice No: 
September 30, 2013 
113103-118687 
54664 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION 
Invoice for fees due for legal services performed and for costs advanced are for period of first date through last date shown below. 
Sandpoint Independent Highway District 
Professional Fees 
Date Initials Description 
9/26/2013 BLA Conference with M. Andersen re outline of issues and course of 
pleadings to move for declaratory relief. 
9/27/2013 CMA Work on outline of motion. Phone conference with S.Campbell. 
9/27/2013 BLA Review Complaint for Declaratory Relief. Review correspondence 
re claim that Joint Powers Agreement is invalid. Research re 
unconstitutionality claim. 
9/27/2013 CLK Prepare notice of association. Email to S. Campbell. 
9/30/2013 BLA Research re constitutional basis to object to Joint Powers 
Agreement. 
Hours 
0.60 
1.00 
1.20 
0.30 
1.90 
Sub-total Fees: $ 
Rate Summary 
C. Matthew Andersen 1.00 hours at$ 325 00/hr $ 325.00 
Beverly L. Anderson 3.70 hours at$ 225.00/hr $ 832.50 
Cheryl L. Krengel 0.30 hours at$ 120 00/hr $ 36.00 
Total hours: 5.00 1,193.50 
EXHIBIT 
I 
Amount 
135.00 
325.00 
270.00 
36.00 
427.50 
1,193.50 
Winston & Cashatt lawyers, P.S. 
Tax 1.0. No.: 91-1041332 
$0.00 
September 2013 
Page: 2 
ReferTo: 3103-1 8687 
Invoice No 54664 
Current Invoice A.mount Due (Fees+ Expenses): $ 1,193.50 
Previous lnvoice(s) Balance Due: $ 0.00 
Applicable Interest: $ 0.00 
Total Balance Due {Current & Previous Invoices): $ 1,193.50 
Balance History 
$0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
City of Sandpoint 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
L.,..,.,.,. £RS 
PROFESSIONAL SERV!CE CORPORATION 
601 W. Riverside Suite 1900 
Spokane, WA 99201 
(509) 838-6131 
E-MAIL ADDRESS: info@winstoncashatt.com 
WEB SITE: www.winstoncashatt.com 
Tax LO. No. 
r,4 4 ("IA ,t ...,-:>"1 
:;:;, ! - 1 V"T l Vs..14 
Statement Date: November 12, 2013 
113103-118687 
54665 
ReferTo: 
Invoice No: 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION 
Invoice for fees due for legal services performed and for costs advanced are for period of first date through last date shown below. 
Sandpoint Independent Highway District 
Professional Fees 
Date Initials 
10/4/2013 BLA 
10/7/2013 BLA 
10/8/2013 BLA 
10/9/2013 BLA 
10/11i2013 TRW 
10/14/2013 BLA 
10/16/2013 TRW 
10/16/2013 BLA 
10/16/2013 TRW 
10/17/2013 BLA 
10/18/2013 CMA 
10/22/2013 CMA 
10/23/2013 TRW 
10/23/2013 CMA 
10/25/2013 TRW 
10/28/2013 TRW 
10/28/2013 BLA 
Description 
Research re Joint Powers agreement, constitutionality of contract. 
Review legislative history and other statutes from S. Campbell. 
Research re ownership of city streets by county, types of 
unconstitutional indebtedness of municipality. 
Research re ownership of city streets by city if Highway District 
cedes ownership. 
Research re ownership of city streets, and ability of Highway 
District to return title to City as opposed to County ownership. 
Email to S. Campbell. 
isolate relevant caselaw from Westlaw. 
Review District's brief in support of motion to dismiss. 
Work on directed research re response to motion to dismiss. 
Research re constitutionality of joint powers agreement. 
Worked on reply to motion to dismiss. 
Research re statutory scheme and validity of joint powers 
agreement. 
Work on structure of response brief. . 
Review of filings. Phone conference with S. Campbell. Prepare no 
objection. 
Work on response to motion to dismiss. 
Work on outline of response brief. 
Work on response to motion to dismiss. 
Work on response to motion to dismiss 
Research re constitutionality of apportionment under Joint Powers 
Hours Amount 
220 495.00 
2.20 495.00 
1.40 315.00 
2.60 585.00 
3.10 294.50 
0.80 180.00 
3.50 332.50 
2.30 517.50 
3.20 304.00 
3.80 855.00 
1.00 325.00 
100 325.00 
0.40 38.00 
2.00 650.00 
2.00 190.00 
0.30 0.00 
1.50 337.50 
Winston & Cashatt Lawyers, P.S. 
1.D. 91-1041332 
November 2, 2013 
Page: 2 
10/30/2013 
10/31/2013 
0/31/2013 
CMA Work on response to District's Motion to Dismiss 
CMA Work on form of response brief. 
BLA Research re joint powers agreements and constitutional and 
statutory validity. 
ReferTo: 
Invoice 
5.00 
4.00 
3.30 
Sub-total Fees $ 
Rate Summary 
C. Matthew Andersen 13.00 hours at $ 325.00/hr $ 4.225.00 
Beverly L. Anderson 20.10 hours at $ 225.00/hr $ 4,522.50 
Tyler R. Whitney 0.30 hours at$ 0.00/hr $ 0.00 
Tyler R. Whitney 12.20 hours at $ 95.00/hr $ 1,159.00 
Total hours: 45.60 9,906.50 
03-118687 
54665 
1,625.00 
1,300.00 
742.50 
9,906.50 
Current Invoice Amount Due (Fees+ Expenses): $ 9,906.50 
$0.00 
Previous lnvoice(s) Balance Due: $ 
Applicable Interest: $ 
Total Balance Due (Current & Previous Invoices): $ 
Balance History 
$1,:193.50 $0.00 $0.00 
====== 
1.193.50 
0.00 
11,100.00 
City of Sandpoint 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
PROFESS!ONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 
601 Riverside Suite 900 
Spokane, WA 99201 
(509)838-6131 
E-MAIL ADDRESS: info@winstoncashattcorn 
WEB SITE: www,winstoncashattcorn 
Tax No, 
,,.,, ....... ,.... -04,... .... ,.., 
:::;1-JV"TlJ,:u:,.. 
Statement Date: December 9, 2013 
113103-118687 
55018 
ReferTo: 
Invoice No: 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION 
Invoice for fees due for legal services performed and for costs advanced are for period of first date through last date shown below, 
Sandpoint Independent Highway District 
Professional Fees 
Date 
11/1/2013 
11/1/2013 
11/4/2013 
1/4/2013 
11/5/2013 
11/5/2013 
11/5/2013 
11/6/2013 
11/6/2013 
11/6/2013 
11/6/2013 
1117/2013 
1117/2013 
11/8/2013 
11/8/2013 
11/8/2013 
Initials Description 
TRW Worked on response to motion to dismiss (no charge), 
BLA 
TRW 
BLA 
TRW 
BLA 
CMA 
CLK 
TRW 
BLA 
CMA 
CMA 
BLA 
TRW 
CMA 
BLA 
Research re indebtedness under constitutional prohibitions, 
consideration for joint powers agreements, judicial estoppel, other 
application of joint powers agreements nationwide, 
Worked on response to motion to dismiss, 
Research re duration requirement Work on brief in opposition to 
motion to dismiss, 
Worked on response to motion to dismiss, 
Work on brief in opposition to motion to dismiss. 
Work on brief Meeting with S.Campbell. Draft affidavits of S. 
Campbell and S. Syth. 
Work on stipulation for extension of time. Work on motion for 
extension of time. Phone call with S. Weeks' office, 
Worked on response to motion to dismiss. 
Work on brief in opposition to motion to dismiss. 
Response to Defs Motion to Dismiss. 
Finalize Response to Defs Motion to Dismiss. 
Work on brief in opposition to motion to dismiss. 
Researched standard for conversion to summary judgment (no 
charge). 
Review of motion to strike. Direct preparation of response, 
Message to S. Campbe!L 
Review motion to strike. Conference with M. Andersen re 
response. (no charge). 
Hours 
0.80 
4.80 
1.40 
2.90 
3.40 
2.20 
6.00 
0.80 
3.50 
4.10 
10.00 
5.00 
3.00 
1,00 
1 .00 
0.50 
Amount 
0.00 
i ,080.00 
133.00 
652.50 
323.00 
495.00 
1,950.00 
96.00 
332.50 
922.50 
3,250,00 
1,625.00 
675.00 
0.00 
325.00 
0.00 
Winston & Cashatt lawyers, P.S. 
Tax No .. 91-1041332 
December 9, 2013 
Page: 2 
ReferTo: 
Invoice No: 
11/11/2013 
11/11/2013 
11/11/2013 
11/12/2013 
11/12/2013 
11/13/2013 
11/13/2013 
11/14/2013 
TRW Pulled cases from Westlaw Worked on response to motion to 
strike. (no charge). 
BLA Research re basis for court to exercise discretion to exclude 
declarations submitted in response to 12(b)(6) motion. Final brief 
in opposition to motion to strike. 
CMA Revise response to objection to motion to strike. Message to S. 
Campbell. 
BLA Review reply brief from District. Research re provisions of statute 
regarding District's authorities. 
CMA Prepareforhearing. 
TRW Researched case law. Attended hearing. (no charge). 
CMA Prepare for hearing on motion to dismiss. Prepare and file 
supplemental authorities. Travel. Meet with clients. Attend 
hearing. 
CMA Letter to counsel. Consult with S. Campbell. 
1 00 
0.50 
1.00 
1.10 
4.00 
3.50 
8.00 
1.00 
Sub-total Fees: $ 
C. Matthew Andersen 
Beverly L. Anderson 
Beverly L. Anderson 
Beverly L. Anderson 
Cheryl L. Krengei 
Tyler R. Whitney 
Tyler R. Whitney 
Tota! hours: 
Expenses 
Date 
11/7/2013 
11/8/2013 
11/12/2013 
Description 
Photocopy charges. 
Messenger Service. 
Westlaw. 
Rate Summary 
36.00 hours at$ 325.00/hr 
0.50 hours at $ 0.00/hr 
18.10 hours at$ 225.00/hr 
0.50 hours at$ 250.00/hr 
0.80 hours at$ 120 00/hr 
6.30 hours at$ 0.00/hr 
8.30 hours at$ 95.00/hr 
70.50 
Payments Received Since Previous Invoice: 
Date 
11/15/2013 
Description 
City of Sandpoint 
$ 11.700.00 
$ 0.00 
$ 4,072.50 
$ 125.00 
$ 96.00 
$ 0.00 
$ 788.50 
16,782.00 
Sub-total Expenses: $ 
Amount 
1,193.50 
03-118687 
55018 
0 00 
125.00 
325.00 
247.50 
1,300.00 
0.00 
2,600 00 
325.00 
16,782.00 
Amount 
39.45 
10.00 
105.88 
155.33 
Winston & Cashatt 
Tax 1.0. No. 91-1041332 
1 /?? /?O 1'.i 
$0.00 
P.S. 
Sub-total Payments: $ 
December 9, 2013 
Page: 3 
ReferTo: 
Invoice No: 
9,906.50 
11,100.00 
31 18687 
55018 
Current Invoice Amount Due (Fees+ Expenses): $ 16,937.33 
======= 
Previous !nvoice(s) Balance Due: $ 0.00 
Applicable Interest $ 0.00 
-----
Total Balance Due (Current & Previous Invoices): $ 16,937.33 
Balance History 
$0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
i...Ariv~YEN5 
A PROFESSIONAL SERVJCE CORPORATION 
601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 900 
Spokane, WA 99201 
(509) 838-6131 
E-MAIL ADDRESS: info@winstoncashatt.com 
WEB SITE: www.winstoncashatt.com 
Tax LO. No. 
City of Sandpoint 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint. ID 83864 
Statement Date: 
ReferTo: 
Invoice No: 
January 15, 2014 
113103-118687 
55426 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION 
Invoice for fees due for legal services performed and for costs advanced are for period of first date through last date shown below. 
Sandpoint Independent Highway District 
Professional Fees 
Date 
12/11/2013 
12/11/2013 
12/12/2013 
12/16/2013 
12/16/2013 
12/17/2013 
12/17/2013 
12/18/2013 
Initials Description 
CMA Review of court's order. Phone conference with S. Campbell. 
Letter to counsel re reinstituting payments. 
BLA Review and analyze decision on motion to dismiss. Conference 
with M. Andersen re potential necessity for new motion, or agreed 
order. Phone conference with S. Campbell and M. Andersen. 
CMA File review to as certain status of the need for follow on pleadings. 
BLA Research re basis for Temporary Restraining Order for potential 
motion. 
CMA Begin preparation of injunction hearing. Messages to counsel. 
Phone conference with S. Weeks. 
BLA Review proposed order on preliminary injunction. Phone 
conference with M. Andersen and S. Campbell. (no charge). 
CMA Work on form of an injunction. Numerous phone calls with S. 
Weeks. Phone conference with S. Campbell. 
CMA Finalize form of agreed injunction. Numerous drafts and 
conversations with counsel. Travel and attend hearing. 
Hours 
2.00 
0.80 
0.50 
2.70 
2.50 
0.40 
3.00 
5.00 
Sub-total Fees: $ 
Rate Summary 
C. Matthew Andersen 13.00 hours at$ 325.00/hr $ 4,225.00 
Beverly L Anderson 0.40 hours at$ 0.00/hr $ 0.00 
Beverly L Anderson 3.50 hours at$ 225.00/hr $ 787.50 
Total hours: 16.90 5.012.50 
Amount 
650.00 
162.50 
607.50 
812.50 
0.00 
975.00 
1,625.00 
5,012.50 
Winston & Cashatt Lawyers, P.S. 
Taxl.D.No .. 91-1041332 
Date 
12/16/2013 
Description 
Westlaw. 
January 5, 2014 
Page: 2 
ReferTo: 
Invoice 
Sub-total Expenses: $ 
03-118687 
55426 
Amount 
345.17 
345.17 
------
Payments Received Since Previous Invoice: 
Date 
1/6/2014 
Description 
City of Sandpoint 
$0.00 
Sub-total Payments: $ 
Amount 
16,937.33 
16,937.33 
Current Invoice Amount Due (Fees+ Expenses): $ 5,357.67 
====== 
Previous lnvoice(s) Balance Due: $ 0.00 
Applicable Interest: $ 0.00 
------
Total Balance Due (Current & Previous Invoices): $ 5,357.67 
Balance History 
$0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
L A W y- iI R S 
A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 
601 Riverside Suite 1900 
Spokane, WA 99201 
(509) 838-6131 
E-MAIL ADDRESS: info@winstoncashatt.com 
WEB SITE: www.winstoncashatt.com 
Tax LO. No. 
r..,11 AF, A_.""""'"" 
-:::J 1- !U-"-t- !J,JL. 
City of Sandpoint 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Statement Date: 
ReferTo: 
Invoice No: 
February 10, 2014 
113103-118687 
55763 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION 
Invoice for fees due for legal services performed and for costs advanced are for period of first date through last date shown below. 
Sandpoint Independent Highway District 
Professional Fees 
Date 
1/22/2014 
1/22/2014 
1/23/2014 
1/24/2014 
Initials Description 
CMA Phone conference with S. Weeks. Prepare ADR report. Review 
issues related to certification. Phone conference with S. 
Campbel!. 
BLA Analyze court's order, preliminary injunction, and requested relief 
in the Complaint. Outline potential courses of action to trigger 
appeal, necessity to move for summary judgment. Conference 
with M. Andersen re litigation plan. Phone call with S. Campbell 
and M. Andersen re litigation plan. 
CMA Phone conference with S. Campbell re annexation issues. 
Message to S. Weeks. 
CMA Work on structure of certifcation. Phone conference with S 
Weeks. Message to S. Campbell. 
0.80 
0.50 
1.00 
Sub-total Fees: $ 
C. Matthew Andersen 
Beverly L. Anderson 
Total hours: 
Description 
Rate Summary 
3.00 hours at$ 325.00/hr 
0.80 hours at $ 225.00/hr 
3.80 
Expenses 
Date 
1/3/2014 To C. Matthew Andersen for travel to/from Coeur d'Alene for 
hearing on motion to dismiss on November 13, 2013. 
$ 
$ 
975.00 
180.00 
1,155.00 
Amount 
487.50 
180.00 
162.50 
325.00 
1,155.00 
Amount 
39.55 
Winston & Cashatt Lawyers, P.S. 
Tax No .. 91-1041332 
Payments Received Since Previous Invoice: 
Date 
2/10/2014 
Description 
City of Sandpoint 
ReferTo 
Invoice No: 
Sub-total Expenses: $ 
Sub-total Payments: $ 
Amount 
5,357.67 
5,357.67 
31 8687 
55763 
39.55 
------
Current Invoice Amount Due (Fees+ Expenses): $ 1,194.55 
====== 
Previous lnvoice(s) Balance Due: $ 0.00 
------
Applicable Interest: $ 0.00 
------
Total Balance Due (Current & Previous Invoices): $ 1,194.55 
Balance History 
$0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
City of Sandpoint 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
PROFESS!Ol'JAL SERVICE CORPORATION 
601 Riverside Suite 900 
Spokane, \NA 99201 
(509) 838-6131 
E-MAIL ADDRESS: info@winstoncashatt.com 
WEB SITE: www.winstoncashatt.com 
Taxl.D. No. 
;Qt?":332 
Statement Date: 
ReferTo: 
Invoice No: 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION 
March 6, 2014 
113103-118687 
56168 
Invoice for fees due for legal services performed and for costs advanced are for period of first date through last date shown below. 
Sandpoint Independent Highway District 
Professional Fees 
Date 
2/5/2014 
Initials Description Hours 
2/20/2014 
2/20/2014 
2/21/2014 
2/21/2014 
2/23/2014 
2/25/2014 
CMA Review of Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion to 1.50 
Dismiss. First draft of 54(b) iangauge. Redraft joint report to the 
court. 
CMA \Nork on certification issues. Research. Messages to S. 2.00 
Campbell. Phone conference with S. Campbell. Efforts at reaching 
S. \Neeks. 
BLA Research re language requirements for 54(b) certification in Idaho. 040 
Review proposed language. 
CMA \Nork on issues related to 54(c) cerrification. Phone conference 1.00 
with S. \Neeks. (no charge}. 
BLA Research re propriety of use of judgment on the pleadings 1.60 
stipulation to achieve appealable issue. Review court order, 
pleadings. 
BLA Research re propriety of use of judgment on the pleadings 1.00 
stipulation to achieve appealab!e issue. 
CMA Review case law. Messages to S. \Neeks re result of approach on 1.50 
judgment on the pleadings. Communications with S. Campbell. 
Sub-total Fees: $ 
Rate Summary 
C. Matthew Andersen 
C. Matthew Andersen 
Beverly L. Anderson 
1.00 hours at $ 
5.00 hours at$ 
3.00 hours at$ 
0.00/hr 
325.00/hr 
225.00/hr 
$ 
$ 
$ 
0.00 
1,625.00 
675.00 
Total hours: 9.00 2,300.00 
Amount 
487.50 
650.00 
90.00 
0.00 
360.00 
225.00 
487.50 
2.300.00 
Winston & Cashatt 
Taxl.D.No .. 91-1041332 
P.S. 
Payments Received Since Previous invoice: 
Date 
2/21/2014 
Description 
of Sandpoint 
Sub-totai Payments: $ 
ReferTo: 
Invoice No: 
Amount 
1,194.55 
1,194.55 
March 6, 2014 
Page: 2 
3103-118687 
56168 
Current Invoice Amount Due (Fees+ Expenses): $ 2,300.00 
====== 
Previous lnvoice(s) Balance Due: $ 0.00 
Applicable Interest: $ 0.00 
------
Total Balance Due (Current & Previous Invoices): $ 2,300.00 
Balance History 
.. 31~1) 
$0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
City of Sandpoint 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
A PROFESSIONAL SERViCE CORPORATION 
Riverside Suite 1900 
Spokane, VVA 99201 
(509) 838-6131 
E-MAIL ADDRESS: info@winsloncashattcom 
WEB SITE: www.winstoncashattcom 
Tax No. 
':041332 
Statement Date: 
ReferTo: 
Invoice No: 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION 
April 2, 2014 
113103-118687 
56472 
Invoice for fees due for legal services performed and for costs advanced are for period of first date through last date shown below. 
Sandpoint Independent Highway District 
Professional Fees 
Initials Description Date 
3/3/2014 CLK Prepare proposed order re motion to vacate. Email to counsel. 
Hours 
0.50 
3/5/2014 CMA Prepare response to Auditor's Letter. 
C. Matthew Andersen 
Cheryl L. Krengel 
Expenses 
Date 
3/14/2014 
Total hours: 
Description 
Westlaw. 
Rate Summary 
1.50 hours at$ 325.00/hr 
0.50 hours at$ 120.00/hr 
2.00 
Payments Received Since Previous Invoice: 
Date 
3/21/2014 
Description 
City of Sandpoint 
1.50 
Sub-total Fees: $ 
$ 
$ 
487.50 
60.00 
547.50 
Sub-total Expenses: $ 
Amount 
2,300.00 
Sub-total Payments: $ 2,300.00 
Amount 
60.00 
487.50 
547.50 
Amount 
69.21 
69.21 
------
Winston & Cashatt lawyers, P.S. 2, 2014 
Tax ID. No.: 91-1041332 Page: 2 
ReferTo: 3103-118687 
Invoice No: 56472 
Current Invoice Amount Due {Fees+ Expenses): $ 616.71 
Previous lnvoice(s) Balance Due $ 0.00 
Applicable Interest: $ 0.00 
Total Balance Due (Current & Previous Invoices): $ 616.71 
Balance History 
$0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
City of Sandpoint 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
A PROFESSIONAL SERViCE COAPORAT!CN 
601 Riverside Suite 900 
Spokane, WA 99201 
(509) 838-6131 
E-MAIL ADDRESS: info@winstoncashatl.com 
WEB SITE: www.winstoncashatt.com 
Taxl.D. No. 
Statement Date: 
ReferTo: 
Invoice No: 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION 
June 6, 2014 
113103-118687 
57395 
Invoice for fees due for legal services performed and for costs advanced are for period of first date through last date shown below. 
Sandpoint Independent Highway District 
Professional Fees 
Date Initials Description 
517/2014 CMA Review of motion for interlocutory appeal. Message to S. 
Campbell. 
5/13/2014 CMA Review and begin work on form of response brief to motion for 
interlocutory appeal. Direct research. 
5/13/2014 BLA Review and analyze brief in support of IHD motion for interlocutory 
appeal. Research re requisites for interlocutory appeal. Draft 
response in opposition to motion for interlocutory appeaL 
5/14/2014 CLK Work on response to motion re interlocutory appeal (no charge). 
5/14/2014 BLA Research re denial of interlocutory review based on trial court 
denial of motion, despite trial court certification. Final brief in 
opposition to motion for interlocutory review. 
5/14/2014 CMA Finalize brief to be submitted. 
5/19/2014 BLA Review cases cited in Response Memo for oral argument 
preparation. 
5/19/2014 CMA Review of IHD reply. Formulate response positions at hearing. 
Message to S. Campbell. 
5/21/2014 CMA Prepare for, travel and attend hearing on Motion for Permissive 
Appeal. 
5/23/2014 BLA Phone conference with M. Andersen and S. Campbell re hearing 
results and plan for summary judgment (no charge). 
5/23/2014 CMA Phone conference with S. Campbell. Arrange for hearing date. 
Direct work on motion for summary judgment. (no charge). 
Hours 
1.00 
1.50 
2.80 
1.50 
0.40 
0.80 
2.50 
0.30 
1.00 
Sub-total Fees: $ 
Amount 
325.00 
487.50 
630.00 
0.00 
247.50 
487.50 
90.00 
260.00 
812.50 
67.50 
325.00 
3,732.50 
City of Sandpoint 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 
601 Riverside Suite 900 
Spokane, WA 99201 
(509)838-6131 
E-MAIL ADDRESS: info@winstoncashatt.com 
WEB SITE: www.winstoncashatt.com 
Tax LO. No. 
01 1f'\A1'?:~".) 
Statement Date: 
ReferTo: 
Invoice No: 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION 
July 15, 2014 
113103-118687 
58031 
Invoice for fees due for legal services performed and for costs advanced are for period of first date through last date shown below. 
Sandpoint Independent Highway District 
Professional Fees 
Date Initials Description 
5/30/2014 BLA Review previous pleadings. Draft and edit motion/memorandum in 
support of summary judgment. 
6/2/2014 CMA Edit memo and motion. 
6/2/2014 CLK Work on summary judgment memo. Draft motion. 
6/3/2014 CMA Finalize form of motion and review/insert applicable rules re 
motion. Confer re filing of earlier affidavits with the clerk. 
6/24/2014 CMA Work on issues related to request for discretionary appeaL 
6/24/2014 BLA Review and analyze District's motion and brief for discretionary 
appeal. 
6/25/2014 BLA Research re case law cited in motion for interlocutory appeal. 
Draft response in opposition to motion for discretionary appeal. 
6/25/2014 CMA Work on objection to motion for discretionary appeal. 
6/26/2014 CMA Work on objection to discretionary appeal (no charge). 
6/26/2014 BLA Work on brief in opposition to motion for discretionary appeal. 
6/30/2014 BLA Work on brief in opposition to motion for discretionary appeal. 
Hours 
1.40 
1.00 
0.60 
1.45 
1.00 
0.90 
3.30 
2.00 
L50 
1.40 
4.40 
Sub-total Fees: $ 
Rate Summary 
C. Matthew Andersen 1.50 hours at$ 0.00/hr $ 0.00 
C. Matthew Andersen 5.45 hours at$ 325.00/hr $ 1,771.25 
Beverly L. Anderson 11.40 hours at$ 225.00/hr $ 2,565.00 
L Krengel 0.60 hours at$ 120.00/hr $ 72.00 
Amount 
315.00 
325.00 
72.00 
471.25 
325.00 
202.50 
742.50 
650.00 
0.00 
315.00 
990.00 
4.408.25 
Winston & Cashatt Lawyers, P.S. 
Tax No .. 91-1041332 
Expenses 
Date 
6/16/2014 
Total hours: 
Description 
Westlaw. 
18.95 
ReferTo 
Invoice 
4,408.25 
18687 
58031 
Amount 
66.24 
Sub-total Expenses: $ 66.24 
Payments Received Since Previous Invoice: 
Date 
717/2014 
Description 
City of Sandpoint 
$0.00 
Sub-total Payments: $ 
Amount 
3,771.70 
3,771.70 
Current Invoice Amount Due (Fees+ Expenses): $ 
Previous lnvoice(s) Balance Due: $ 
Applicable Interest: $ 
Total Balance Due (Current & Previous Invoices): $ 
Balance History 
$0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
4,474.49 
====== 
0.00 
0.00 
-----
4,474.49 
City of Sandpoint 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
I, .. ..... 7 
L. ~ ..-w c;; n .;;, 
PROFESS!ONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 
Riverside Avenue, Suite 900 
Spokane, \NA 99201 
(509) 838-6131 
E-MAIL ADDRESS: info@winstoncashatt.com 
WEB SITE: www.winstoncashatt.com 
Taxl.D. No. 
(';A 4f°\A4"'.l".)P) 
.;;; !- IV'"'T !VV4. 
Statement Date: 
ReferTo: 
Invoice No: 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION 
August 11, 2014 
113103-118687 
58512 
Invoice for fees due for legal services performed and for costs advanced are for period of first date through last date shown below. 
Sandpoint Independent Highway District 
Professional Fees 
Date 
7/1/2014 
7/1/2014 
7/2/2014 
7/9/2014 
7/10/2014 
7/10/2014 
7/11/2014 
7/11/2014 
7/14/2014 
7/14/2014 
7/15/2014 
7/21/2014 
7/22/2014 
7/29/2014 
Initials Description 
BLA Final brief in opposition to motion for interlocutory appeal. 
BRB Prepare letter to Idaho Supreme Court/Court of Appeals (no 
charge). 
BLA Final brief in opposition to motion for permissive appeal. Email 
correspondence with S. Campbell and M. Andersen. 
BLA Review and analyze IHD's response in opposition to motion for 
summary judgment for reply. 
CMA \Nork on reply brief re summary judgement. Task map with B. 
Anderson. 
BLA Initial draft reply brief in support of motion for summary judgment. 
BLA \Nork on reply brief in support of summary judgment. 
CMA \Nork on reply brief. Phone conference with S. Campbeli. 
BLA Research re right of City to vacate streets, consideration for 
contract, statutory interpretation on issues of law, attorneys fees 
recovery for frivolous suit. \Nork on reply brief in support of motion 
for summary judgment. 
CMA \Nork on reply re summary judgment. 
BLA Conference with M. Andersen. Conference with S. Campbell. 
\Nork on and final reply brief in support of summary judgment. 
CMA Prepare for hearing on summary judgment. Prepare form of order. 
Message to S. Campbell. 
CMA Prepare, travel, attend hearing re summary judgment and meet 
with counsel. 
CMA Review of order from Supreme Court and determine if fees and 
cost can be awarded at this juncture. 
Hours 
3.00 
0.10 
1.10 
0.90 
1.00 
4.20 
4.00 
1.50 
4.80 
2.00 
1.10 
4.00 
4.00 
0.50 
Amount 
675.00 
0.00 
247.50 
202.50 
325.00 
945.00 
900.00 
487.50 
1,080.00 
650.00 
247.50 
1,300.00 
1,300.00 
162.50 
Winston & Cashatt 
Tax LO. No .. 91-1041332 
P.S. 
C. Matthew Andersen 
Beverly L Anderson 
Beverly R Briggs 
Total hours: 
Description 
Rate Summary 
13.00 hours at$ 325.00/hr 
19.10 hours at$ 225.00/hr 
0.10 hours at$ 0.00/hr 
32.20 
To FEDEX for postal charges on July 2, 2014. 
ReferTo: 
Invoice 
Sub-total Fees: $ 
$ 4,225.00 
$ 4,297.50 
$ 0.00 
8,522.50 
Expenses 
Date 
7/16/2014 
7/22/2014 To C. Matthew Andersen for travel to Coeur d'Alene for hearing on 
Summary Judgment motion July 22, 2014. 
1, 2014 
Page: 2 
8687 
58512 
8,522.50 
Amount 
21.39 
39.20 
Sub-total Expenses: $ 60.59 
Payments Received Since Previous Invoice: 
Date 
8/8/2014 
Description 
City of Sandpoint 
$0.00 
Sub-total Payments: $ 
Amount 
4,474.49 
4,474.49 
Current Invoice Amount Due (Fees+ Expenses): $ 8,583.09 
Previous lnvoice(s) Balance Due: $ 
Applicable Interest: $ 
Total Balance Due (Current & Previous Invoices}: $ 
Balance History 
$0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
====== 
0.00 
0.00 
8,583.09 
LAWYERS 
601 Riverside Suite 
WA 99201 
(l:;nQ) R~R-R1~1 
E-MAIL ADDRESS: info@winstoncashatt.com 
WEB SITE: www.winstoncashatt.com 
Tax I.D. No. 
91-1041332 
of Sandpoint 
1 Lake Street 
Statement Date: 
Refer To: 
August 12, 2014 
113103-118687 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION 
Invoice for fees due for legal services performed and for costs advanced are for period of first date through last date shown below. 
Sandpoint Independent Highway District 
Professional Fees 
Date Description Hours 
8/1/2014 CMA Research and provide guidance on fee application. Message to S. 0.60 
Campbell. 
8/5/2014 CMA Initiate review re fee petition. 050 
8/11/2014 CLK Work on memo in support of fees and costs, memorandum of 2.20 
costs and affidavit of M. Andersen. Draft proposed order. 
8/11/2014 CMA Work on Memo re Costs; Cost Memo and affidavit,; Judgment and 6.00 
Permanent Injunction (Draft). Message to S. Campbell. 
Sub-total Fees: $ 
Rate Summary 
C. Matthew Andersen 
Cheryl L. Krengel 
7 .10 hours at $ 325. 00/hr 
2.20 hours at$ 120.00/hr 
$ 
$ 
2,307.50 
264.00 
Total hours: 9.30 2,571.50 
Amount 
195.00 
162.50 
264.00 
1,950.00 
2,571.50 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
2 8 PM N . 
[ 
I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal 
9 corporation of the State of Idaho, 
Case No. CV-13-01342 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ORDER GRANTING REQUEST FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES Ml]) COSTS 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a 
political subdivision of the State of Idaho, 
Defendant. 
THIS MATTER came before the Court on City of Sandpoint's request for attorney's fees and 
costs permitted by LC. § 12-117 as well as discretionary costs incurred in commencement of the action 
as allowed by lR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). The court having considered the: 
• Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff City of Sandpoint' s Motion 
for Summary Judgment; 
• City of Sandpoint' s Memorandum in Support of Attorney's Fees and Costs; 
• City of Sandpoint's Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit of C. Matthew Andersen in 
Support of Attorney's Fees and Costs; 
• and the pleadings filed in this matter 
The Court having found good cause to grant Plaintiffs request for attorney's fees and costs: 
ORDER GRANTING REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS PAGE l 
W~~Wa,./MU 
A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORAllOM 
~50 Nc,rltt,,r8'!! Blvd., Suits 2il6 
ldaholl38H 
6li7-2100 
r1u g. 21. 20i 4 1: 38PM Mit,'he11, Haynes, cr,edlander, Pete No. 69t6 P. 6/ 7 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
ff IS NOW TttcREFORE ORDERED: 
1. The City of Sandpoint is awarded attorney's fees in the amount of 
I 
$. __ __,Cf--- - and discretionai:y costs in the amount of$ S'- ,' 13 I 1 7 '>-fora total of fee and 
(J 'l',- ~f ' { M 
cost award of$ 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this iv,t-d•yof AolJi//. 2014_ 
Presented by: 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
ORDER GRANTING REQlJEST FOR A ITORNEY' S 
PEES AND COSTS - PAGE 2 •_; 3 '; . , .. 
lt?~~w~ 
A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 
2M Nonflw831. Blvd .. Suha 206 
Coeur d' Alane, Idaho 63814 
p~; {208) 667-2103 
4 C. Manhew Andersen 
Winston & Cashatt 
5 601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1900 
Spokane. WA 9920 l 
6 509-838-1416 (fax) 
7 
Scot R. Campbell 
8 Sandpoint City Attorney 
I 123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
(208) 255-1368 (fax) 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
David E. Wynkoop 
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP 
P.O. Box 31 
Boise, ID 83680 
(208) 887-4865 (fax) 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 664-1684 (fax) 
ORDER GRANTING REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS - PAGE 3 
lv't?lJll#tb r:c/ZJM~ 
A PROFESS!ONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 
250 Nolfmtest Blvd., Sulla 206 
Coow d' Afene. ldllho B3814 
Ph~: 
P, ug. 21. 201 4 1 : 37 PM Mitcrell, Hay nes , cri ed l and er , Pet e 
1 
2 SCOT R. CAMPBELL, ISB No. 4121 
' 
3 SA .. NDPOINT CITY ,ATTORl\YEY 1123 Lake Street 
4 Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Telephone: (208) 263-0534 
5 Facsimile: (208) 255-1368 
scampbell@ci.sandpoint. id.us 
6 
7 C. MATI'HEW ANDERSEN, ISB No. 3581 WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS, 
8 a Professional Service Corporation 
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206 
9 Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
10 
Telephone: (208) 667-2103 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121 
11 cma@winstoncashau.com 
12 Anorneys for City of Sandpoint 
..., -~ ~ ! • 
•· C •" 
N 6"' r r• U L t) • ' 7 . 
,, .. ,. f"\ l 
_:¥J. 4 \ 
P. i/7 
13 
14 
15 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FlRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
16 CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal 
corporation of the State of Idaho, 
17 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV-13-01342 
DECLARATORY AND MONETARY 
JUDGMENT 
18 
19 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a 
20 political subdivision of the State of Idaho, 
[PROPOSED] 
21 Defendant. 
22 JUDGMENT CREDITOR: City of Sandpoint 
Independent Highway District 
C. Matthew Andersen 
23 
24 
25 
26 
JUDGMENT DEBTOR: 
ATTORNEYS FOR JUDGMENT 
CREDITOR: WINSTON & CASHATT LA WYERS 
601 W. Riverside Ave., Suite 1900 
Spokane, WA 99201 
DECLARATORY AND MONETARY JUDGMENT 
PAGE l 
tt7in<lltm~ CfjaJM// 
A ?RCrESS!ONAL SEFIVIOE CORPORATION 
250 Norihv,eat Blvd .• SJ~e ~06 
Coeur d' Alel'18, fdnho 8381-4 
p~; (200) 007-2103 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Mi 
ATTORNEYS FOR JUDGMENT 
DEBTOR: 
JUDGMENT AMOUNT 
ATTORNEY'S FEES Af.tl]) 
COSTS: 
c~~*- 0 f"'n.-v,,,J,=11 
t.J\.,,VL ..1:\..,. '\.....,,C1...u.1puv.u. 
SANDPOINT CITY ATTORNEY 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
David R Wynkoop 
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP 
730 N. Main Street 
P.O. Box 31 
Meridian, ID 83680 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
15 POST JUDGMENT INTEREST: To accrue at the legal rate allowed by Idaho law 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT 
The Court entered its Order Granting Declaratory Relief and its Memorandum Decision and 
Order Granting Plaintiff City of Sandpoint's Motion for Summary Judgment both on July 31, 2014. For 
the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Decision, the Court hereby declares pursuant to I.C. §10-1201 
et. seq., the following rights, status and legal relations between the City of Sandpoint and the 
Independent Highway District: 
L The Memorandum of Understanding of September 14, 2005 between the City of 
Sandpoint and the Independent Highway District is legal. valid and enforceable. 
DECLARATORY AND MONETARY JUDGMENT 
PAGB2 
~?1~11,~~~ 
A !"RdFESS!ONAL SERVICE COFl?OAA'rlON 
200 No1~11Wt Slv<:i.. Sona 206 
C::!em d' Alam,, ldllho 03814 
I 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
y es, r, 1 a e ( 
IS 
3. is ordered to ID respects with its 
obligations set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding and the Joint Powers Agreement and 
Permanent Injunction shall issue with regard to that obligation. 
4. The Independent Highway District is directed to include in its payment of ad valorem 
taxes to the City of Sandpoint all taxes collected pursuant to I.C. §40-800 eL seq., including without 
limitation any collection for delinquent taxes, interest and costs, that are collected as a result of 
Independent Highway District levies on the taxpayers of the City of Sandpoint. 
MONETARY JUDGMENT 
The Court having entered its Order awarding Plaintiffs Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs 
14 on A:;i iyi\J,\ J.-t, t'::l , 2014, and based the Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit of Counsel 
thereon. the Court enters judgment in favor of Plaintiff, City of Sandpoint, and against Defendant) 
Independent Highway District. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 I 
JUDGMENT is entered this date against Plaintiff in favor of Defendant in the amount of 
t 
Q'('-- ""i/ t,{/-; 
$ __ _::,,:.-- for costs and $ (b . I 3 l. 7:(" for attombyi fees for a total judgment of 
$ __ ~<-t;;....,.3~L-1 ........... S:  
Post judgment interest to bear at the legal rate allowed by Idaho law from the date of this 
Judgment until paid in full_ 
DONE JN OPEN COURT thi~day of A:~\,-:: 
DECLARATORY AND MONETARY JUDGMENT 
PAGE3 
, 2014. 
~~/}~~ 
A PflOFESS!ONAL SERI/fee CORPORATION 
250 Nontt11set Blvd,. &;ile 201.'l 
Cosu, d' Aieos, Idaho 83lH4 
(208) &67-2103 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
" L Mi :h~ 1,Hay E:, r, 
I hereby certify that I caused a tme and 
complete copy of the foregoing to be D mailed, 
postage prepaid; D hand delivered; 0 sent 
via facsimile on August 2014, to: 
C. Matthew Andersen 
Winston & Cashatt 
601 W. Riverside A venue, Suite 1900 
Spokane, WA 9920 l 
509-838-1416 (fax) 
Scot R. Campbell 
Sandpoint City Attomey 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
(208) 255-1368 (fax) 
David E. Wynkoop 
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP 
P.O. Box 31 
Boise, ID 83680 
(208) 887-4865 (fax) 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 664-1684 (fax) 
CLERK OF THE CO URI, 
DECLARATORY AND MONETARY JUDGMENT 
PAGE4 
6 
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A PROFESSIONAL SERVICE COR?ORATION 
250 Notthwee ! Blvd~ S.J~e 206 
Coeur d'Alene_ ldoho 83814 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
g, rv~ 
'' 
ay1:, Frie a 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIIE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIB C01J1\1TY OF BONNER 
8 
CI1Y OF SA .. J.~1DP0INT, a municipal 
9 corporation of the State ofidaho, ; 
I Case No_ CV-13-01342 
10 Plaintiff, I I AMENDED ORDER GRANTING REQUEST 
vs. 11 
12 INDEPENDENT IIlGHWAY DISTRICT, a 
political subdivision of the State ofldaho, 
I FOR ATIORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
I 13 
14 
15 
16 
Defendant. I 
THIS MATTER came before the Court on City of Sandpoint's request for attorney's fees and 
17 costs pennitted by I.C. §12-117 as well as discretionary costs incurred in commencement of the action 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 · 
26 
as allowed by I.RC.P. 54(d)(l)(D). The court having considered the: 
• Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff City of Sandpoint's Motion 
for Summary Judgment; 
• City of Sandpoint's Memorandum in Support of Attorney's Fees and Costs; 
• City of Sandpoint's Memorandum of Costs and A:ffida:vit of C. Matthew Andersen in 
Support of Attorney's Fees and Costs; 
• and the pleadings filed in this matter 
The Court having found good cause to grant Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees and costs: 
AMENDED ORDER GRJ\1\;'TlN{t REQUEST FOR 
ATTOR..'NBY' S FEES .Al'H) COSTS - PAGE l 
~~I~ 
A ?ROfESSIOHAl s.a'!Vl::E @RPOAATIOI'< 
200 Nar~ Sh.-a, s.uit9 2oa 
Coeur d' Aliina, li:llmo lll\31-4 
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~ 
. I 
i I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
1. The City of Sandpoint is awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $56,131.75 and 
discretionary costs in the amount of $0 for a total of fee and cost award of $56,131.75. 
DONE IN OPEN COURTthis . ~1,~y of Av , "?t:, 2014. 
\ 
Presented by: 
C. MAITHEW ANDERSEN, ISB No. 3581 
WINSTON & CASHATT 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
AMENDED ORDER GRANTING REQUEST FOR 
ATTORNEY' S FEES Ai.'ID COSTS~ PAGE 2 
?t'~h~ 
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complete copy of the foregoing to be n mailed, 
2 postage prepaid; D hand delivered; ~ sent 
~ via facsimile on August .?,.~2014, to: 
.,, 
4 C. Matthew Andersen 
Winston & Cashatt 
5 601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1900 
Spokane, WA99201 
5 509-838-1416 (fax) 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Scot R. Campbell 
Sandpoint City Attorney 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
(208) 255-1368 (fax) 
11 David E. Wynkoop Sherer & Wynkoop. LLP 
12 P.O. Box31 
Boise, ID 83680 
13 (208) 887~4865 (fax) 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene. ID 83814 
(208) 664-1684 (fax) 
AMENDED ORDER ORAN"iING REQUEST FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES M1D COSTS - PAGE 3 
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I 
1 
2 -SCOTR CAMPBELL, ISBNo. 4121 
S.A-NDPOINT CITY ATIOF~'EY 
1123 Lllke Street 3 
4 Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Telephone: (208) 263-0534 
5 Facsi.tnile: (208) 255-1368 
scampbell@ci.sandpoint.id.us 
6 
7 C. MA TIHEW ANDERSEN. ISB No. 3581 WINSTON & CASHATI, LAWYERS, 
8 a Professional Service Corporation 
250 Northwest Boulevard. Suite 206 
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83814 9 
10 
Telephone: (208) 667~2103 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121 
cmata1winstoncashatt.com 11 
12 Attomeys for City of Sandpoint 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
IN TifE DISTRICT COURT OF TifE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTIUCT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal 
corporation of the State of Idaho, 
vs. 
Case No. CV-13-01342 
Plaintiff. 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT. a 
20 political subdivision of the State of Idaho. 
AMEhlDED DECLARATORY AND 
MONETARY JUDGMENT 
[PROPOSED] 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
JUOOMENT CREDITOR: 
JUOOME:NT DEBTOR: 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
City of Sandpoint 
Independent Highway District 
11s I 
: ' ~- <' ' 
-- -- r_ 
AMENDED DECLARATORY AND 
MON"ETARY JUDGMEN1 
?c'~~~ 
PAGE1 
A ~FESSie*lAt SE~VICE DO'fv'OAATIOf>I 
250 ~th>ll9!lt ew., ~ 200 
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2 
3 
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8 
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11 
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14 
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18 
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20 
21 
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ATT0Ri~~YSFOR1UDGMENT C. Matthew Andersen 
CREDITOR: WINSTON & CASHATT LAWYERS 
601 W. Riverside Ave .• Suite 1900 
Spok~ne, VvA 99201 
and 
Scot R Campbell 
SANDPOINT CITY ATTORNEY 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoiut, Idaho 83 864 
ATTORNEYS FOR JUDGMENT 
DEBTOR: David R Wynkoop 
Sherer & Wynkoop; LLP 
730 N. Main Street 
P.O. Box31 
Meridian, ID 83680 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
JU001vfE:NT AlvIOUNT 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND 
COSTS: $56,131.75 
POST JUDGMENT INTEREST: To accrue at the legal rate allowed by Idaho law 
DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT 
The Court entered its Order Granting Declaratory Relief and its Memorandum Decision and 
Order Granting Plaintiff City of Sandpoint's Motion for Summary Judgment both on July 31, 2014. For 
22 
the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Decision, the Court grants the City of Sandpoint its requested 
23 relief and hereby declares pursuant to I.C. §10-1201 et seq., the following rights, status and legal 
-24 relations between the City of Sandpoint and the Independent Highway District: 
25 
26 
AMENDED DECLARATORY AND 
MON"ETARY JUDG:Mffi',;"T 
PAGE2 
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between 
IS 
The Joint Powers Agreement between the 
District is legal, valid and enforceable. 
of Sandpoint and 
I 
Independent f 
5 
6 
7 
3. The Independent Highway District is ordered to comply m all respects with its 
obligations set forth in Memorandum of Understanding and the Poivers Agreement and 
8 Permanent Injunction shall issue with regard to that obligation.. 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
4. The Independent Highway District is directed to include in its payment of ad valorem 
taxes to the City of Sandpoint all taxes collected pursuant to I.C. §40-800 et. seq .• including without 
limitation any collection for delinquent taxes, interest and costs, that are collected as a result of 
Independent Highway District levies on the taxpayers of the City of Sandpo.int. 
MONETARY JUDGMENT 
The Court having entered its Amended Order av,,arding Plaintiff's Request for Attorney's Fees 
and Costs on August Uf , 2014, based the I.RC.P. 54(eX5) Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit of 
Counsel thereon, the Court enters judgment in favor of Plaintiff, City of Sandpoint, and again.st 
Defendant, Independent Highway District. 
MONETARY JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
L Plaintiff shall recover froru. Defendant in the amount of $0 for costs and $56,131.75 for 
22 attorney's fees for a total monetary judgment of $56, 
23 
24 
25 
26 
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Presented by: 
lO WINSTON & CASHATT, LAW\'"ERS 
11 
12 
13 C. MATIHEW Ai~DERSEN, ISB No. 3581 
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Scot R. Campbell 
Sandpoint City Attorney 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
(208) 255-1368 (fax) 
David E. Wynkoop 
Sherer & Wynkoop, ILP 
P.O. Box31 
Boise, ID 83680 
(208) 887-4865 (fax) 
Susan P. Weeks 
fames, Vernon & Weeks 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 664-1684 (fax) 
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SUSANP. WEEKS 
JAMES, VER~ON & WEEKS, PA 
1626 LINCOLN WAY 
COEUR D-ALENE, IDAHO 83814 
208-667-0683 
FAX 208-664-1684 
LS.B. 4255 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Independent Highway District 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND OF COlJNTY OF BONNER 
CITY SANDPOINT, a municipal 
corporation the State 
Case CV 3-01342 
Plaintiff, 
vs. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, 
a political subdivision of the State of Idaho, 
Defendant. 
COMES Defendant, Independent Highway District, by and through its attorneys 
record, David E. \Vynkoop of Sherer & \Vynkoop, LLP and Susan Weeks of James, Vernon & 
Weeks, P.A. and moves this Court, pursuant to LR.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B) for reconsideration of this 
Court's August 2L 2014 Order Granting Request Costs and this Court's 
Amended Order s 
to such fees and costs. 
2. Defendant Independent Highway District an objection which should be 
considered by the Court. 
This motion is supported by a memorandum and affidavit filed herewith. Oral argument 
is requested. 
DATED this 27th day of August, 
JAMES, VER.~ON & WEEKS, PA 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day of August, 2014, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION upon the following, by the method 
indicated below: 
Scot R. Campbell 
Sandpoint City Attorney 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83 864 
C. Matthew A.ndersen 
WINSTON & CASHATT, LA WYERS 
250 Northwest Boulevard, 206 
Coeur Idaho 83814 
2 
XX via facsimile to 208-255-1368 
X,X via facsimile to 208-7 65-2121 
3 
208-887-4865 
LS.B. 2429 
SUSANP. WEEKS 
JAMES, VER1'l0N & \VEEKS, PA 
1626 LINCOLN WAY 
COEUR D-ALENE, IDAHO 83814 
208-667-0683 
FAX 208-664-1684 
I.S.B. 4255 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Independent Highvvay 
IN DISTRICT COURT OF 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
OF SANDPOINT, a municipal 
corporation State Idaho, 
Plaintiff, 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
COlJNTY OF B01'.1NER 
Case 13-01342 
vs. OBJECTION TO MEMOR/\NDUM OF 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES AND 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
a political subdivision the State Idaho, A TTOR.}..JEY FEES 
Defendant. 
Independent pursuant to and 54e(6) and 
hereby object to the Memorandum Attorney's Fees and Costs requested by City Sandpoint. 
objection is supported by the supporting memorandum filed herein. Oral argument is 
requested. 
AND MOTION TO 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day of August, 2014, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF MARJ TILLEY upon the following, the method 
indicated below: 
Scot R Campbell 
Sandpoint City Attorney 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
C. Matthew Andersen 
WINSTON & CASHATT, LA WYERS 
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206 
Coeur Idaho 83 814 
John T. Mitchell 
Chamber Copy 
XX via facsimile to 208-255-1368 
XX via facsimile to 208-765-2121 
XX via facsimile to 208-446-1132 
OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND A TTOR.i"JEY 
2 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
JAMES, VER.NON & \VEEKS, PA 
1626 LINCOLN \VAY 
COEUR D-ALENE, IDAHO 83814 
208-66 7-0683 
FAX 208-664-1684 
LS.R 4255 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Independent Highway District 
IN DISTRICT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND OF 
OF SANDPOINT, a municipal 
corporation of the State of Idaho, 
COUNTY B01'rNER 
Case No. CV-2013-01342 
Plaintiff, 
vs. AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN P. WEEKS IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, ATTO~~EY FEES 
a political subdivision the State of Idaho, 
Defendant. 
) 
: ss 
County of Kootenai ) 
1. I, Susan Weeks, after first being duly sworn, depose and say: 
AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN P. WEEKS IN SUPPORT OF TO 
as 
3. I been practicing 
September 20, 1990. I am i~ ... u,,,~, 
the First Judicial District. 
on 
the rate attorneys 
4. Attorneys First Judicial District more 15 experience bill 
between $225 an hour to $285 an hour. It has been my experience that the $285 rate 
is reserved for complex litigation. 
5. I recently concluded a matter before the 
representing the opposing party, Eric Stidham 
charged $285 an for complex litigation 
of Appeals wherein the attorney 
Boise branch Holland & Hart, 
issues to federal 
environmental laws (CERCLA and RCRA.) and bankruptcy issues. 
6. I recently concluded a trial on a foreclosure involving non-complex business 
litigation, and the opposing counsel, John Miller, charged $200 per hour. 
7. My billing rate non-complex litigation is $225 an hour. My billing rate for 
complex litigation is $250 an hour. Certain clients are charged less based upon 
the duration their relationship 
repeat business to the 
8. I have contacted four local firms to inquire 
and the fact that 
their 
client brings 
litigation rates. Joel 
Hazel is charging $285 an hour at highest rate. Doug Marfice is billing $250 an 
lS at 
P. IN SUPPORT OF FEE 
Susan P. Weeks 
Notary for the State of Idaho 
Commission Expires: ____;::;:L,L.-~L,L.-~~Z:::...S-c.__ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day of August, 2014, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN P. \VEEKS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION upon the following, by the method indicated below: 
Scot R. Campbell 
Sandpoint City Attorney 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
C. Matthew Andersen 
WINSTON & CASHATT, LA WYERS 
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Hon. John T. MitcheH 
Chamber Copy 
XX via facsimile to 208-255-1368 
XX via facsimile to 208-765-2121 
XX via facsimile to 208-446-113 2 
AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN P. WEEKS fN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO ATTORi""JEY FEE 
REQUEST: 3 
208-887-4800 
FAX 208-887-4865 
LS.B. 2429 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
JAMES, VERi~ON & WEEKS, PA 
1626 LINCOLN WAY 
COEUR D-ALENK IDAHO 83814 
208-667-0683 
FAX 208-664-1684 
LS.B. 4255 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Independent Highway District 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal 
corporation of the State 
Plaintiff, 
THE COlJNTY OF B01'.'NER 
Case No. CV-2013-01342 
vs. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM OF 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES AND 
a political subdivision of the State ofldaho, MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND 
A TTORL~EY FEES 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff filed a Memorandum Costs and of Support 
Attorney's Fees and Costs on August 13, 2014. Seven days later, on August 21, 2014, prior to 
the expiration of time for Defendant to object to such costs and attorney fees, the Court entered 
Order Granting Requests for Fees and awarding no attorney and 
131.75in costs. 22, 1 an 
3 
STANDARD 
district court's decision to award attorney fees is a decision, subject to the 
abuse of discretion standard ofreview. Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744, 753, 86 P.3d 458, 467 
(2004). In determining whether a party prevailed entirely or partially, a court must consider three 
things: "(a) the final judgment or result obtained in the action in relation to the relief sought the 
respective parties; (b) whether there were multiple claims or issues between the parties; and the 
extent to which each of the parties prevailed on each of the issues or claims." Chadderdon v. King, 
104 Idaho 406, 411, 659 P .2d 160, 165 (1983); Jerry J Joseph CL U Ins. 
117 Idaho 555,557,789P.2d1146, I 148 (Ct.App. 1990). 
ARGUMENT 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e )( 1) provides that a trial court 
v. Vaught, 
mvard reasonable 
attorney fees to a prevailing party in a civil action where a statute or contract provide for such 
relief. Whether a party has prevailed is determined by the trial court in the exercise of its 
discretion by considering "the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief 
sought by the respective parties." The Court previously determined that Plaintiff prevailed in 
this action. 
The Rule also specifies the factors the trial court must consider determining the 
reasonableness of an award of attorney fees: 
Amount of Attorney Fees. In the event the court grants attorney fees to a 
party or parties in a civil action it shall consider the following factors in 
determining the amount of such fees: 
The time and labor required. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM 
AND TO COSTS 
or vVJ.UUii",'-,H 
The time limitations imposed 
circumstances of the case. 
(G) The amount involved and the results 
(H) The undesirability of the case. 
The nature and length of the professional relationship 
with the client. 
(J) A wards in similar cases. 
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research 
(Computer Assisted Legal Research), if the court finds it 
was reasonably necessary preparing a party's case. 
Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in 
the particular case. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3). 
In determining whether a party prevailed entirely or partially, a court must consider three 
the final judgment or result obtained the action relation to relief sought by the 
respective parties; whether there were multiple claims or issues between the parties; and the 
extent to which each of the parties prevailed on each of the issues or claims." Chadderdon v. King, 
104 Idaho 406,411,659 P.2d 160, 165 (1983); T J. CL. Assoc .. Inc. v. Vaught, 
117 Idaho 555,557,789 P.2d 1146, I 148 (Ct.App. 1990). 
1. Entitlement to Attornev Fees 
City of Sandpoint requested attorney fees under § 12-120. At hearing on the 
judgment, Court inquired into why of Sandpoint was not 
requesting attorney fees under LC.§ 12-117. In its Memorandum of Costs, the City requested 
attorney fees under § 12-117. In relevant part, Idaho Code § 12-117 provides: 
( 4) In any civil judicial proceeding as adverse parties a 
governmental entity and another governmental entity, the court shall award 
prevailing party attorney's other reasonable 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
FEES DISALLOW FEES: 3 
means state 
was 
to represent its interest. According to of Matthew Andersen, firm was 
retained September 2013 to represent the Sandpoint. billing 
City's counsel support of its request contains 
provided by the City's attorneys and paralegals 
14. 
time entries describing the services 
September 201 and August 11, 
On September 30, 2013, C. Matthew- Andersen filed a notice of appearance and notice 
association. On October 22, 2013, City's counsel filed a non-objection to the District's request 
for additional time to file a brief in support of a motion to dismiss. On November 7, 201 City's 
counsel filed a response to District's motion to dismiss. On November 2013, City filed two 
affidavits related to Motion to Dismiss, which this struck. On November 13, 2013, 
City filed a supplemental citation to authority, and a response to District's motion to strike. The 
Court conducted a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss on November 13, 13. On December 18, 
2013, the City and District stipulated to entry of a reciprocal preliminary injunction. On March 
3, 2014, the City and District filed a stipulated motion to vacate the trial. On May 14, 2014, the 
City filed a response to the District's motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal. The City 
attended a hearing on the interlocutory appeal on May 21, 2014. The City filed an opposition 
with the Supreme Court to the request to grant an interlocutory appeal. On May 27, 2014, the 
City moved for summary judgment, notice of hearing and memorandum support of summary 
judgment. on pleadings filed in 
response to the motion for summary judgment. On 15, a brief 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
FEES COSTS AND 4 
4 
an costs 
costs. 
case, were two parties, no exchange discovery (because 
case mainly legal, rather than factual, issues). no use expert witnesses, no trial 
preparation and no trial. This case ··--··---. presented pure questions of law and simply involved 
an exchange of dispositive motions on these legal issues. This case did not transcend the 
boundaries an attorney's abilities. Despite the limited litigation necessary to conclude 
case. the 
performed by & Cashatt and discretionary costs $775.29. 
Criterion Rule to consider prevailing charges for 
work." The Idaho Supreme Court stated Lettunich v. 141 Idaho 425,435, 111 
P.3d 110, 120 (2005) that the trial court "should consider the fee rates generally prevailing in the 
pertinent geographic area, rather than what any particular segment of the community may 
charging." The District respectfully asserts that the costs and fees claimed by Plaintiff are 
excessive and should be reduced. First, hourly rates charged by Plaintiffs counsel are not 
accordance with prevailing rate 
paralegal work is $120. Another person, Tyler 
rate of $95.00 per hour. 
rate 
. Mr. Andersen's claimed hourly rate 
rate is $225. Cheryl KrengeI's hourly rate for 
, identified as a law was billed at a 
skills and as Mr. 
and 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
AND ATTORNEY FEES: 5 ATTORNEY FEES MOTION 
IS 
resources 
trial. Because this case was determined on dispositive motions 
without discovery, this argument lacks merit. legal cases require the attorney be 
skilled. this case was not complex and did not require extraordinary commitments by 
Winston & Cashatt. 
In Samuel v. Black Rock Development, Inc., et al., Kootenai County Case No. CV 2012-
4492, in an opinion issued March 18, 2013, this Court found Robert A. Dunn's hourly rate of 
$400.00 per hour to be unreasonable; a rate of $275.00 per hour for an attorney licensed five 
years unreasonable; a fee $225.00 per hour for an attorney licensed seven years unreasonable, 
and a rate $220.00 per an years unreasonable. The Court also 
found paralegal fees of $95.00 per hour and $110.00 per hour unreasonable. This Court adjusted 
the fees doivnward by 33%. like Samuel, District submits the rates billed in this case were not 
reasonable. 
Further, the time committed to the matter was not reasonable. Mr. Andersen indicates in 
his affidavit he has extensive experience in civil litigation, and Ms. Andersen has extensive 
expenence legal research and VvTiting all kinds. Given this experience and background, and 
that research and writing is a routine task for these attorneys, the time dedicated to these tasks is 
not reasonable. The District moved to dismiss. The City prepared a response. The billing 
records indicate that the City spent 36. 7 hours dedicated to research related to its response. 
Another 57 1 hours was spent response brief, response brief, and 
accounts 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES AND 6 
2 
unreasonable. 
preliminary injunction. 
7.8 to to dismiss be 
under Rule Although not as excessive as spent on the response brief, these hours 
remain high for such limited legal tasks. 
Counsel for the billed 1 7 hours to oppose the motion for leave to file a permissive 
appeal, which includes the time to attend 
memorandum to the Idaho Supreme Court, 
court. 33.8 
was expended to prepare a 
covered the same arguments raised to the 
appeal. Again, this 
of is not reasonable given the task. 
On the motion for summary judgment, which largely incorporated the previous briefing 
of the parties, the City's counsel expended 32.95 hours. This time inciuded appearance at the 
hearing. Once again, especially in light of the 118.9 hours expended on the motion to dismiss, 
these hours are not reasonable. 
unrelated charge the District should not be charged is 1.5 for preparation an 
"auditor's letter" on March 5, 2014. Presumably this was a letter to the auditor regarding 
the annual audit It was unrelated to the litigation. 
Given the litigation, the fees sought are excessive. The City participated in three 
and an appeal. There was no 
MEMORANDUM IN TO MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
7 
a 
costs 
costs. gives a 
court power to costs when costs were necessary exceptional costs 
and which, the interest justice, should be awarded. The City seeks 
charges, claiming they were does not 
why the costs were exceptionaL of the discretionary costs submitted by the City are 
normal costs associated litigation. Nothing about them are exceptional. Therefore, the 
should decline to award these costs. 
DATED day 2014. 
Scot R. Campbell 
Sandpoint City Attorney 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83 864 
C. Matthew Andersen 
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS 
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 814 
Hon. John Mitchell 
Chamber Copy 
xx 
xx 
xx 
a true correct 
facsimile to 208-255-1368 
facsimile to 208-765-2121 
facsimile to 208-446-1132 
2014 1:55 2085545741 
DAVIDE. WYNKOOP 
SHERER & WYNKOOP, 
730 N. MAIN ST. 
P.0.BOX31 
MERIDIAN, IDAHO 83680 
208-8874800 
FAX 208-887-4865 
I.S.B.2429 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, PA 
1626 LINCOLN WAY 
COEUR D-ALENE, IDAHO 83814 
208-.667--0683 
FAX 208-664-1684 
LS.B.4255 
Attorneys fur Defendant 
Independent Highway District 
JAMES VERN 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIB FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STAIB OF IDAHO, IN AN""D OF THE COUNIY OF BONNER 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal corporation ) 
of the State ofidaho, ) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a 
political subdivision of the State of Idaho, 
Defendmt. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
CountyofBonner ) 
) 
) 
) 
} 
} 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV 2013-01342 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
BRENT FEATHERSTON 
BRENT FEA !HERSTON, being first duly sworn deposes and states: 
1. J make the following statements of my own personal knovrledge. 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRENT FEATHERSTON: 1 
PAGE 01/03 
08/ . 55 20865457!!1 JAMES 
Iaman 
September 
3. I prootke the First Judicial District and I am fmr.iliar with the local morney 
~te for attorneys in both Kootenai County and Bonner County fur municipal litigation, civil 
litiga:d.014 com.merci.al litiga:ti~ contract claims and oonsti.tutional issues. 
4. My cun-ent billing rate is $2:50 per hour, although I bill some clients less. 
5. A rate of $325.00 per hour for an attorney in the First Judicial District 'With a 
similar background and expe.!:iznce as mine is above the market ntte. 
DATED this _2'/ day of August, 2014. 
SUBSCRJBED AND SWORN TO before me this c:28: day of August, 2014. 
AFF.IDA V1T OF BRB.NT FEATHERSTON: 2 
PAGE 02/03 
4 : 56 20866467" JAMES VERN 
I HEREBY CERH¥Y that on this c:28 -f~ of August, 20i4, I served a ttue and 
oorrect copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF MARJ filLEY upon the following, by the 
method indicated below: 
Scot R. Campbell 
Sandpoh:rt City Attorney 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
C. Matthew Andersen 
WINSTON & CASHATT, LA WYERS 
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206 
Coeur d·Atene, Idaho 83814 
Hon. John T, Mitchell 
Chamber Copy 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRENT FEATHE'.RSTON': 3 
XX via facsimile to 208-255~ 1368 
XX via facsimile to 208~765-2121 
XX via facsimile to 208~446-1132 
PAGE 03/03 
83680 
Telephone: (208) 887-4800 
Facsimile: (208) 887-4865 
ISB 2429 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814 
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684 
ISB No. 4255 
Attorneys for Defendant Independent Highway District 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHDO, IN AND FOR THE COlJ'NTY OF BONNER 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal 
corporation of the State of Idaho, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a 
political subdivision of the State of Idaho, 
CASE NO. CV-2013-01342 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
FILING CATEGORY: L4 
FILING FEE: $129.00 
(Exempt I.C. § 67-2301) 
Hon. John Mitchell presiding 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF, CITY OF SANDPOINT, AND THE 
PARTIES' ATTORNEYS, SCOT CAMPBELL C. MATTHEW ANDERSEN, AND THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, Independent Highway District, appeal against the 
Sandpoint, the August 21, 2014 
1 
4 
and to Rule 11 ), 
Idaho Appellate Rules. 
3. preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants then 
to assert the appeal; provided, such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the 
Appellants from asserting other issues on appeal: 
(a) Did the District Court err granting summary judgment to Plaintiff on the 
grounds enunciated therein? 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. The Appellant has request no preparation of any portion of any reporter's transcript: 
6. The Appellants request the following records from the Clerk's records pursuant to 
I.A.R. 27(b). 
08/16/2013 
09/09/2013 
09/20/2013 
10/11/2013 
11/07/2013 
11/07/2013 
11/07/2013 
11/08/2013 
11/12/2013 
11/13/2013 
11/13/2013 
12/09/2013 
12/18/2013 
8/2013 
Complaint and Request for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 
Motion to Dismiss 
Defendant's Motion for Enlargement of Time to File Brief 
Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
Affidavit of Scot R. Campbell 
Affidavit of Shannon Syth 
Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs Response Brief and Affidavits 
Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Citation to Authority 
Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Strike Response Brief and 
Affidavits 
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
Stipulation for Reciprocal Preliminary Injunction 
Reciprocal Preliminary Order 
2 
14 
06/12/2014 
07/08/2014 
07/08/2014 
07/08/2014 
07/08/2014 
07/15/2014 
07/29/2014 
07/31/2014 
07/31/2014 
08/13/2014 
08/13/2014 
08/13/2014 
08/13/2014 
08/21/2014 
08/21/2014 
08/22/2014 
08/22/2014 
08/28/2014 
City of Sandpoint's Support 
Order Granting Rule 12 Interlocutory Appeal Certification 
Affidavit of Marj 
Second Affidavit of Marj Tilley 
Affidavit of Julie Bishop 
Memorandum in Response to City of Sandpoint's Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
City of Sandpoint's Reply in Support of Summary Judgment 
Order Denying Motion for Appeal by Permission 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff City of Sandpoint's 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Order Granting Declaratory Relief 
Notice of Presentment (without oral argument) 
City of Sandpoint's Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs 
City of Sandpoint's Memorandum in Support of Attorney's Fees anc Costs 
Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit of C. Matthew Andersen in Support of 
Attorney's Fees and Costs 
Order Granting Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs 
Declaratory and Monetary Judgment 
Amended Order Granting Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs 
Amended Declaratory and Monetary Judgment 
Affidavit of Brent Featherston 
7. Exhibits: There are no exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court. 
8. I certify: 
(a) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated 
fees for preparation of the reporter's transcript and clerk's record. 
( c) The appellate filing fee has been paid. 
( d) Service has been made upon all the parties required to be served pursuant 
Susan P. Weeks 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4TH day of September, 2014, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing upon the following, by the method indicated below: 
C. Matthew Anderson 
Winston & Cashatt 
250 Northwest Blvd., Ste 206 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Scot R. Campbell 
Sandpoint City Attorney 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
APPEAL: 4 
XX via facsimile to 208-765-2121 
XX via facsimile to 208-255-1368 
2082651447 @rda,.cor +·12082651447 
R. 
"'.> I SANDPOINT 
,;, 1123 Lake Street 
4 Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
I Telephone: (208) 263-0534 5 Facsimile: (208) 255-1368 
6 
7 C. MATTHEW ANDERSEN, ISB No. 3581 
WINSTON & CASHATT, LA WYERS, 
a a Professional Service Corporation 
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206 
9 Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-2103 
10 Facsimile: (208) 765-2121 
11 I £!lli!.~115.!Q~!!fil.!j£Qm 
12 Attorneys for City of Sandpoint 
13 
14 
15 
IN THE DISTRICT COtJRT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
16 CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal 
corporation of the State of Idaho, 
17 
18 
19 
VS. 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a 
20 political subdivision of the State of Idaho, 
21 
22 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. CV-13-01342 
REQUEST FOR ADDIDONAL RECORD 
23 TO: THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLAt""'IT AND THE PARTY'S ATTORJ.'IBY 
24 AND: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT 
25 
26 REQUEST FOR ADDIDONAL RECORD 
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~~~rtadatt 
A ?'OOrESSIONA!. SE!'MCE CCIR?ORATION 
250 ~Blvd .. Sull9 2fl6 
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Pl'looe· (21)8J 667-21CG 
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4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
2DB265!447@rcfa:,: . .::or: Fa:-:: +12082651447 4 
addition to that required to included additional 
to be provided in electronic format pursuant to I.AR. 27(b): 
I I Register Date Description 
/ 9/20/2013 ' Notice of Hearing re: Defendant's Motion for Enlargement 
I of Time to File Brief 
12/3/2013 Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and Initial Pretrial I 
Order 
I 6/12/2014 
i 
Motion for Appeal by Permission and Stay of Proceedings 
I 6123/2014 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Appeal by 
I i Permission 
7/9/2014 City of Sandpoint' s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion I for Appeal by Permission 
8/27/2014 Motion for Reconsideration 
8/27/2014 
1 
Objection to Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees and 
Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees 
8/27/2014 J Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Opposition to Motion 
1 Attorney Fees I 
8/27/2014 Memorandum in Support of Objection to Memorandum of I 
Costs and Attorney Fees and Motion to Disallow Costs and I Attome Fees 
19/4/2014 
y 
/ Notice of Appeal 
I certify that a copy of this request for additional record has been served upon the clerk of the 
district court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
26 REQUEST FOR ADDITTONAL RECORD 
PAGE2 
~~el}~ 
A?RO~StlWICE COR?ORATION 
200  Blvd, Sui18 2D!l 
Coaurd' Alene" !daho014 
!"holle: {200) 657-2103 
is 
I 
I 
'2 I 
., ! 
4 
5 
8 
9 
I 
To: 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and 
10 complete copy of the foregoing to be lX] mailed, 
postage prepaid; D hand delivered; D sent 
11 via facsimile on September 18 , 2014, to: 
12 
David R. Wynkoop 
13 Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP 
730 N. Main Street 
14 P.O. Box 31 
15 
Meridian, ID 83680 
16 Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. 
17 1626 Lincoln Way 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Bonner County District Court 
Attn: Civil Clerk 
215 S. First Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
23 'I+----=-__/;.~~~......::!:~:::::::::::::...~ 
24 
25 
26 REQUEST FOR ADDITTONAL RECORD 
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C. TIHEW k'IDERSEN, ISB No. 3581 
WIN TON & CASHATT, LA WYERS, 
a Professional Service Corporation 
SCOT R. CAMPBELL, ISB No. 4121 
SANDPOINT CITY ATTORNEY 
Attorneys for Respondent City of Sandpoint 
~~~Wada# 
A PROFESSIONAL SERViCE OORPORATU)N 
250 ~ Bli;d.,, S!lllB 200 
Coeur d' Alsnei. !lklho 83814 
1"11cn!!; (20B) 667-2103 
,.., 
! 
IS 
cc: 
TO 
Matthew Anderson 
Winston & Cashatt 
Northwest Blvd., Ste 
83814 
Scot R. Campbell 
Sandpoint City Attorney 
1 123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
a 
BE 
In h n eme ou 
... 
CITY OF ANDPO T, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
V. 
...) 
---
INDEPE DENT HTGHWA Y DI TR.JCT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
.} 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
0 t 
~ 
. ' 
a o 
ORDER. GRANTING EXTENSJON OF 
TIME TO OBTAIN A FINAL 
JUDG 
upreme Court Docket No. 251 -201 4 
Bonner Co ty No. 2013- l 342 
Ref. o. 14483 
An ORDER CO DmO ALLY DISM1SSING APPEAL was e ered by this Court 
eptember 22 2014 for the reason a final judgment had not been entered y the District Court. A 
RESPO SE TO CO DITIONAL DISMl AL AND REQUEST APPEAL BE RETAINED was 
filed by counsel for Appellant October 1 • 2014. Therefore, 
IT HEREBY ORDERED that Appellants request that this appea] be retained i 
GRANTED. Appellant shall obtain a final judgment on or before ovem r JO 201 or this 
appeaJ may be dismissedt:' 
DA TED this _1_ day of November 2014. 
cc: Counsel o Record 
District Court Clerk 
District CoW1 Judge 
ORDER ·. o. 42517-2014 
y Order of the Supreme Court 
' 
From: 20ll4461132@rcfax .coli Fa1': +12084461132 
'age 2 of 11107120'14 3:02 
11 
I R 
3 I SANDPOINT 
1123 Lake Street 
4 Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 I Telephone: (208) 263-0534 
5 Facsimile: (208) 255-1368 
scampbell@ci.sandpoint.id.us 
6 
7 C. MATTHEW A.1~DERSEN, ISB No. 3581 WINSTON & CASHATT, LA WYERS, 
8 a Professional Service Corporation 
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206 
9 Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-2103 
lO Facsimile: (208) 765-2121 
11 cma@winstoncashatt.com 
12 Attorneys for City of Sandpoint 
13 
14 
15 
16 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF IBE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDA.HO, IN Ar"\1D FOR IBE COUNTY OF BOl\TNER 
CITY OF SAr~DPOINT, a municipal 
corporation of the State ofidaho, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV-13-01342 
SECOND AMENDED DECLARATORY AND 
MON'ET ARY JlJDGl\,fENT 
17 
18 
19 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a 
20 political subdivision of the State ofidaho, 
[PROPOSED] 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
JlJDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
JlJOOME1'1T CREDITOR: 
JUOOMENT DEBTOR: 
City of Sandpoint 
Independent Highway District 
SECOJ\JD Alv1ENvED DEC..."LARATORY AJ\lv 
MOJ:\1ETARY JUDG1vllil\.1T 
PAGEl 
?#!4tdh-l'tllfa:JM.tt 
APROfESS!O!'lAl SERVICE OORf''OHAT'.Of,I 
250 linr!hme! Blvd~ S1!i18 200 
Oo;im d' Aten&, Idaho 831H4 
~: (ZOB} 001·2103 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 I 
14 
l;Fax: (509) 202-4304 
A TIORNEYS FOR JUDGMENT 
DEBTOR: 
15 JUIXI1v1EN'T AMOUNT 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND 
16 COSTS: 
17 POST JtJDGMENT INTEREST: 
2084461132@rcfa)[.C0!1 Fa)[: +12084461132 
and 
Scot R. Campbell 
SANDPOINT CITY ATTOR.t,TEY 
1123 Lake Street 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
David R. Wynkoop 
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP 
730 N. Main Street 
P.O. Box31 
Meridian, ID 83680 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
$56,131.75 
age ol 5 i 110712014 
To accrue at the legal rate allowed by Idaho lav,i 
18 DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT 
The Court grants the City of Sandpoint its requested relief and hereby declares pursuant to LC. 
20 
I §10-1201 et seq., the foHowing rights, status and legal relations between the City of Sandpoint and the 
19 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Independent Highway District: 
1. The Memorandum of Understanding of September 14, 2005 between the City of 
Sandpoint and the Independent Highway Distdct is legal, valid and enforceable. 
SECOND A!v1El\TDED DECLA.c~TORY Ai"\iu 
MOl\TETARY JUDG:MEJ\.1T 
PAGE2 
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A PROFESSIONAL Sffi'ef!GE ClJRPOAATIOl'f 
250 Nor!n'lleet Bi'ro~ S'llite 206 
Coi<ur d'Alene. kllll!oil3&l4 
Phone: (20!!} 657-2103 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
LiFax: (609) 202-4304 To: 20844S1132@rda:,u::oo Fax: +12084461132 .g!I 5 1110712014 
is legal, 
3. The Independent Highway District is ordered to comply all respects with 
and other obligations set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding and the Joint Powers Agreement. 
4. 
5. 
A Permanent Uliunction shall issue with regard to that obligation. 
The Independent Highway District is directed to include in its payment of ad valorem 
8 taxes to the City of Sandpoint all taxes collected pursuant to LC. §40-800 et seq., including without 
9 
10 
11 
12 
limitation any collection for past, present or future delinquent taxes, interest and costs, that are collected 
as a result of Independent Highway District levies on the taxpayers of the City of Sandpoint. 
MONETARY JUDGMENT 
13
1 The Court enters judgment in favor of Plaintiff, City of Sandpo.int, and against Defendant, 
14 Independent Higlnvay District. 
15 MON'ETARY IDDGME:NTIS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
1. Plaintiff shall recover from Defendant in the amount of $0 for costs and $56,131.75 for 
attorney's fees for a total monetary judgment of $56,131.75. 
2. Post judgment interest to bear at the legal rate allowed by Idaho law from the date of this 
Judgment until paid in fuU. 
~'\l- \ I DONE IN OPEN COURT this \,v day of_"-'{l,._,,_,Jb=-"'-\!£,=<"'::l.=·i.1,_'¥'_,,__ _ , 2014. 
SECOND j1JvlEJ,,1DED t ,r.- ,! ,!-'," ,._ 
MOl'-l'ETARY JUDGlvillNT 
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HOJ'jORAB\E JOHN T. MITCHELL 
f \ 
l \ 
\ \ 
·, \ 
"'~ I 
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A ?ROFESS!ONAl S9'VfGE OORPOAATJON 
2:50 ~1~m1et Bi11d. ~ 200 
Coi;m d' Alena, lm!l!o83814 
~: 120!:lj 651-2103 
II 
2 II 
31 
41 
{509} 202,4304 To: 20S44S1132@rcfax.con 
5 
/ C. MAITHEW 
6 Attorneys for Plaintiff 
7 
8 
9 
10 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and 
complete copy of the foregoing to be mailed, 
postage prepaid; D hand delivered; sent 
via facsimile on November , 2014, to: 
C. Matthew Andersen 
11 Winston & Cashatt 
12 601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1900 Spokane, WA 99201 
13 509-838-1416(fax) 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Scot R. Campbell 
Sandpoint City Attorney 
1123 Lake Stree1 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
(208) 255-1368 (fax) 
David E. Wynkoop 
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP 
P.O. Box31 
Boise, ID 83680 
(208) 887-4865 (fax) 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 664-1684 (fax) 
SECOND AMENDED DECLARATORY ANTI 
MO}lETAR Y JlJDGlvlEl'l'T 
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A PROFESBlONAL SERVlCE CORPORATION 
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Co!itn d' Al!m;;, !<ll!ho 83!H4 
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11 
3 11 SANDPOINT 
1123 Lake Street 
4 Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Telephone: (208) 263-0534 
5 Facsimile: (208) 255-1368 
scampbell@ci.sandpoint.id.us 
6 
7 C. MATTIIE\:V ANDERSEN, ISB No. 3581 \:VINSTON &CASHATT, LAWYERS, 
8 a Professional Service Corporation 
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206 
9 Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-2103 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121 
cma@winstoncashatt.com 
10 
11 
12 Attorneys for City of Sandpoint 
13 
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16 
17 
18 
19 
IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
OF IDAHO, IN Al\TD FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal 
corporation of the State ofldaho, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CV-13-01342 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
[PROPOSED] 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTR1CT, a 
20 political subdivision of the State of Idaho, 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
DECLARATORY AND MONETARY JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
The Court grants the City of Sandpoint its requested relief and hereby declares pursuant to LC. 
§10-1201 et. seq., the following rights, status and legal relations between the City of Sandpoint and the 
Independent Highway District: 
FINAL JUDGMEI'\:11' 
PAGEl 
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A Pf!OFESSlONAl SERVICE CORPOAATlON 
250 Northweet Blvd, Suite 200 
Coi!m d' Afene, ldMO a31H4 
!'hon11: !200} e67 -210~ 
5 
6 
l,F ax: (50S) 202-4304 20844S1132@rcfax.con Fax: +12084461132 age 4 
and 
enforceable. 
3. The Independent High\vay District is ordered to comply in all respects with monetary 
7 
and other obligations set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding and the Joint Powers Agreement. 
8 
9 
11 
12 
13 
14 
4. 
5. 
A Permanent I:q_junction shall issue with regard to that obligation. 
The Independent Highway District is directed to include in its payment of ad valorern 
taxes to the City of Sandpoint all taxes collected pursuant to LC. §40-800 et. seq., including without 
limitation any collection for past, present or future delinquent taxes, interest and costs, that are collected 
as a result of Independent Highway District levies on the taxpayers ofthe City of Sandpoint. 
6. Plaintiff shall recover from Defendant in the amount of $0 for costs and $56,131.75 for 
15 attorney's fees for a total monetary judgment of $56,131.75. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
7. Post judgment interest to bear at the legal rate allowed by Idaho law from the date of this 
Judgment until paid in full. 
DONEINOPENCOURTthis J.2vAdayof tJ~~ 
FINAL JlJDG:tvJE\.'T 
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A PROFESSIONAL SSW!GE CORPORATION 
250 1«)11h'H&e! Eht<I, Suite 200 
~ui d' Afemi, Idaho 838!4 
~; (208) 007-2103 
2084451132@,cfax.con Fax: +i20844Sl132 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
C. MATTHEW A1'\JDERSEN, ISB No. 3581 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and 
complete copy of the foregoing to be mailed, 
postage prepaid; D hand delivered; sent 
10 
via facsimile on November 2014, to: 
i , C. Matthevi.1 Andersen 
-.1. 
Winston & Cashatt 
12 601 \\7. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1900 
Spokane, WA 99201 
13 I 509-838-1416 (fax) 
14 Scot R. Campbell 
15 Sandpoint City Attorney 
1123 Lake Street 
16 Sandpoint, ID 83864 
(208) 255-1368 (fax) 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
David E. Wynkoop 
Sherer & Wynkoop, ILP 
P.O. Box 31 
Boise, ID 83680 
(208) 887-4865 (fax) 
Susan P. \\i eeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 664-1684 (fax) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, Il'l AND FOR THB COUNTY OF BONNER 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, a municipal 
9 corporation of the State of Idaho, 
Case No. CV-13-01342 
10 
11 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ORDER DENYING MOTION TO ALTER OR 
AMEND ruDGMENT 
12· INDEPENDENT IIlGHW AY DISTRICT, a 
political subdivision of the State of Idaho, 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Defendant. 
THIS MATTER came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. 
The court having considered the: 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
• Defendant' s Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend 
Judgment~ 
• Defendant's Amended Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment; 
• City of Sandpoint's Response to Defendant' s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment; 
• Declaration of C. Matthew Andersen; 
• Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment; 
• and the pleadings filed in this matter 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO ALTER OR. 
AMEND JUDGMENT 3 8 8 
~~"'1rf'tUAalt 
A PROFESSIONAL SEHVICE CORPORATION 
250 Nonhwaa1 BMi. Slui!l 21111 PAGE i t:;oeLll d'Alene. Idaho 83814 
f'tQla; (i!IBI 11117-ZUB 
I 
J 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
f') 
,L 
is 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this lQ!day of Arv':) l 
Presented by: 
C. MATTI W ANDERSEN. ISB No. 3581 
12 WlNSTO & CASHATT 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
2.6 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
ORDBR DENYING MOTION TO ALTER OR 
AMEND JUDGMENT 
PAGB2 
Hi;02: 14 
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1 I hereby certify that I caused a true an~ 
complete copy of the foregoing to be @ mailed, 
2 postage prepaid; D hand!.Jlivered; ffisent 
3 via facsimile on April ') LS; ' • 2015, to: 
4 C. Matthew Andersen 
Winston & Cashatt 
5 601 W. Riverside Avenue, Suite 1900 
Spokane, WA 9920 l 
6 509-838-1416 (fax) 
7 R. Scot Campbell 
8 Sandpoint City Attorney 
1123 Lake Street 
9 Sandpoint. ID 83864 
10 
· (208) 255-1368 (fax) 
11 David B. Wynkoop 
Sherer & Wynkoop. LLP 
12 P.O. Box 31 
Boise, ID 83680 
13 (208) 887-4865 (fax) 
14 SusanP. Weeks 
15 James, Vernon & Weeks 
1626 Lincoln Way 
coeuf'd'Alene, ID 83814 
(208) 664-1684 (fax) 
16 
17 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO ALTER OR 
AMEND JUDGMENT 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
vs. ) 
) 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, ) 
) 
) 
Defendant- Appellant. ) 
SUPREME COURT NO. 42517-2014 
BONNER COUNTY CV2013-1342 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner, do certify that the foregoing Record in this 
cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct and complete 
Record of the pleadings and documents requested by Appellant Rule 28. 
IN WITNES~ WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
said Court this J:f 0day of:J;nne, 2015. 
Clerk's Certificate 1 
MICHAEL W. ROSEDALE 
Clerk of the District Court 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
vs. ) 
) 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, ) 
) 
) 
Defendant- Appellant. ) 
SUPREME COURT NO. 42517-2014 
BONNER COUNTY CV2013-1342 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, Michael R. Rosedale, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner, do hereby certify that the following is 
offered as the Clerk's exhibit on appeal: 
NONE 
IN WITNESS ,WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
/j?v"tl 
said Court this ,;:1c?r day of JJ.H:1e, 2015. 
Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits 1 
MICHAEL R. ROSEDALE 
Clerk of the District Court 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
CITY OF SANDPOINT, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
vs. ) 
) 
INDEPENDENT HIGHWAY DISTRICT, ) 
) 
) 
Defendant- Appellant. ) 
SUPREME COURT NO. 42517-2014 
BONNER COUNTY CV2013-1342 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Michael R. Rosedale, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State 
of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner, do hereby certify that I have personally served 
or mailed, by United Parcel Service, one copy of the CLERK'S RECORD to each of the 
Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
MR. SCOT R. CAMPBELL 
1123 LAKE STREET 
SANDPOINT, ID 83864 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
MS. SUSAN P. WEEKS 
1626 LINCOLN WAY 
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83814 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
IN WITNES§4WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
said Court this .;rt day 2015. 
MICHAEL R. ROSEDALE 
Clerk's Certificate of Service 1 
